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This thesis argues that the pursuit of dwelling has become a key imperative 
for life in the spaces of contemporary literary fiction. Heidegger characterised 
dwelling as a form of life-building stemming from attachment to, and immersion in, a 
particular environment. This project explores dwelling in what Lauren Berlant has 
called the continually ‘overwhelming’ present of late modernity, in contexts where 
subjects navigate the persistent threat of existential dereliction or homelessness posed 
by historical trauma, loss or cultural alienation in an ongoing process once described 
by Heidegger as the ‘plight of dwelling’. 
Extending what Tim Ingold has subsequently called the ‘dwelling 
perspective’ into the field of novel theory, the thesis develops current research into 
the ‘persistence of dwelling’ in the novel form (Farred and López) through 
comparative study of novels by Zadie Smith, Tom McCarthy and Don DeLillo. It 
examines dwelling as an embodied mode of navigating and living within a world of 
diverse afflictions, attachments and involvements in these writers’ works, to show 
how the relations between human, non-human and narrative elements build the 
lifeworlds of contemporary fiction. 
The thesis examines Zadie Smith’s London fiction to show how modes of 
dwelling are cultivated through encounters between subjects and the narrative 
elements that shape their social environments, with a particular focus on mood, 
ethical attunement, empathy, worldliness and cosmopolitanism. Tom McCarthy’s 
Remainder is explored to demonstrate that the novel orients around the possibility 
that technological destruction will engender new modes of dwelling and retrieve a 
‘proper’ relation to the technology of writing. Don DeLillo’s later fiction, especially 
The Body Artist, is discussed to show that, in this work, dwelling is always a 
negotiation between the meaningful gathering of memory, the non-human and the 
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human in the focal points of narrative, and the loss, trauma and dispersion that make 
meaning possible. 
By conceptualising new uses for Heidegger’s work in literary criticism, the 
thesis offers a framework for thinking the condition of being in the contemporary that 
parts ways with humanist and poststructuralist ethical criticism. It also extends 
criticism on trauma and the contemporary novel, and demonstrates the renewed 
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In her article ‘Aesthetics and the New Ethics: Theorizing the Novel in the Twenty-
First Century’, Dorothy Hale makes an important claim about the ethical and political 
foundations of the novel’s aesthetic dimensions: 
This is the ethico-political basis of novelistic aesthetics. The representation of 
character in the novel is never free of the threat of instrumentality, either from 
the subjective source of narration or from an objectification posed by literary 
design. Fictional characters are produced as ‘human’ precisely by the 
perceived limitation from both sources that novelistic form places on their 
autonomy. Fictional characters can be felt to be no different from real human 
beings to the degree that their functional positionality seems like a restriction 
of their subjective potentiality, a limit to the full freedom that they have the 
right to enjoy beyond their representation by and in a novel.1 
The value of Hale’s statement for this thesis lies in the way it positions the question 
of the ‘human’ as the locus and foundation of novelistic creation. This view 
understands the novel form to be in a double bind, where its promise of mimetic 
representation creates a reader for whom narrative artistry itself is an imposition and 
limitation on the ‘human’ it produces. The understanding of the novel as a form that 
succeeds through its representation of otherness, which emerges in part from the 
recent history of ethical criticism, also provides an important background for critics 
and novelists who now respond to and adapt these concerns in the twenty-first 
century.  
If this quotation suggests that novels should regulate the colonising force of 
readerly identification, it also suggests a desire for a form that might free characters 
by reflexively negotiating the restrictive tendencies of narration on novelistic 
                                                 
1 Dorothy J. Hale, ‘Aesthetics and the New Ethics: Theorizing the Novel in the Twenty-First 
Century’, PMLA, 124.3 (2009), 896–905 (p. 903). 
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subjects. It points towards an enduring critical and popular investment in the novel as 
a space which revolves around the accommodation, inhabitation, belonging, and 
dwelling, of human life; a view, ascribed by Hale to general novel readers, cultural 
critics, new ethical theories of the novel, and creative writing pedagogy, which has 
wide reaching implications for our relationship with the novel form.2  
Judith Butler, one of the key figures of the ethical criticism that Hale 
discusses in this article, reflects on these concerns about the carceral dimensions of 
form in her 2011 work Frames of War: ‘The “being” of life’, Butler argues, ‘is itself 
constituted through selective means; as a result, we cannot refer to this “being” 
outside of the operations of power, and we must make more precise the specific 
mechanisms of power through which life is produced’.3 Butler theorises the capacity 
for literature to cultivate awareness of indissoluble human attachment to others that 
exist outside the normative frames of social recognition, calling us into an ethics of 
originary non-violence. This argument, which reflects the understanding of form as 
an encroachment on freedom mentioned by Hale, imagines literary forms as spaces 
for encounters that function in opposition to the violence of news media that frames 
distant others as less than ‘life’ and so as ungrievable. As such, Butler’s argument is 
underpinned by an investment in literary forms which allow subjects to break the 
frames that these structures impose, even whilst this framing proliferates through the 
process of breaking from its own context: ‘The frame, in this sense, permits —even 
requires — this breaking out’.4 
Butler’s new ethicist tying of literature into an ethics of non-violence 
continues the tendency to locate ethical value in the encounter between reader and 
textual other. As Rosalyn Diprose has observed, Butler’s focus on the 
interdependence of human actors risks overlooking human attachments to lived 
                                                 
2 Hale, ‘New Ethics’, pp. 903-904. 
3 Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (London: Verso, 2010), p. 2. 
4 Butler, Frames, p. 11. 
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environments and non-human entities. To address this problem, Diprose turns to 
Heidegger’s notion of human existence as ‘dwelling’, rather than ‘life’, to 
demonstrate how vulnerability to destruction caused by environmental disasters and 
totalising politics might elude Butlerian ethics of non-violence.5 Whilst my approach 
to the issue of dwelling is different to that proposed by Diprose, I take as instructive 
her suggestion that the freedom of human actors — real or fictional — rests on their 
indissoluble attachment, or what I will provisionally call their binding, to an 
environing world of human and non-human entities. 
This thesis is underpinned, indeed motivated by, an interest in particular 
dimensions of these issues: firstly, the ways in which novelists are currently 
responding to, and exploring, the status of the novel form as an unfolding of 
‘dwelling’; and, secondly, how Heidegger’s interpretation of dwelling as the ‘basic 
character of human being’ (BDT, p. 146) can serve to expand critical understandings 
of ‘life’ as it appears in the contemporary novel. My thesis approaches these issues by 
examining particular aesthetic and formal dimensions of the novel, attending to the 
way that they shape possibilities of dwelling in fiction by Zadie Smith, Tom 
McCarthy and Don DeLillo. By connecting key aesthetic and formal dimensions of 
the novel — its diffuse moods and atmospheres, its status as a technology of writing, 
and its basic narrative nature — with theoretical discussions of these issues as they 
relate to human dwelling, I seek to develop new insights into dwelling as a problem 
that is generative for contemporary literary fiction. By tracing the way that these 
novelists interpret, mobilise and exploit their implied duty to accommodate human 
life in their work, the thesis positions the contemporary novel as a form which 
                                                 
5 Rosalyn Diprose, ‘Corporeal Interdependence: From Vulnerability to Dwelling in Ethical 
Community’, SubStance, 42.3 (2013), 185–204 (p. 190) 
<https://doi.org/10.1353/sub.2013.0035>. This move to broaden the view of human 
attachment beyond human interdependence is also evident in the work of Lauren Berlant, 
whose notion of ‘cruel optimism’ foregrounds political attachments to possibilities for life 




continues to find creative currency in its perceived obligation to accommodate human 
life. 
In its focus on the theoretical question of dwelling in the novel form, the 
thesis departs from recent discussions of dwelling in literary criticism which have 
productively drawn out issues of dwelling as a persistent human longing for home 
that is also irreducibly political. Amongst critics who have raised the question of 
dwelling in literature from a political standpoint, Herman Rapaport suggests that 
dwelling is, in part, a question of sovereignty and settlement. For Rapaport, ‘the word 
“settlement” implies a decided intention to dwell somewhere permanently, usually 
arrived at by a group’.6 Rapaport argues, furthermore, that in Heidegger is it essential 
to be settled for a period of time in order to dwell: ‘Nomads for Heidegger, from what 
we can deduce, are merely an arbitrary population with no essential vicinity, since 
vicinity implies the establishment of a permanent infrastructure, such as the Roman 
aqueducts or Greek temples’.7  
From a different perspective, reading W.G. Sebald’s Rings of Saturn, Sinha 
Roy argues that, in modernity, ‘everyday practices of dwelling have come to inhere in 
the act of wandering, so much so that movement (both literal as well as figurative)—
not fixation or localization—has, to a formidable extent, come to underlie Being’.8 
For Roy, ‘the provenance of dwelling can be traced to the primordial desire of man to 
wander—to discover anew a common ground for existence in nature’.9 As this recent 
criticism demonstrates, the persistent search for dwelling in a globalised world is both 
political and inseparable from global histories of dispossession and exile.  
                                                 
6 Rapaport, Herman, ‘Fantasies of Settlement: Heidegger, Tocqueville, Fichte, Faulkner’, 
MFS Modern Fiction Studies, 63.1 (2017), 9–28 (p. 9) 
<https://doi.org/10.1353/mfs.2017.0002>. 
7 Rapaport, p. 15. 
8 Satarupa Sinha Roy, ‘Wandering to Dwell: Heidegger and the Phenomenology of Dwelling 
in Sebald’s The Rings of Saturn’, MFS Modern Fiction Studies, 63.1 (2017), 29–49 (p. 30) 
<https://doi.org/10.1353/mfs.2017.0003>. 
9 Roy, pp. 41-42.  
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The approach taken in this thesis is more provisional and concerned with the 
aesthetic and formal dimensions of dwelling in the novel. Whilst I aim to retain a 
focus on the human contexts of the fiction discussed here, I am more concerned with 
connecting these issues to the experimental aspects of contemporary fiction than with 
addressing how novels treat the character of dwelling in current national, regional 
and global contexts.  
Many of the perspectives brought to bear on issues addressed in these 
chapters emerge from Heidegger’s writings directly, from writers in the fields of 
anthropology and philosophy that address issues related to his work, and from the 
three authors whose novels form the focus of this study. It is through their synthesis 
that I intend to generate new theoretical insights that characterise a distinctive 
relationship and approach to the novel form. By means of an inroad into these 
discussions, and to further introduce the theoretical orientation of this thesis, I return 
to the long passage from Dorothy Hale quoted above, and to the question of the 
relevance of Heidegger’s claim that ‘human being consists in dwelling’ (BDT, p. 147) 
to the contemporary novel. The theoretical orientation of the thesis means that I 
intend not only to employ the insights of Heidegger’s writings on dwelling to open 
new readings of the novels under discussion, but also, in the totality of these 
discussions, to “cash out” on theoretical and conceptual insights that broadly emerge 
from, and can be attributed to, this approach. 
Theories of ethical binding and dwelling as binding 
Perhaps the most interesting thing about Hale’s formulation is that the author 
arrives at it through analyses of the experience of reading, as theorised by critics 
writing on the ethical value of literature. As a number of commentators have 
recognised, two broadly oppositional poles have emerged in recent decades from the 
wide range of arguments about ethical reading. The first of these schools of thought, 
associated with Martha Nussbaum’s influential proposal of the novel as a from that 
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cultivates ‘love’ for the other, proposes the ethical value of empathy, care and 
identification in the process of reading.10 The other pole of ethical criticism, broadly 
associated with poststructuralist thought, has sought to foreground the important 
ethical value of encountering alterity as alterity — otherwise describable as the felt 
experience of otherness.11 Dorothy Hale has likewise observed the continuities 
between these two camps, arguing that ‘the ethical value of literature lies in the felt 
encounter with alterity that it brings to the reader’, for ‘the poststructuralist ethicists’ 
and liberal humanists alike.12 Summing up the insights of these two ‘camps’, what 
Hale collectively terms the ‘new ethics’, about which I will have more to say below, 
the author writes that ‘the new ethics helps us to recognise novelistic aesthetics as 
inherently politicized by showing how the novel form positions the reader as “free” 
through the experience of being socially bound’.13  
Whilst this experience of freedom unfolds through the reader’s care for 
fictional characters, the true ethical value of novel reading, however, emerges only 
with the reader’s recognition of the limit of this identificatory binding. At the point of 
recognition of the other’s irreducible alterity, the reader experiences unfreedom equal 
to the freedom of the other ‘who, in turn, now binds her’.14 The reader’s ‘private, 
emotional’ encounter with ‘the lives represented by a novel and with the literary text 
itself as a life’ constitutes a model ethical relationship between readerly self and life 
in the novel, which affords both parties a socially mediated freedom ‘that is not 
                                                 
10 See Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge. 
11 For a history of ethical criticism of the novel, see Andrew Gibson, Postmodernity, Ethics, 
and the Novel (London: Routledge, 1999); on the Levinasian roots of ethical criticism see 
Robert Eaglestone, Ethical Criticism: Reading after Levinas (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1997); on the text as otherness, see Derek Attridge, The Singularity of 
Literature, New edn (New York: Routledge, 2017); on the ‘turn’ to literature in moral 
philosophy, and the ‘turn’ to ethics in literature, see Michael Eskin, ‘Introduction: The Double 
“Turn” to Ethics and Literature?’, Poetics Today, 25 (2004), 557–72 
<https://doi.org/10.1215/03335372-25-4-557>; on the role of deconstruction in ethical 
thought, see Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, 3rd edn 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014).  
12 Hale, ‘New Ethics’, p. 899.  
13 Hale, ‘New Ethics’, p. 902. 
14 Hale, ‘New Ethics’, p. 902. 
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simply compensatory for social positionality but outside systematic discipline’.15 As 
such in the ‘new ethics’ that Hale theorises here, ‘reading produces not false ideology 
but a true experience of how possibility is produced in and through the operation of 
social constraint’.16 
Where lies the connection between Heidegger’s claim that ‘human being 
consists in dwelling’ (BDT, p. 147) and a conception of ethics as freedom through 
binding, as ‘a true experience of how possibility is produced in and through the 
operation of social constraint’?17 I will suggest, here, that Heidegger’s thought and 
the new ethical theory Hale describes share a proto-ethical investment in the freeing 
of life through certain configurations of boundedness and movements of binding. 
Whilst Hale locates this freedom in the constitution of an ethical relationship between 
reader and life in the novel that liberates both parties from ‘systematic discipline’ and 
‘the threat of instrumentality’, Heidegger’s formulation of human being as dwelling 
envisages a form of entanglement (or binding together) of the human being and the 
world they inhabit which frees both human and non-human entities into their 
‘essential being’ (BDT, p. 148). 
Two brief examples will demonstrate that a play between binding into the 
world and freeing of the world is brought into productive tension in Heidegger’s 
thought. Firstly, in the essay ‘The Thing’, Heidegger describes our mortal dwelling in 
the fourfold gathering of earth, sky, divinities and mortals: ‘The appropriative 
mirroring sets each of the four free into its own, but it binds these free ones into the 
simplicity of their essential being toward one another’ (T, p. 179). Elsewhere, and in 
ways highly significant for this thesis, Heidegger turns to expositions of artworks in 
order to reveal the particular entanglement of human being and world which unfolds 
in dwelling. As Paul Harrison observes with regard to Van Gogh’s painting ‘A Pair of 
                                                 
15 Hale, ‘New Ethics’, p. 903. 
16 Hale, ‘New Ethics’, p. 903. 
17 Hale, ‘New Ethics’, p. 903. 
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Shoes’, discussed by Heidegger in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, ‘dwelling names 
the binding and the manner of this binding of such shoes and world’.18 
Approaching this issue from the perspective of Heidegger’s writings on 
dwelling, however, risks overlooking the ambivalent role that such being bound into 
the world has in Heidegger’s earlier work. In The Essence of Human Freedom, 
published from a lecture course delivered in the summer of 1930, Heidegger is keen 
to observe limits on human freedom that binding to beings entails. Here Heidegger 
argues that ‘the understanding of being, has the character of letting-standing-over-
against as something given’ when we acknowledge the ‘binding character’ of beings: 
[T]he manifestness of beings in the binding character of their so- and that- 
being, is only possible where the comportment to beings, whether in 
theoretical or practical knowledge, already acknowledges this binding 
character. But the latter amounts to an originary self-binding. (EHF, p. 207) 
The originary self-binding that Heidegger describes here is the limit of our freedom, 
because the practical knowledge that this binding produces gives over to practical and 
theoretical knowledge, and so to a conception of freedom as ‘practical’, where 
‘freedom as autonomy is self-responsibility’ created by the self’s binding into a world 
of objects (EHF, p. 207). 
The task of philosophy, as conceived in this text, is to recall this constitutive 
freedom which a relation to Being, and entities in the world as standing-over-against 
us, betrays. In this sense Heidegger suggests that philosophy should realise a more 
                                                 
18 It is uncertain which painting is being discussed by Heidegger, as he mentions only ‘a well-
known painting by Van Gogh, who painted such shoes several times’ (OWA, p. 32). This 
ambiguity itself fed into a controversy over Heidegger’s purported (mis)interpretation of Van 
Gogh’s work, led by the art critic Meyer Schapiro and centring on both the identity of the 
work and Heidegger’s suggestion that the shoes in the painting are ‘peasant shoes’ (OWA, p. 
33). Shapiro notes that Van Gogh painted the works in Paris in 1886-87. Paul Harrison, ‘The 
Space between Us: Opening Remarks on the Concept of Dwelling’, Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space, 25.4 (2007), 625–47 (p. 628) 
<https://doi.org/10.1068/d365t>; Meyer Schapiro, ‘The Still Life as a Personal Object - A 
Note on Heidegger and van Gogh’, in The Reach of Mind: Essays in Memory of Kurt 
Goldstein, ed. by Marianne L. Simmel (New York: Springer, 1968). 
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constitutive freedom on which this binding that allows things to stand over and 
against us is grounded. As Heidegger goes on to state immediately after this, ‘the 
letting-be-encountered of beings, comportment to beings in each and every mode of 
manifestness, is only possible where freedom exists’ (EHF, p. 207). As Susan Meld 
Shell notes, Heidegger’s questioning of autonomy here as a limit to ‘our freedom to 
will authentically’ appears to demand that ‘we give up on […] ordinary (moral) 
notions of “responsibility”’.19 The author points out that Heidegger presented this 
critique of autonomy and self-binding at lectures in 1930, ‘midway between Being 
and Time and the Rectoral Address that he delivered as a newly minted member of 
the Nazi Party’, in turn implicating Heidegger’s appeal to philosophical freedom in 
the context of his deplorable political associations: ‘no one, perhaps, has shown more 
clearly what freedom without the Grenzgott of morality might mean than Martin 
Heidegger’.20 
Whilst Heidegger’s notion of freedom as limited by self-responsibility 
appears deeply problematic, it is also possible to discern, here, a search for a mode of 
relationality (dwelling) where beings show themselves in their essential nature; in 
particular, this is evident in Heidegger’s complaint that beings ‘can only show 
themselves as objects’ when human beings let them ‘stand-over-against’ us as 
‘something given’ (EHF, p. 207). As such, I propose to suggest in my introduction 
that Heidegger’s writings on dwelling, and the early concerns about forms of self-
binding they contain, can help form a relation to contemporary critical work on the 
aesthetics of the novel.  
It is possible, firstly, to connect Heidegger’s concerns about the limitations 
that ‘originary self-binding’ (EHF, p. 207) has for human freedom with Judith 
Butler’s poststructuralist appeal to the ethical value that emerges in reading when 
                                                 
19 Susan Meld Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2009), p. 340. 
20 Shell, p. 340. 
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characters resist, for instance, revealing their interiority to readers. In Judith Butler’s 
reading of Henry James’ Washington Square, Catherine Sloper’s refusal to explain 
herself threatens to rupture the smooth functioning of narrative progress itself: 
‘Catherine has taken herself out of the circuit, and there is no future if this enigma 
stays intact, if no fresh explanation can incite more plot’.21 In this key passage of 
criticism for Hale’s conception of reading as a process of self-binding, Butler argues 
that Catherine ‘mark[s] the limits of all speaking that seeks to bind her, that offers 
itself to her as a way of binding herself’.22 Butler proposes that Catherine’s refusal of 
readerly knowledge demands of the reader that we ‘cease judging’, and that this 
‘suspension of judgement brings us closer to a different conception of ethics, one that 
honors what cannot be fully known or captured about the Other’.23 A comparable 
movement of freedom emerging from sparing, a movement of freedom that unfolds 
through the ‘care’ of ‘staying with’, ‘saving’, ‘sparing’ and ‘preserving’ (BDT, p. 
149) is at the heart of Heidegger’s notion of human dwelling; as Heidegger proposes: 
To free really means to spare. The sparing itself consists not only in the fact 
that we do not harm the one whom we spare. Real sparing is something 
positive and takes place when we leave something beforehand in its own 
nature, when we return it specifically to its being, when we “free” it in the 
real sense of the word. (BDT, p. 147). 
As such, this conception of dwelling as a movement of care that sets ‘something free 
into its own presencing’ (BDT, p. 148) contains within it an interest in preserving 
alterity comparable with Butler’s argument. As Nicholas Dungey observes, ‘dwelling 
                                                 
21 Judith Butler, ‘Values of Difficulty’, in Just Being Difficult? Academic Writing in the 
Public Arena, ed. by Jonathan D. Culler and Kevin Lamb (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), pp. 199–216 (p. 207). 
22 Butler, ‘Difficulty’, p. 208. Qtd in Hale, ‘New Ethics’, p. 900. See also Dorothy J. Hale, 
‘Fiction as Restriction: Self-Binding in New Ethical Theories of the Novel’, Narrative, 15.2 
(2007), 187–206 <https://doi.org/10.1353/nar.2007.0010>. 
23 Butler, p. 208. 
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entails recognizing the coming and passing of others, a letting-be of their essential 
natures’.24 
Yet, surely the mention of an essential nature makes clear an obvious point of 
incompatibility between Butler’s notion of alterity and Heidegger’s? Whilst the 
poststructuralist interpretation of alterity foregrounds what Hale calls alterity’s 
‘endless potential to resist comprehension, to trouble certainty’, Heidegger’s thinking 
of dwelling proceeds on the basis of a ‘simple oneness’ (BDT, p. 147) that unfolds 
when things are freed into their essence.25 At this point, it is perhaps possible to see 
how a Heideggerian approach to questions of autonomy and self-restriction begins to 
depart from the new ethics. The distinction between Heidegger’s thinking of the play 
between freeing and binding in dwelling, and that which unfolds in Hale’s reading of 
the new ethics, rests (amongst other things) on the indivisibility of this freeing-
binding in Heidegger’s dwelling. In Hale’s view, the ethical value of reading unfolds 
‘in new ethical theory generally’ through the ‘psychological necessity of oscillating’ 
between the experience of being bound and unbound to a relationship with the social 
other.26 An approach that attends to dwelling, by contrast, would necessarily attend to 
the effects, and negotiate the conditions, of aesthetic binding as they unfold in the 
aesthetic dimensions of novels themselves. 
In this sense I seek to distinguish the approach that I am formulating in this 
thesis from that of Hale’s ‘new ethics’, even whilst I take this issue of binding and the 
aesthetics of the novel as a point of departure for my own work. I will also seek to 
establish this point of departure by connecting my thesis with recent work by 
Namwali Serpell and Arne De Boever; giving a brief literary historical overview of 
dwelling and literature; and, by discussing my methodology and the selection of 
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authors for this study, before turning in more detail to the question of dwelling in the 
novel in the next chapter.27 
Aesthetics and form: beyond the ‘new ethics’ 
Responding critically to the way that texts bind together human and non-
human entities through their formal and aesthetic dimensions necessarily begins with 
recognising that ethical critics are, of course, already responding to the aesthetic 
dimensions of texts. In fact, the poststructuralist move to theorise the ethical value of 
the novel in recent years has partly emerged in response to Foucauldian critiques of 
the novel as a form that interiorises the universalising expectations of liberal society. 
In this view Nussbaum’s readerly ‘love’, for instance, appears as a means of 
continuous and insistent coddling of the subject inseparable, finally, from a 
mechanism of control.28 At the same time, the attempt to theorise the ethical value of 
the experience of identification, care, defamiliarisation or difficulty necessarily 
entails a certain uncoupling of ethics from the aesthetic. As Robert Eaglestone has 
observed in this regard, conceiving that ‘ethics and aesthetics are one and the same’ 
remains a somewhat intractable task for ethical critics.29 Hale’s theorisation of 
reading as an oscillation between aesthetic experience and ethical reflection reduces 
this division between ethics and aesthetics to a fine point, but the distinction clearly 
remains necessary, as the following passage suggests: 
Ethical knowledge is the experience of irresistible encounter with what once 
does not try to know, what one cannot but know. It is knowledge that is 
beyond reason, that is of the emotions, and that is so intuitive as to seem a 
bodily knowing. To formulate this knowledge as epistemology, as we must 
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do, is to register the moment when we move from being bound to binding and 
back again. But the process of converting knowing into knowledge is what 
enables the process to continue and to be felt as a progress.30 
If this need to formulate intuitive ethical knowing into epistemological ethical 
knowledge partly underpins new ethical theories of the novel, the desire to counter 
Foucauldian conceptions of novel reading as a process of interiorising liberal 
universal values also remains significant.31 
 These propositions suggest an ongoing privileging of ethical knowledge over 
the aesthetic form of the novel that generates it, even whilst the novel form remains 
privileged within ethical theories of literature more broadly. In this thesis I take these 
key propositions — regarding the division between the ethical and the aesthetic, and 
the privileging of detached readerly reflection as a route to ethical knowledge — as 
an invitation to explore what Hale calls the ‘ethico-political basis of novelistic 
aesthetics’.32 This entails examining how the various modes of binding characters into 
worlds, and constituting worlds through the binding of characters, operate as effects 
and elements of aesthetic form in ways that are implicitly intentional in texts 
themselves and not conveyed through moments of detached ethical reflection. 
I take this path through Hale’s work on the new ethics to introduce some of 
the starting points of this project, but not to introduce this thesis as a work of ethical 
criticism. Turning away from readerly experiences of identification and care, or 
defamiliarisation and difficulty, means that this thesis does not seek to contribute to 
ethical theories of the novel per se. Instead, I intend to explore the ways in which 
contemporary novels knowingly and provocatively respond to their own positioning 
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as forms that are at once the spaces of an ‘all too visible incarceration of subjectivity 
by aesthetic form’ and a privileged ‘achievement of alterity’.33 As Hale notes, ‘both 
ethical camps not only take for granted the achievement of alterity as the novel’s 
generic purpose but also understand it to be accomplished through novelistic form’.34 
This project of critically addressing what Hale calls the ‘ethico-political basis 
of novelistic aesthetics’ has been taken up by Arne De Boever, who situates the 
negotiation between incarceration and possibility not in the movement of reading but 
in the novel’s aesthetic dimensions themselves.35 In Narrative Care: Biopolitics and 
the Novel De Boever proposes to read the novel as a pharmakon with both potentially 
destructive and curative dimensions, describing the novel ‘as a form of life-writing, a 
kind of aesthetic care of the self and of others’ that has necessarily biopolitical 
dimensions relating to the management of characters’ aesthetic existence.36 In this 
vein De Boever proposes reading the novel ‘as a work of bioart that is traversed by 
both biopolitical concerns and by concerns with the care for the self and the care for 
others. Although the novel might be complicit with biopower, it is also — and for this 
very reason — a site where experimentation with care takes place’.37 
If De Boever’s observation that, in contemporary fiction, ‘care’s imagination 
exists in a perpetual struggle with the novel’s biopolitical origins’ is instructive for 
this thesis, another important instance of recent criticism is Namwali Serpell’s Seven 
Modes of Uncertainty.38 In this critical response to the new ethics, Serpell turns away 
from encounters with social others in novels to develop a theory of the novel form as 
an environment which readers navigate, and where they encounter narrative structures 
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and patterns which afford readers certain ethical perturbances.39 Seeking to draw out 
an ethics of reading made possible by the ‘structural intentionality’ of the text which 
readers explore, Serpell suggests that ‘the better conceit for reading might be 
architecture’.40 
My approach in this thesis broadly shares in formulations of the novel as a 
space for inhabitation: readerly, as in Serpell’s discussion of the affordances of 
phenomenological movement through the structure of the novel; and 
characterological, as demonstrated in Hale’s evocation of the narrative as a carceral 
formation, an ‘encroachment on the existential freedom of those characters’.41 In 
respect to the latter, it is possible to approach the question of dwelling in the novel, as 
Alfred López has recently suggested, ‘through the individual’s struggle to achieve 
within the world that has produced her the status of a conscious and contented being’ 
(p. 3). This attention to the way that possibility and progress emerge from and 
through social constraint suggests the literary bildungsroman as the paradigmatic 
genre of literary dwelling for López, who contends that ‘every bildungsroman may 
thus be read as a narrative of dwelling, an anatomy of the space within which Being 
as the fulfilment (or not) of dwelling occurs’.42 
This suggestive formulation raises a number of questions regarding the very 
possibility of dwelling in the novel. These considerations are taken up in detail in the 
next chapter of the thesis, which places Heidegger’s writings in the context of recent 
literary criticism and anthropological theory focusing on dwelling. I begin from the 
position here though, that the discussion of dwelling in the novel will be always 
indivisible, first and foremost, from the concerns of a particular work. The small 
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selection of contemporary writers I have chosen for this thesis each offer nuanced 
navigations of the possibility of dwelling in the novel form, yet these possibilities are 
never reducible to the fulfilment of dwelling or a valorisation of the novel form as a 
space where dwelling unfolds. Even in instances where what Heidegger calls the 
‘search […] for the nature of dwelling’ (BDT, p. 159) plays a central role in a novel’s 
events, the search for belonging or what López terms ‘contented being’ remain 
secondary to questions about the implication of aesthetic elements, narrative forms 
and the technology of writing itself in the flourishing of human existence. 
The self-conscious navigation of the question of dwelling and the novel’s 
entanglement in this takes on specific dimensions in the contemporary, and my 
theoretical framing of this discussion necessarily responds to the dominant social 
conceptualisation of the novel form as an ‘aesthetics of alterity’ discussed above.43 At 
the same time, contemporary writers inherit the novel as a form that has always 
responded to shifts in modes of human inhabitation, or dwelling, brought on by social 
and technological transformations, which I will now briefly introduce. 
Dwelling: a literary inheritance 
Shortly before his death in 1940, and so some time before the appearance of 
Heidegger’s first discussion of dwelling in 1951’s ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, 
Walter Benjamin argued that dwelling was a specific obsession of 19th century 
European life, and had emerged as a symptom of the alienation engendered by the 
Industrial Revolution. In his writings on the culture and environment of 19th century 
Paris, Benjamin argued that ‘[t]he nineteenth century, like no other century, was 
addicted to dwelling. It conceived the residence as a receptacle for the person, and it 
encased him with all his appurtenances so deeply in the dwelling’s interior that one 
might be reminded of the inside of a compass case, where the instrument with all its 
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accessories lies embedded in deep, usually violet folds of velvet […] The twentieth 
century, with its porosity and transparency, its tendency toward the well-lit and airy, 
has put an end to dwelling in the old sense’.44 
The pursuit of dwelling in the private sphere of the nineteenth-century 
bourgeois home was, for Benjamin, a failed response to a crisis of belonging 
unfolding with the arrival of technological and architectural modernity. As David 
Spurr, whose study Architecture and Modern Literature is indispensable to the brief 
literary historical framing of dwelling I offer here, notes, this inward-looking attempt 
to shape the home as a private receptacle for the subject was bound to failure: ‘far 
from satisfying the individual’s desire for an authentic subjectivity, [it] merely 
increased a sense of alienation from the real conditions of existence’.45 In 
architectural terms, as Benjamin had suggested, the emergence of outward-looking, 
neatly organised modernist architecture presaged the end of the ‘nineteenth-century 
womblike interior’.46 This investment in the ability of private property, objects, 
decoration, ornaments and belongings to represent a fully-fledged subject and their 
existence in a material world bears comparison with the nineteenth-century realist 
novel. As Peter Brooks has argued, attending in particular to the ornamental 
accumulation of possessions that underpins the representation of character in the 
realist novel, ‘things that people use and acquire in order to define themselves — 
their tools, their furniture, their accessories. These things are indeed part of the very 
definition of “character”, of who one is and what one claims to be’.47 
If this comparison suggests a related formulation of dwelling in nineteenth-
century realist fiction and architecture, the departure from traditional notions of 
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dwelling in modernist architecture was to an extent reflected in modernist literature’s 
departure from literary realism. As David Spurr writes of modernism’s departure 
from the privileged spaces of nineteenth-century literature:  
In one work after another, from Proust to Beckett, the subject is opened up 
and exposed to the elements of modernity. What is revealed in this process, 
however, is not the inner Xanadu of romantic poetry but rather a space 
essentially continuous with the outside, itself composed of the elements of a 
symbolic universe that exists independent of any subject. The inner space of 
the subject turns out to be a constituent part of the symbolic universe to which 
the subject is just that—subject and not sovereign.48 
 
The emergence of dwelling as a particular issue in modern literature and in 
philosophy, is reflected in Heidegger’s turn to this problematic in 1951 (with his 
lecture ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’) in the context of the crises of housing and 
habitation inflicted by Word War II. The question dwelling, its status as a 
‘specifically modern concept’, provided a means through which to think the emergent 
crises of modernity, ‘a crisis in human habitation, [and a crisis] in the adaptation of 
human beings to the objective conditions of a world in which the question of what it 
means to be human is given unprecedented urgency’.49 
In this essay, Heidegger’s famous example of the Black Forest farmhouse, 
‘built some two hundred years ago by the dwelling of peasants’ (BDT, p. 158), 
demonstrates how building emerges from dwelling when humankind is perfectly and 
harmoniously at home in the world. The essay thinks of the house as emerging from 
the event of dwelling in the fourfold, whilst the house became a place where the 
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fourfold is gathered: ‘the self-sufficiency of the power to let earth and heaven, 
divinities and mortals enter in simple oneness into things, ordered the house’ (BDT, 
p. 157). Heidegger downplays the labour of construction to emphasise that the house 
was built by craftspeople who used their tools as ‘things’ to gather the fourfold: ‘a 
craft which, itself sprung from dwelling, still uses its tools and frames as things, built 
the farmhouse’ (BDT, p. 158). Yet even whilst, for Heidegger, this house ‘represents 
the ideal of human dwelling in complete harmony with its surroundings’,50 he also 
recognised both the anachronism and impossibility of such a reconstruction or return 
to this way of life: ‘Our reference to the Black Forest farm in no way means that we 
should or could go back to building such houses; rather, it illustrates by a dwelling 
that has been how it was able to build’ (BDT, p. 158, emphasis in original). 
Heidegger emphasises the architectural character of the farmhouse only to 
demonstrate the way that the fourfold of earth, sky, divinities and mortals are 
gathered in that place, so that the farmhouse emerges as the taking-place of dwelling. 
As such, the example of the farmhouse reminds Heidegger’s reader that such 
harmonious dwelling is impossible in modernity, whilst also suggesting that dwelling 
cannot simply be abandoned in favour of building. In this way Heidegger argued, at a 
time of national reconstruction, that the ‘real plight of dwelling’ will not be resolved 
by rebuilding (BDT, p. 159). Amidst the destruction, upheaval and new possibilities 
ushered in by modernity, Heidegger argues that, ‘mortals ever search anew for the 
nature of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell’ (BDT, p. 159, emphasis in 
original). By recalling the issue of dwelling, Heidegger saw the possibility for people 
to move beyond the essential homelessness of modernity: ‘mortals answer this 
summons […] when they build out of dwelling, and think for the sake of dwelling’ 
(BDT, p. 159). As Heidegger’s discussion of dwelling here suggests, the plight of 
dwelling presents in modernity both literally in the experience of exile, destitution 
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and displacement that increasingly characterised life in modernity, and existentially 
as a particularly modern condition of homelessness, which entailed, in Spurr’s terms, 
‘not just lacking shelter but not being at home in the world, including the world of 
language. Modern literature and architecture are the consequences of this condition, 
in both their formal freedoms and their respective engagements with the question of 
the way we live now’.51 
The attempt to reinvent dwelling in order to overcome the essential 
homelessness of modernity also necessarily characterises Heidegger’s writings on 
dwelling as late-modern or postmodern. As David Spurr argues, in the discussion of 
the Black Forest farmhouse in ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, Heidegger’s ‘lesson is 
not one of nostalgia for that life but of the search for a form of dwelling willing to 
abandon the ideals of fullness and presence that dominate our cultural memory of that 
life, and prepared to find consolation in the freedom granted by the displacements of 
the contemporary world. Heidegger called for an awareness of the essential 
homelessness of the modern, industrialized world in order to relieve the misery of that 
condition’.52 Where Benjamin had rightly seen the bourgeois nineteenth-century 
home as a doomed attempt at dwelling through insulation from the alienating effects 
of modernity, and where modernist writers departed from the similarly questionable 
attempt to construct the authentic self through accumulation of possessions, often 
centred in the home, that Peter Brooks locates in the nineteenth-century realist 
tradition, Heidegger finds in the home of the pre-modern peasant a form of poetic 
dwelling that, paradoxically, reveals new possibilities for meaningful existence 
beyond the crises of modernity. 
Perhaps the key point of consideration in regard to Heidegger’s invocation of 
the Black Forest farmhouse is the focus on language, and not architecture itself, as a 
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mode for beginning to attend to the problem of dwelling. In other words, Heidegger is 
not interested in the architecture of the farmhouse itself, so much as he is interested in 
the experience of dwelling as it unfolds in the relationship between the dweller and 
their lived environment. The consideration of dwelling in the farmhouse reflects an 
investment in the capacity for language, indeed storytelling itself, to reflect on the 
nature of worldly dwelling — the particular formation of human binding into worldly 
environs — as it unfolds in different times and places. This return to storytelling and 
to narratives of experience presents itself as particularly important in the context of 
industrialism, social fragmentation, commodification of and mechanisation of 
experience that Heidegger associates with modernity. In modernity, Walter Benjamin 
claimed that ‘experience has fallen in value’,53 industrialism, social fragmentation, 
commodification of and mechanisation of experience meant that the traditional 
human relations that made storytelling meaningful were subverted — contradicted by 
these civilisational developments. Dwelling is, in this sense, not necessarily 
architectural but still always concerned with the character of the relationship between 
the human and the environing world. As perhaps the most familiar means by which 
humans shape their dwelling in the world, architecture lends itself here to Heidegger, 
and to novelists, as a form for thinking through the changing nature of our worldly 
existence. 
Whilst I have suggested that Heidegger views architecture as a means for 
recalling our existence as essentially characterised by an unfolding of dwelling, it is 
also the case that his essay responds to the essential forgetting of our entanglement 
with things and lived environments in the industrial and technological modern era. In 
this regard Spurr rightly points to the architectural emergence of what Rem Koolhas 
and Marc Augé have both influentially termed the ‘junkspaces’ of postmodern 
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architecture and the ‘non-places’ of transient contemporary experience.54 In this 
respect, architecture becomes a less important part of constructing identity, in the face 
of ‘the ceaselessly shifting and impermanent nature of junkspace, which abandons the 
logic of the monument, leaving no architectural structure of lasting value’.55 
Junkspaces and non-places are conceivable in relation to literature in these terms; as 
Spurr demonstrates: 
[In these environments] individuals are made transparent, as it were, by being 
systematically reduced in terms of consumer transactions, transportation 
objectives, or security risks. As conceived in such terms, the contemporary 
constructed environment poses a special problem for imaginative literature, 
and in particular narrative fiction. Architectural forms of the past are more 
conducive to narrative form, partly because of the richness of their symbolic 
associations and partly because each of these forms, as well as each concrete 
instance of it, has a history of its own. The building mediates between the 
present and the past, and this mediation itself serves as a kind of larger 
narrative to the narrative proper of a novel or short story. In the case of 
junkspace or the non-lieu, however, there is no mediation, no history to which 
the fictional narrative can adhere.56 
In the space of the present, as Spurr rightly notes, dwelling has to be learned and 
invented anew, in part due to the growing ‘absence of any necessary relation between 
the human subject and the built environment’.57 
Zadie Smith, Tom McCarthy, Don DeLillo 
Each of the writers addressed in this thesis demonstrates a complex 
relationship both to the reimagining of dwelling that unfolds in modernist fiction, and 
to the ‘architectural disaffection’ Spurr identifies in contemporary literature. 58 Apart 
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from the junkspaces and non-places which Spurr draws attention to, the writers 
addressed here all questioningly return to, and find creative potential in, characters’ 
attachments to particular lived environments and architectural spaces. They each 
interact, for instance, with the question of the novel, and the bourgeois home, as 
womblike structures for dwelling, as signalled above in my discussion of Benjamin 
and Brooks. This problematic is most clearly invoked in Tom McCarthy’s Remainder 
(2005), when the unnamed narrator toys with the prospect of rebirth through the 
construction of a house where he will feel ‘authentic’ again.59 In Don DeLillo’s The 
Body Artist (2001), the appearance of an unknown figure in a remote seaside home is 
likewise imagined as an embryonic process.60 Zadie Smith’s White Teeth (2000), too, 
imagines the novel as a space for the gestation of new forms of community. That this 
novel was famously charged with hysteria, a condition historically attributed to a 
malfunctioning or ‘wandering’ womb, is in turn suggestive of continuing critical 
expectations that novels will nurture traditional, and so fully ‘human’, forms of life. 
Whilst the relation of these writers’ work to modernism is not a central issue 
in this thesis, it goes some way to explaining their suitability for this study. The 
inheritance of modernism is particularly evident in McCarthy’s work, as the novelist 
and numerous commentators on his writing has observed.61 DeLillo’s work The Body 
Artist, set in a remote seaside home, arguably marked a transition from postmodern 
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epic to a Woolfian modernist poetics.62 Smith’s White Teeth has been situated 
between modernism and postmodernism by a number of critics, whilst NW 
prominently reinterprets modernism’s fragmentary depictions of the subject.63 This 
novel likewise explores dwelling through the experience of its loss, evoked in part by 
setting its characters’ strong experiences of place against the continuous threat of 
material homelessness in contemporary British society. In each case, like their 
modernist forebears, Smith’s, McCarthy’s and DeLillo’s explorations of dwelling in 
local environments and architectural spaces are not reducible to investments in place 
or the built environment as the foundations of worldly dwelling.  
As discussed above, in Heidegger’s discussion of the farmhouse in ‘Building 
Dwelling Thinking’, the farmhouse itself remains a locus for thinking the relational 
aspects of worldly dwelling, revealed above all not in built environments but in poetic 
language itself. I argue that for the novelists addressed in this thesis, the built 
environments of houses, estates, neighbourhoods and towns that characters navigate 
similarly remain indivisible from concerns with the novel’s linguistic structuring – in 
aesthetic forms, technologies of writing or interpretative models – supports and shape 
possibilities for worldly belonging. As such I have selected these writers in part for 
the way they reflect certain concerns in Heidegger’s thinking about the challenges 
and threats to dwelling in modernity, but also for the way their writing makes it 
possible to begin focusing on the way that ethical questions about dwelling are folded 
into the aesthetic, as addressed in my discussion of the new ethics above. 
                                                 
62 See Philip Nel, ‘Don DeLillo’s Return to Form: The Modernist Poetics of “The Body Artist”’, 
Contemporary Literature, 43.4 (2002), 736–59 <https://doi.org/10.2307/1209040>. 
63 Zadie Smith, White Teeth (London: Penguin Books, 2001); Zadie Smith, NW (London: Penguin 
Books, 2013). On modernism in Smith, see Vanessa Guignery, ‘Zadie Smith’s NW or the art of 
line-crossing’, E-rea, 2014 <https://doi.org/10.4000/erea.3892>; Matthew Paproth, ‘The Flipping 
Coin: The Modernist and Postmodernist Zadie Smith’, in Zadie Smith: Critical Essays, ed. by 




Following this introduction, Chapter 1 addresses the possibilities for dwelling 
afforded by narrative and literary forms, as conceived in recent scholarship and in 
Heidegger’s thought. This discussion serves to bridge the divide between Heidegger’s 
writings on dwelling, art and poetry and the novel form. To the extent that this is 
achieved, the chapter draws out some elements that characterise and delineate the 
possibilities of human dwelling – attunement and mood; technology; narrative 
mediation and interpretation – each of which are particularly pertinent to the formal 
and aesthetic dimensions of the novel. The remaining chapters take up each of these 
issues individually as the critical focus for analysing the explorations of dwelling in 
the novels selected for discussion. In each chapter that follows I foreground a 
particular novelistic investment in one of these elements of human dwelling. 
 In Chapter 2, I address the work of Zadie Smith, whose fiction and essays 
have been central to critical discussions of aesthetics and ethics in the contemporary 
Anglo-American novel. In this chapter I seek to demonstrate the relevance of 
Heidegger’s work on dwelling to the ‘new ethics’, discussed briefly in this 
introduction. I explore the importance of attunement and mood in Zadie Smith’s 
White Teeth and NW to suggest that this fundamental dimension of human 
worldliness is more primary in these novels than the representation of different social 
perspectives, and that Smith’s fiction aims at attending to these dimensions of human 
experience in order to allow the aesthetic dimensions of her work to reveal the 
affective conditions of dwelling in contemporary Britain. Just as Zadie Smith’s White 
Teeth begins with a transformative suicide attempt, Chapters 3 and 4 each respond to 
a rhetorical strategy employed in the two novels they address, which open with the 
loss or rupture of a particular mode of dwelling mobilised as the occasion for a search 
for dwelling that unfolds in the novel.  
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In Chapter 3 I address Tom McCarthy’s Remainder, a novel at the heart of 
recent criticism that highlights how aesthetic and formal experimentation in 
contemporary fiction is reinterpreting the ethics and politics of the novel form. In this 
text, the loss of dwelling mentioned above is figured through the memory of an 
authentic relation to the surrounding world that occasions a search for a narrative 
form which can respond to the technological transformation of human life and return 
the human figure to its proper relation to writing and technology more generally. 
In Chapter 4 Don DeLillo’s The Body Artist is read as a contemporary 
meditation on the possibilities for narrative belonging in contemporary lived 
environments. Bringing together the capacity for narrative to mediate the concerns 
with technology and attunement raised in the previous chapters alongside the primary 
concern with narrative as a mode of human dwelling, this novel is presented as an 
artistic meditation on, and a parable of, the aesthetics of dwelling in our time. 




Chapter 1: Theorising Dwelling in the Novel 
 
This chapter draws out the dimensions of dwelling that are at issue in this 
thesis, and in doing so offers a conceptualisation of dwelling as a category for novel 
criticism. In developing my approach to reading with a concern for dwelling, I 
examine Heidegger’s own exegeses on literary works and their different modes of 
revealing alongside current discussions of dwelling in novel studies. My theoretical 
approach to the issue of dwelling is supported by current anthropological conceptions 
of dwelling, where the term applies to the flourishing of life in specific relational and 
ethnographic contexts. These discussions lead into an exposition on narrativity and 
dwelling, and the challenges involved in positioning the novel in this dialogue. 
Extending the discussion of dwelling from narrativity to narrative forms in an attempt 
to grasp conceptually at the novel’s place in dwelling, involves a shift from 
(epistemological) considerations about narrative as a means of knowing, or 
(ontological) questions about narrative as a mode of human being, to considerations 
about the ontology of the novel itself, its simultaneous existence as physical object, 
technology, environment, situation and world. 
Whilst Heidegger’s writings offer many of the richest and most original 
insights into the question of dwelling, they actively work against presenting it as a 
theoretical or analytic tool. In particular, Heidegger’s notion of human being as 
dwelling makes manifest his opposition to ideas of human understanding as 
fundamentally a process of detached, rational and calculative interpretation that, 
Heidegger argues, permeates the Western philosophical tradition.64 As such, the 
purpose of this chapter is to bridge the conceptual gap between Heidegger’s thinking 
of dwelling and contemporary theories of the novel, and to develop a working 
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Martin Heidegger (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 9–26. 
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understanding of dwelling that is responsive to the formal specificities of the novel. 
Doing so does not mean simply demonstrating connections between novel theory and 
philosophical conceptions of dwelling, however, nor does it mean overriding or 
effacing the elusive and illusory nature of Heidegger’s writing in order that it 
accommodates and supports a theoretical framework. Instead, it entails asking 
questions about which aspects of Heidegger’s writing on dwelling are amenable to the 
study of the contemporary novel, and in what ways his work, which never discussed 
the novel directly, requires adapting for this purpose. It also entails responding to 
literary criticism and anthropology that have taken up dwelling as a concern, allowing 
the stories that these fields trace to reveal the issue of dwelling as it is negotiated in 
contemporary environments, and in the narrative artworks they produce. 
‘Worlding’ and the novel 
The interest in ‘binding’ to a world introduced in the previous chapter is 
grounded in Heidegger’s interest in human worldliness, an understanding of human 
being that begins with the conception, in Being and Time, of being-in-the-world, In-
der-Welt-sein, as a fundamental ‘existential determination of Dasein’ (BT, p. 64). 
Dasein is unique amongst beings, for Heidegger, by virtue of its worldliness. As 
Heidegger argues in Being and Time, when introducing his discussion of world, 
‘“World” is ontologically not a determination of those beings which Dasein 
essentially is not, but rather a characteristic of Dasein itself’ (BT, p. 64). Dasein’s 
constitutive worldliness emerges not through its standing over and against the world, 
or vice versa. Instead, as Sean Gaston notes, ‘Dasein is always alongside or amidst 
the world: both inside and outside the world at once’ (p. 72).65 This complex being-
alongside the world means that the world is never self-evident to Dasein. 
                                                 
65 Sean Gaston, The Concept of World from Kant to Derrida (London ; New York: Rowman 
& Littlefield International, 2013), p. 72. For a detailed discussion of the concept of world in 
Heidegger see Chapter 4 in this volume (pp. 67-98). 
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In other writings, however, Heidegger extended these concerns to consider in 
more detail specific human activities (such as artistic production) and their capacities 
for the ‘opening up of a world’ (OWA, p. 44). Perhaps due to his perception, in 
evidence in Being and Time, that Dasein normally turns away from its world, the 
artwork became significant for Heidegger for its capacity to reveal the world of a 
historical community, founding that world by revealing and inaugurating a mode of 
dwelling. 
The role that artworks play in presenting possibilities for Being for 
historically specific linguistic communities is particularly clear in ‘The Origin of the 
Work of Art’, where Heidegger argues that ‘[t]he linguistic work, originating in the 
speech of the people […] transforms the people’s saying so that now every living 
word fights the battle and puts up for decision what is holy and what unholy, what 
great and what small, what brave and what cowardly, what lofty and what flighty, 
what master and what slave’ (OWA, p. 42). Here Heidegger conceived of the artwork 
as a site for the fraught, discordant negotiation of the mode of belonging or dwelling 
proper to a particular community. The importance of language is evident in 
Heidegger’s proposal that the work ‘originat[es] in the speech of the people’ that 
make up that world and so, contemplating and opening to questioning the values of 
that place, putting ‘every living word’ into battle to reveal what is ‘holy and unholy’ 
(OWA, p. 42). Revealing a world to a historical community, the artwork does not 
make propositional statements about possibilities that already exist in the world. 
Instead, it reveals the world, as ‘the opening up of that into which human being, as 
historical, is already cast […] everything that already is […] for an historical people 
[…] though still hidden from itself’ (OWA, p. 75). Yet we are not so interested in 
pursuing what Heidegger held to be the great work of art here: as James Magrini has 
noted, novels and artworks do not hold the same potential for mass gathering as, for 
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instance, a Greek temple or the Nuremberg rally, and so are less likely to fit the 
designation of great art Heidegger proposed at the time of ‘The Origin’.66 
At the same time, it is an equally problematic and conflicted move to attribute 
a kind of weaker version of worlding to the novel, even insofar as this is a necessary 
move. The first complication is the possibility of denying the gravity of the worlding 
that unfolds in cultural formations such as the novel.67 Addressing the worlding of 
narrative forms such as the novel also risks introducing an understanding of the novel 
as a proliferation of different possible life narratives that the reader can choose freely 
from, which is unfaithful to the notion of worlding that I am pursuing here. Robert 
Eaglestone makes clear this distinction between the world-opening of artworks and 
the interpretation of possible narratives discussed above when he writes that 
‘[a]rtworks in the broadest sense, then, disclose or give us that world in which we live 
as a concrete, determinate, and specific place, revealed and enframed by those 
artworks […] Because we (now) inhabit multiple and often conflicting worlds, it is 
the artworks that reveal to us who and how we are, what these worlds are, and to 
some extent, what our potentialities for Being are’.68 Our belonging to, and inhabiting 
of, many different worlds mentioned by Eaglestone makes explicit the problems 
inherent in Heidegger’s conception of the vigorous world-founding of a community 
in ‘The Origin’. Nonetheless, Heidegger’s formulation of the artwork as a world-
opening event of language, rather than a propositional statement about the worlds 
they represent, is significant. As Eaglestone notes in this regard, ‘[n]ovels about the 
less-developed world by writers often called “postcolonial” are not simply reports by 
what Gayatri C. Spivak names (while critiquing the concept) “native informants”’.69 
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Globalisation, colonialism, global war, mass migration and the emergence of 
world literature mean that if literature speaks to a world, it is a plurality of worlds or 
the dimensions of a shared, global world. Both formulations are far removed from the 
distinct cultural worlds elaborated on in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. In recent 
years, as such, the possibility of revealing dwelling through art has led recent critics 
to consider the world-opening capacity of art both in relation to more local contexts 
and, more often, in terms of considering our worldly dwelling on a global scale.  
Madigan Haley’s essay, ‘Marginal Figures and the Ethos of the Global Novel’ 
argues that the global novel now seeks to give voice to the emergent traces of a mode 
of dwelling that transcends particular national or regional contexts to pursue ‘an 
ethical language beyond the individual self and the particular world of the work’.70 In 
doing so, for Haley, the global novel evinces a sense of a changing relationship to 
narrative in the globalised world. Haley negotiates the relationship between the 
individual text and its global context by arguing that the global novel expresses this 
loss of distinct worlds whilst forming a constellation of texts that can begin to be 
thought of collectively as a world at a global scale. In this context Haley argues that 
the global novel invites us to think of ethos differently, as an emergent global ethos 
which lies not at the centre of localised communities but at their margins, margins 
which themselves reveal global interdependence. This global ethos is 
a common, if incomplete, horizon of being and acting that rescues the 
meaning of events from the merely personal and particular. Suggesting that 
global literature figures such a horizon does not entail a facile universalism. 
Nor does it imagine fiction’s relation to a “common life” in terms of 
standardization. Rather, it recognizes that the work of […] fiction is not 
simply to describe historical events but to allow them to refer beyond 
themselves, becoming in some sense “our” history.71 
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As the approach taken in Haley’s work suggests, the collectivism of a historical 
community that Heidegger imagines in ‘The Origin’ might exclude more nascent 
forms of community, seeming to offer little help for thinking the situation of those 
whose dwelling is threatened by marginality and precisely the kind of hierarchy and 
domination that Heidegger here accepts as integral to ethos and the proper working of 
community itself. If Haley’s work further demonstrates the insufficiency of thinking 
ethos in relation to the customs and hierarchies of a particular place in a 
contemporary, globalised world, one of the unanswered questions that emerges from 
the discussion is: to what extent do such formulations alleviate or modify the 
attachments that dwelling in a particular place entails? 
As my discussion here suggests, the opening of worlds in artworks does not 
occur simply through mimetic narratives that function as other possible narratives for 
life. This view risks equating, as I have suggested, narrativity with narrative artworks 
— what Eaglestone calls the ‘strong mimeticist position, suggesting that “we” and art 
are, in deep ways, the same’.72 By turns, Heidegger’s conception of truth revealed in 
the artwork is non-mimetic, an act by which a world is opened or uncovered. In the 
case of Van Gogh’s painting that Heidegger discusses in ‘The Origin of the Work of 
Art’, the painting allows the shoe to ‘emerge into the unconcealedness of its being’ 
(OWA, p. 35), to show in an essential sense what and how it is and so too to reveal 
the world of the peasant woman who wears it. This form of truth, involves, as 
Eaglestone notes, ‘being knowingly in relation to what grounds the sense of a 
proposition’,73 a form of knowledge to which we arrive by means of a revelation: we 
now recognise the world of the work.  
For Heidegger the very notion of world is irreducible: we always already find 
ourselves in and in relation to a world, rather than coming to piece together a sense of 
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the world. For this reason Heidegger introduces the world in Being and Time in terms 
of its ‘worldliness’ (BT, pp. 63–86). However, I will approach this world-opening in 
the novel by highlighting here the way it is shaped through writing as something that 
emerges from a world; through the specific formal and material dimensions of the 
novel (as an object or thing which readers engage with); and, through the readerly 
processes of attunement and interpretation which respond and give meaning to the 
novel’s worldly qualities. In ‘The Thing’, Heidegger is at pains to stress this point:  
This appropriating mirror-play of the simple onefold of earth and sky, 
divinities and mortals, we call the world. The world presences by worlding. 
That means: the world's worlding cannot be explained by anything else nor 
can it be fathomed through anything else […] The human will to explain just 
does not reach to the simpleness of the simple onefold of worlding. The 
united four are already strangled in their essential nature when we think of 
them only as separate realities, which are to be grounded in and explained by 
one another. (T, p. 177-8) 
Whilst Heidegger insists upon these points, it is nonetheless the case that the 
character of this worlding, the ‘mirror-play’ of the fourfold is revealed in Hölderlin’s 
poetry. Van Gogh’s work similarly reveals the world of the peasant woman to 
Heidegger, and through Heidegger’s phenomenological evocation of the artwork’s 
revealing, the character of this world is communicated to Heidegger’s reader. This is 
significant because I am interested, in what follows, in the role of dwelling in and as 
worlding in the novel form, in how modes of inhabitation that unfold in the narrative 
spaces of the novel, and their relation to the aesthetic and formal dimensions of 
literary texts, serve to reveal the worlds. First, however I seek to address the question 




Writing belongs to dwelling 
Placing dwelling at the centre of a theoretical discussion of the novel implies 
not only a particular viewpoint on narrative creativity, but also on the character of 
human being itself. In ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, perhaps the foundational essay 
on dwelling for the fields of anthropology, architecture and sociology, Heidegger 
claims that ‘the way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are 
on the earth, is Buan, dwelling’ (BDT, p. 145). Heidegger explains that this ‘Old 
English and High German word for building, Buan, means to dwell’ (BDT, p. 144). 
In this way, Heidegger seeks to reverse the relationship of primacy between building 
and dwelling. Where we commonly assume that ‘we attain to dwelling […] only by 
means of building’ (BDT p. 143), Heidegger asks his reader to allow this 
etymological discovery to lead into thinking building as belonging, instead, to 
dwelling. Whether building is conceived in terms of cultivating, which ‘tends the 
growth that ripens into its fruit of its own accord’ by ‘cherish[ing]’, ‘preserv[ing]’, 
‘protect[ing]’ and ‘car[ing] for’ — Heidegger’s examples are ‘till[ing] the soil’ and 
‘cultivat[ing] the vine’ — or in terms of constructing, the kind of activities that, ‘in a 
certain way, make their own works’ — here ‘shipbuilding and temple-building’ are 
given as examples — Heidegger says that ‘both modes of building […] are comprised 
within genuine building, that is, dwelling’ (BDT, p. 145). 
The key point that Heidegger raises here, that, fundamentally, ‘building 
belong[s] to dwelling’ (BDT, p. 143), has been elaborated from a historical 
perspective by anthropologist Tim Ingold. In his seminal work The Perception of the 
Environment (2000), Ingold proposed what he then called ‘the dwelling 
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perspective’,74 the founding statement of which is drawn from Heidegger’s essay.75 In 
Ingold’s anthropological register, adopting this perspective means ‘that the forms 
people build, whether in the imagination or on the ground, arise within the current of 
their involved activity, in the specific relational contexts of their practical engagement 
with their surroundings’.76 It follows from this statement that building of any kind 
cannot take place apart from an embodied engagement with a lived environment. As 
Ingold goes on to propose, ‘Building, then, cannot be understood as a simple process 
of transcription, of a pre-existing design of the final product onto a raw material 
substrate’.77 To acknowledge the human capacity for envisioning (or for projection, in 
Heidegger’s terms) necessitates stating that ‘envisioning is itself an activity carried on 
by real people in a real-world environment […] Only because they already dwell 
therein can they think the thoughts they do’.78 Drawing comparatively on 
archaeological anthropology of ancient human built environments and studies of 
modern and contemporary built environments, Ingold rejects the idea of a moment in 
cultural and technological development when humans stopped ‘dwelling’ and started 
‘building’.79 
To take another example, I will briefly introduce Ingold’s discussion of 
writing. As with building, which cannot, as discussed above, ‘be understood as a 
simple process of transcription, of a pre-existing design of the final product onto a 
raw material substrate’, the written word is likewise ‘not prefigured as a mental 
                                                 
74 Tim Ingold, The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill 
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construction which the writing hand merely serves to transcribe onto a surface’.80 
Ingold, in this way, emphasises the process of writing as an embodied and emplaced 
skill: ‘there can be no inscription without incorporation – without, in other words, the 
building of habitual patterns of posture and gesture into the bodily modus operandi of 
the skilled practitioner […] writing is an achievement of the whole human organism-
person in his or her environment’.81 For Ingold, writing remains an artistic process 
comparable with other creative practices such as weaving. It is, in the first place, ‘a 
kind of dextrous movement […] the patterning or weave of the text emerges as the 
crystallisation of this movement’.82 Reflecting on the importance of embodied, skilled 
engagement and the importance of dwelling as the font of human creativity and so of 
building itself, Ingold proposes that ‘meaning is immanent in the relational contexts 
of people’s practical engagement with their lived-in environments’.83 Ingold writes 
that ‘humans are brought into existence as organism-persons within a world that is 
inhabited by beings of manifold kinds, both human and non-human. Therefore 
relations amongst humans, which we are accustomed to calling “social”, are but a 
sub-set of ecological relations’.84 
Ingold’s conception of writing as an art that emerges from the movement of 
dwelling seeks to counter conceptions of writing as ‘operation of a technology’ which 
‘divorces the author from the immediate context of sensuous engagement with his or 
her surroundings’ and ‘involves a more or less mechanical execution of a 
preconceived verbal composition’.85 Ingold has in mind here, in particular, Walter 
Ong’s argument that ‘writing (and especially alphabetic writing) is a technology […] 
it initiated what print and computers only continue […] the separation of the word 
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from the living present’.86 For Ingold, viewing writing, weaving, or playing an 
instrument as a technology, as Ong does here, ‘recast[s] the skilled activity of artisans 
as the behavioural or mechanical output of a formal system of rules and principles 
[…] that practitioners are bound to put into effect, regardless of their personal 
experience and sensibilities’. Ingold proposes that ‘[t]here is far more to playing the 
violin, however, than the mechanical execution of a pre-prepared series of 
instructions. And if there is a certain analogy between violin-playing and writing, it 
must point to a conclusion […] that the activity of the writer, like that of the violinist, 
is an art in itself’.87 
The question of the author as an artisan introduced by Ingold might suggest 
the implausibility of this conception of authorship in post-industrial societies. As 
Bradley Deane notes, ‘the image of the “hand-made” novel is no less an ideological 
fiction than that of the novel-writing machine’.88 Instead, I turn to Ingold’s discussion 
of writing for the particular perspective that it brings to the question of writing as a 
technology, a question that concerns Ong, as mentioned, but also both Heidegger and, 
as Ingold’s discussion suggests, all those who take time to reflect on the practice of 
writing. 
At issue in this thesis, in particular, is the relationship between the novel’s 
appearance as a technology and its other manifestations as a thing and a world. At 
issue when considering dwelling in the novel, too, is a negotiation of the author’s 
relation to their craft, and a related negotiation of the capacity for writing to reveal 
meaning which is, to cite Ingold, ‘immanent in the relational contexts of people’s 
practical engagement with their lived-in environments’.89 This might involve the 
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ability of writing to translate the meaningful content of dwelling into narrative, to 
trace a path through the relational contexts of inhabitation that ends in the coherent 
form of a novel which can open this world to a readership. Ingold’s appeal to the idea 
of the author as artisan clearly involves questions of agency in the play between 
writer and craft, which of course in my discussion is the contemporary novel. This 
could involve, in relation to Ong’s work on orality and literacy, a negotiation 
‘between the oral storyteller and the novelist, between oral storytelling and written 
literary practices’, discerned by Areti Dragas as part of the return of the storyteller in 
contemporary fiction.90 Considering the authors I address in this thesis, this issue of 
agency presents itself in terms closer to Ingold’s than Ong’s, as a negotiation between 
writing-narrating as an artistic process that emerges from dwelling, on the one hand, 
and the writing technologies and narrative forms this narrating-writing is built into, 
on the other. 
The text: between technology and thing 
In the view traced here, writing is never reducible to a technology in the sense 
of a mechanical operation, but rather is a technological and artistic process always 
negotiating with its own technicity. Such an awareness of technicity is evident in 
Ingold’s writing, when he switches to a more personal register, lamenting that, whilst 
‘handwriting flows from the moving point of contact between pen and paper […] 
[t]he keyboard ruptures this connection […] Typing on the computer, I find, is joyless 
and soul-destroying. It rips the heart out of writing’.91 It is notable that the elaboration 
of a dwelling perspective on human activity in Ingold’s writing does not assuage his 
concern that the tools of his craft threaten to reduce his writing to the mechanised 
operation of a technology, in particular now that typing on the computer has all but 
replaced writing by hand with pen and paper. Ingold’s comments here suggest, once 
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again, that adopting a dwelling perspective does not entail a naïve rejection of 
technology, but rather suggests a fundamentally Heideggerian sensitivity to the 
depersonalising character of modernity, and of modern technology in particular. Put 
differently, Ingold’s heightened awareness of the rupturing effect of technology is a 
reflection of the proto-ethical perspective on human life as dwelling encountered in 
Heidegger’s thought. 
If writing was considered here as both a technology and an art, how to 
conceive of the novel, and the contemporary novel in particular, in this perspective? 
How to distinguish this entity from any other in the lived environment — the pen, the 
computer, the table, the basket, etc. — from the perspective of Heidegger’s thought? 
To address this question I will note, first, Heidegger’s mention of books as things in 
his essay ‘The Thing’. Here Heidegger describes things that are ‘unpretentious’ and 
modest: 
Inconspicuously compliant is the thing: the jug and the bench, the footbridge 
and the plow […] Things, each thinging from time to time in its own way, are 
heron and roe, deer, horse and bull. Things, each thinging and staying in its 
own way, are mirror and clasp, book and picture, crown and cross. (T, p. 180) 
The position of the book amidst this catalogue of common, everyday objects and 
animals suggests perhaps its marginality in contemporary technological society, 
whilst also belying the special role of things in Heidegger’s thought. Things, in spite 
of their seeming marginality here, at the centre of the event of dwelling for 
Heidegger, inaugurating and make possible dwelling by opening a world in their 
thinging. For Heidegger, dwelling is not conceivable in terms of human action alone, 
but emerges through our engagement with things. 
Heidegger takes the example, in particular, of the jug as a thing that gathers 
together and reveals (or outpours) a world. The jug is a thing, for Heidegger, rather 
than a tool or object, when it brings humankind, in their existence as earthbound, 
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mortal beings, into unity with a world of plurality of environmental and relational 
ties, what Heidegger in his later thought calls the fourfold of earth, sky, mortals and 
divinities. In Heidegger’s terms, ‘[i]n the gift of the outpouring earth and sky, 
divinities and mortals dwell together all at once. These four, at once because of what 
they themselves are, belong together. Preceding everything that is present, they are 
enfolded into a single fourfold’ (T, p. 171). 
In order to demonstrates how the fourfold is gathered and revealed by the 
thing, I will first draw on Heidegger’s description of this process. Heidegger 
emphasises the way that the jug gathers together each element of the fourfold in its 
contents, in its form and materiality, in its capacity for outpouring and in its cultural 
meaningfulness. The jug’s outpouring wine and water points back to the spring and 
the vine, which in turn points towards the sky: 
The outpouring gives water, it gives wine to drink. In the spring the rock 
dwells, and in the rock dwells the dark slumber of the earth, which receives 
the rain and dew of the sky. In the water of the spring dwells the marriage of 
sky and earth. It stays in the wine given by the fruit of the vine, the fruit in 
which the earth’s nourishment and the sky’s sun are betrothed to one another. 
But the gift of the outpouring is what makes the jug a jug. In the jugness of 
the jug, sky and earth dwell. (T, p. 170) 
The connection of the human to this movement of water, and to the growth and 
harvest of grapes, connects to their essential mortality. As Heidegger goes on, ‘[t]he 
gift of the pouring out is a drink for mortals. It refreshes their leisure. It enlivens their 
conviviality’ (T, p. 170). The outpouring also has cultural importance, and the act of 
outpouring reveals a world of human relations, traditions and values: ‘at the jug’s gift 
is at times also given for consecration, then it does not still a thirst. It stills and 
elevates the celebration of the feast. The gift of the pouring now is neither given in an 
inn nor is the poured gift a drink for mortals. The outpouring is the libation poured 
out for the immortal gods’ (T, p. 170). 
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The difference between this kind of thing and the tools and equipment that we 
encounter in everyday use is evident in the way that one opens a world, and the other 
appears in the world. As Malpas notes, ‘to think of the thing as itself having a certain 
location presupposes that one has already stepped back from the thing as “thinging,” 
and so as gathering a world, in order to view it simply as one “thing” located with 
respect to other similarly located “things” within a larger order of such locations’.92 
Unlike an object or tool which appears in the environment and with which we interact 
in our dwelling, then, the thing reveals and places us in the very world of meaningful 
relationality and engagement in which that dwelling unfolds. For Heidegger, the jug 
is a thing because it revealed the world of the fourfold, the world in which humankind 
dwell as mortals. Heidegger values the jug as an example because it is a thing that 
makes possible a certain kind of thinking, a thinking on human mortality, on human 
involvement in and connection to a meaningful environing world. 
If there is something about the jug — in particular its capacity for containing 
and outpouring — that makes it a thing, can this example help develop an 
understanding of the literary text (and the ‘book’ that Heidegger mentions (T, p. 180)) 
as a thing? On the one hand, it is important not to efface the particular character of the 
thing. As Jeff Malpas notes, ‘the revealing that occurs through the gathering that 
occurs in relation to the thing is such that it reveals the character of the thing itself, 
but in doing so it also reveals a particular configuration of the world and so reveals 
other things in a particular light also’. Taking the example of the jug quite literally, 
Malpas explains that ‘[w]hen the jug opens up the world through its “outpouring,” 
what is opened up is the entirety of that to which the jug belongs: the kitchen in 
which the jug is kept, the shop from which it was bought, the character of its making, 
the mode of decoration that it bears, the cups and glasses into which it pours, the 
                                                 




wine, the milk, the water that are poured from it, the occasions of its use, the needs to 
which it responds, the people that make use of it or who are served by it… and so 
on’.93 
In this sense the comparison of the novel with the jug seems incongruous. 
Yet, is there not an implicit connection between the jug, as a container that outpours a 
world, and a literary form? Cleanth Brooks’ famous dictum that ‘[t]he poem itself is 
the well-wrought urn’ is one clear association.94 For Barbara Johnson, ‘[u]rns are 
containers. They contain the ashes of the dead. They can also contain water, wine, 
nourishment. As containers or vehicles, they lend themselves as metaphors for form 
itself, or language itself, as in Francis Ponge’s poem about a jug, which ends, 
“Couldn’t everything I have just said about the jug be said equally well of words?” 
Urns can be metaphors for the relation between form and content, but also between 
body and soul, expression and intention. […] The thing, the human, the poem, and 
indeed language itself all become metaphors for each other through the urn.’95 
The idea that the jug has the character of a thing that reveals the world 
poetically is evident, of course, in Heidegger’s poetic description of the world that the 
thinging jug opens, discussed above. Indeed, Heidegger’s conception of dwelling is 
arguably revealed by the poetic language as fundamentally as it is by the thinging of 
the jug that is the event for the advent of the essay I have been discussing. 
So far I have considered writing as an artistic process and a technology, and 
suggested that the novel, as a particular expression of that intersection between art 
and technology might reveal a world through its status as a thing. I also noted that it is 
the language of the fourfold, which Heidegger encounters in Hölderlin’s poetry, 
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which attunes him to the thinging of the thing, and makes possible its expression in 
language. Heidegger’s discussion of Hölderlin’s poetry, to which I now turn, 
develops further an understanding of the privileged status of poetry — and so too, I 
suggest, of literature — amongst things. In both Heidegger’s earlier writings on 
artwork, and his later work on poetry, dwelling and the thing, it is clear that belonging 
and dwelling is always at issue. It is clear, too, that specific things reveal particular 
modes of dwelling and belonging to the world, and that, under different 
circumstances, individuals will differentially respond, attune, and react to the 
exploration or characterisation of dwelling that particular things reveal, to the worlds 
that things (whether a jug, poem, Greek tragedy or temple) open to them. 
Poetry, reading, writing and attunement 
Considering literature in relation to dwelling might begin with Heidegger’s 
discussion of dwelling and poetic language in ‘Poetically Man Dwells’. Heidegger 
begins this essay, however, by contending that dwelling cannot rest on literature. He 
asks, ‘if the sole form in which poetry exists is literary to start with, then how can 
human dwelling be understood as based on the poetic?’ (PMD, p. 215). In doing so, 
Heidegger intends to establish a more fundamental relationship between the poetic 
and our dwelling which is not limited to thinking of either dwelling or the poetic as 
something merely built or made by human hand. Heidegger gives voice to this 
objection as follows: ‘things of imagination are merely made. Making is, in Greek, 
poeisis. And man’s dwelling is supposed to be poetry and poetic? This can be 
assumed surely, only by someone who stands aside from actuality’ (PMD, p. 214). 
Heidegger does not suggest that we dwell in poetry but rather asks us to attend to 
Hölderlin’s statement more carefully to understand that, to say that dwelling is poetic, 
is to say that dwelling is a form of human existence in which things show up 
poetically: ‘When Hölderlin speaks of dwelling, he has before his eyes the basic 
character of human existence’ (PMD, p. 215). 
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For Hölderlin, Heidegger argues, ‘[p]oetry is what first brings man onto the 
earth, making him belong to it, and thus brings him into dwelling’ (PMD, p. 218). 
Hölderlin does not speak of poetry as a special form of building that makes dwelling 
possible but, Heidegger contends, it is nonetheless the case that Heidegger’s thinking 
emerges from the language of Hölderlin’s poetry. Hölderlin ‘does not speak of 
building, either in the sense of cultivating and erecting, or in such a way as even to 
represent poetry as a special kind of building […] Despite all this, we are thinking the 
same thing that Hölderlin is saying poetically’ (PMD, p. 218). As discussed above, 
the dwelling that Heidegger conceives through Hölderlin’s poetry is a dwelling 
amongst the fourfold, an inhabiting of the world in these poetic terms, as earth, sky, 
divinities and mortals. In the fourfold, things shine and the world is revealed as the 
dynamic unity of the dance of the neighbouring fourfold elements, each relating to 
each other and presencing in a dynamic mirror-play which passes from one element 
of the fourfold to another. 
If Heidegger found in the poetry of Hölderlin and Rilke the means to convey 
the character of dwelling, its poetic mode of revealing and disclosure, this was 
arguably largely due to the liberation of things in this mode of disclosure from their 
presencing as resources in the mode of disclosedness associated with modern 
technology which Heidegger called Gestell, translating as ‘enframing’ or ‘the 
framework’. It is worth mentioning here that the free coming to presence of things in 
the fourfold, their essencing, is entirely oppositional to the technological mode of 
disclosure that Heidegger describes as Gestell.96 Following from this I interpret 
Heidegger’s conception of poetic dwelling, firstly, as mentioned above, as a process 
of attunement to the world as disclosed in the poetic language of Hölderlin’s poetry; 
and, secondly, as the antinomy of the experience of the world as disclosed under 
technological Gestell. As such, the poetic dwelling that Heidegger develops in these 
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later writings represents a vision of a certain, idealised form of dwelling in which 
things are expressed in their essence and in their proper relation to Being. 
This notion of poetic dwelling does not fully address the novel form, nor the 
technological landscape the novel emerges from and is bound up in, but it is 
heuristically useful to consider poetic dwelling as demonstrating one mode of 
disclosure made possible in language: a mode of disclosure which reveals a world 
utterly different to that revealed under Gestell, precisely by enacting a liberation from 
this mode of disclosure. Whilst the poetic dwelling realised, for Heidegger, in the 
poetry of Hölderlin, and considered proper to humankind in Heidegger’s work, might 
represent a certain idealised form of dwelling and its transformational potential, it is 
the technological disclosure of the world under Gestell which Heidegger argues is 
dominant in modern society and which will be most familiar to contemporary readers 
of his work. In Julian Young’s terms, the highly poetic nature of Heidegger’s 
discussion of the fourfold is intended ‘to evoke the Grundstimmung, the “fundamental 
mood”’, of dwelling, an atmosphere which is notably absent from contemporary 
life.97 For Heidegger, then, the language of the poetry offers a means by which we are 
able to meditate on our proper relation to Being in a time of destitution, to consider 
our proximity to Being through experience of the visible world in the poetic terms of 
the fourfold. 
Hölderlin’s poetry revealed to Heidegger not only a world to which 
humankind belongs, the world of the fourfold, but also the specific dynamic of that 
worldly belonging. As Jeff Malpas notes, artworks such as Hölderlin’s poetry are 
distinct from more simple things like the jug in that, in some cases, they bring ‘not 
merely the elements of the fourfold, but the gathering of the fourfold itself, and its 
very mode of gathering, at least partially into view’.98 Through its poetic formulations 
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of human inhabiting, Hölderlin’s poetry reveals a poetic, romantic, character of 
dwelling, giving expression to a worldly belonging to which Heidegger was 
particularly responsive, and which, for Heidegger, expressed linguistically the 
fundamental character of human dwelling. 
Dwelling, in particular the form of poetic dwelling discussed above in relation 
to Heidegger’s work on Hölderlin, can be understood as a particular attunement to the 
world in which things show up in their poetic radiance. In fact, that Hölderlin’s poetry 
opens a thinking of the fourfold for Heidegger demonstrates precisely how literary 
attunement takes place. That Hölderlin’s poetry reveals this process of essencing for 
Heidegger, which in turn allows Heidegger to articulate the process by which other 
things thing, establishes literature as a particularly important element in attunement. 
For Heidegger, the very fact of our receptivity is describable in terms of 
attunement or affectedness. For Heidegger, attunement (Befindlichkeit) is a basic 
ontological structure of human existence which makes it possible for human beings to 
find themselves situated in and responsive to the world in a way that is meaningful to 
them. Befindichkeit has also been translated by William Richardson as ‘already-
having-found-oneself-there-ness’,99 a translation which rightly suggests that 
attunement is not something that we experience but is the apriori condition of the 
everyday experience I have already been discussing: ‘all immanent reflection can find 
“experiences” only because the there is already disclosed in attunement’ (BT, p. 133). 
As such, attunement is a ‘fundamental existential mode of the equiprimordial 
disclosedness of world, Dasein-with and existence because this disclosure itself is 
essentially being-in-the-world’ (BT, p. 133). Heidegger means here that, to all intents 
and purposes, being-in-the-world is attunement, for attunement discloses the there, 
the world and others that share Dasein’s world. Attunement has three essential 
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determinations: the ‘disclosedness of the world which belongs to being-in’ (BT, p. 
133), ‘the disclosure of throwness’ (BT, p. 133), and ‘the actual disclosure of the 
whole of being-in-the-world’ (BT, p. 133). 
As such, attunement makes us aware of the world, of our being-there in the 
world, and in turn of everything that we experience there. Through attunement, then, 
things show up to Dasein ‘in such a way that what it encounters in the world can 
matter to it’ (BT, p. 133). In this way attunement reveals, for instance, the world ‘as 
something by which it can be threatened’, and making affective responses possible, 
allowing us to be ‘touched’ by the world (BT, p. 134). At the same time, In Being and 
Time, worldly attunement is conceived experientially through moods (Stimmungen). 
Andrea Elpidorou and Lauren Freeman explain this relation as follows: ‘As the ontic 
manifestation of Befindlichkeit, Stimmungen are the various and specific ways in 
which Dasein can relate to and disclose the world, all of which occur against the 
backdrop of the structure of Befindlichkeit’.100 Heidegger describes this condition of 
encountering the world, following his discussion of attunement, mood as follows: ‘we 
must ontologically in principle leave the primary discovery of the world to “mere 
mood”’ (BT, p. 134). 
Heidegger’s insight that the world is disclosed through attunement, and 
secondly, that our knowledge of the world is always coloured by, even made possible 
by, our being in a mood have been taken up by literary scholars in recent years, which 
have seen an explosion of critical interest in dwelling, mood and attunement. 
Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, who has played a large part in reviving mood as a 
category of literary analysis in recent years, expands on this difficulty by explaining 
that the term Stimmung is very difficult to translate, often being rendered in English 
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as both as ‘mood’ and ‘climate’; furthermore, where a mood is often a private, inner 
feeling, so deeply cloistered within the self as to evade others’ understanding, 
Stimmung implies something that surrounds and even assails us, exerting a physical 
influence. The Stimmung of a literary text then suggests its tone, its atmosphere or 
mood, and the way that these stem from the tone, rhythm or other distinctive qualities 
of the novel’s voice. Gumbrecht explicates the play between mood and attunement 
existing in Stimmung, observing that the word is a linguistic cousin of the words 
Stimme, meaning ‘voice’, and Stimmen, which refers to ‘tuning a musical instrument’. 
By rejecting the mimetic basis of literary accounts of alterity, Gumbrecht’s work 
approaches a discussion of literary attunement, focused through his primary argument 
that literary atmospheres and moods afford a sensuous experience of the historical 
past, allowing readers to ‘encounter past realities’ and creating ‘effects of immediacy’ 
routinely overlooked in current scholarship.101 
In spite of the relation Gumbrecht draws between mood and attunement, 
research that jointly considers mood and attunement in literary studies is currently 
underdeveloped. This is a complex issue in literary scholarship because, whilst the 
distinction between mood and attunement in Heidegger’s writings can be reduced to a 
distinction – albeit not insignificant – between ontological attunements and their ontic 
manifestations in moods, the mood of a work of art or literature and the attunement of 
a reader of viewer appear quite separate. In common usage, attunement usually has an 
object — for instance we might speak of a person being attuned to a particular 
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situation or an artwork — whereas mood is more dispersed and generalised, 
designating a general disposition towards others and things in the surrounding world. 
Whilst being in a mood can certainly relate to a particular thing — you might be in 
the mood for dancing, or a particular film, for instance — this still perhaps suggests 
an underlying attitude or emotion. Attunement, by contrast, usually implies a more 
active engagement with a thing or context, a strong feeling of understanding, or lack 
of such understanding. 
In this vein, it is important to distinguish between the analysis of literary 
mood and atmosphere that Gumbrecht develops and the more originary movement of 
attunement which Heidegger argues unfolds in the language of Hölderlin’s poetry. In 
these writings, Heidegger affords to poetry a similar capacity for world-opening in his 
later writings on Hölderlin’s works. In Hölderlin's Hymns:“Germania” and “The 
Rhine”, Heidegger writes that: 
The voice [Stimme] of the telling must be attuned [gestimmt], that the poet 
speaks from out of an attunement [Stimmung], an attunement that determines 
and attunes [be-stimmt] the ground and soil and that permeates [durchstimmt] 
the space upon which and within which the poetic telling founds a way of 
being. This attunement we name the fundamental attunement of poetizing. 
This attunement we name the fundamental attunement of the poetizing. By 
fundamental attunement, we do not mean some vague emotional state that 
merely attends the telling. Rather, the fundamental attunement opens up the 
world that in the poetic telling receives the stamp of beyng’ (HHGR, p. 73). 
Here, the voice (Stimme), of the poet speaks of their attunement, rendered here as 
Stimmung, productively allowing thought of attunement as world disclosure alongside 
the term’s more everyday connotations. 
This is productive for my purposes because, if the novel is to be considered a 
space for dwelling to unfold, it is necessary to consider the Stimmung of the text not 
only as a mood but as a fundamental attunement to which the novelist’s voice, and 
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perhaps also the life that inhabit that space, are attuned. Insofar as dwelling is shaped 
through attunement and connection with things, our dwelling can be understood as 
entailing and expressing the various permutations of attunement and responsiveness 
to the world, its situations and possibilities, as they change through time. Such 
ongoing shifts in attachments, affinities, relations and interpretations constitute the 
very dwelling which I address here. As such the contention that such varying 
attunements, responses, attachments and interpretations take place narratively follows 
from the way that they occur through time but also in place, in the negotiation of 
opened spaces and lived environments in response to which attachments and 
responses are formed. This is especially the case in the novel form, a bounded space 
which reader and character negotiate. 
Novels as ‘environing worlds’ 
Despite the primacy that Heidegger gives to Dasein over other entities, which 
as many commentators have noticed certainly includes animals, Dasein’s worldliness 
– characterised by immersed, entangled involvement with human non-human entities 
– has much in common, as Jeff Malpas notes, with twentieth-century thinking on 
animal behaviour. Explaining this connection, Jeff Malpas writes: 
The idea of the ‘environing world’ that appears in twentieth-century 
ethological thought looks to understand the way in which different creatures 
always live within a certain configuration of salient features and affordances. 
Similarly, the ‘world,’ as Heidegger uses it, is understood as a particular 
configuration of meaning—a context of meaning we might say 
(Bedeutsamkeit) or of meaningful involvements (Bewandtnis). The world as 
first encountered is thus not a world of mere causes, of ideas or impressions, 
or even of states of affairs, but a world of self, of others, of concrete things.102 
As Malpas does not mention specific criticism in this regard, I recall here Namwali 
Serpell’s recent conceptualisation of ethical criticism, mentioned in my introduction, 
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as the ‘phenomenological evocation of the aesthetic, affective and ethical affordances 
of moving through [a narrative] structure’.103 Serpell, like Malpas, draws the term 
‘affordances’ from the work of ethological thought, in particular the work of James J. 
Gibson, where it originally designated, in Serpell’s terms, ‘how animals relate to an 
environment’.104 
If these implicit affinities between Heidegger’s notion of the world and 
Serpell’s approach to the novel suggest the possibility of approaching the novel as an 
‘environing world’ which affords certain possibilities for dwelling, there are also 
significant distinctions to be made between our approaches. Firstly, as I have been 
suggesting throughout the thesis so far, my approach is concerned with the 
possibilities for dwelling of characterological life in the ‘environing world’ of the 
novel, and the way that this dwelling might be shaped by a text’s formal and aesthetic 
dimensions. Second, as stressed above, approaching the novel from a dwelling 
perspective would necessitate attending to the world-building movement of (human) 
dwelling itself.105 
Both of these considerations are in fact borne out in Tim Ingold’s ‘dwelling 
perspective’, discussed above, which itself responds to Gibson’s work on affordances. 
As Ingold notes, Gibson’s model does not attend to the social dimension of human 
life. Whilst Gibson suggests that humans share mutual affordances, interaction is 
given little consideration beyond this. Instead, other humans in the environment are 
also seen as giving affordances, acting back as they are acted on; as Gibson 
concludes, ‘behaviour affords behaviour’.106 On the one hand, Gibson’s suggestion 
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that human activity is interpreted through a more primary relation with the 
environment appears conducive to thinking through the problematic of life in the 
novel form — what Dorothy Hale terms the ‘double nature’ of character as ‘full 
psychology’ and ‘as an element of aesthetic form’.107 On the other hand, a theory of 
affordances appears to overlook, as Ingold notes, that each ‘environment’— in my 
study, each narrative environment —‘is […] in reality constituted in relation to the 
beings whose environment it is’.108 As Ingold points out, ‘for all his emphasis on 
perception as a process that is continually going on, Gibson assumed that the world 
which the perceiver moves around in and explores is relatively fixed and permanent, 
somehow pre-prepared with all its affordances ready and waiting to be taken up by 
whatever creatures arrive to inhabit it’.109 To view the novel as an event of dwelling, 
by contrast, would mean to think characterological life as generative of the 
‘environing world’, or narrative environment, itself. As Ingold writes in an 
anthropological register, ‘life is not the revelation of pre-existent form but the very 
process wherein form is generated and held in place’.110 
Narrativity and narratives: reading and logos 
How far, it seems equally necessary to ask, does Heidegger’s thought suggest 
an originary human connection to narrative? Whilst I take up the issue of narrative 
dwelling as it is negotiated in a novel, DeLillo’s The Body Artist, in Chapter 4, it 
nonetheless bears questioning here whether it is possible to take this thinking of the 
relationship between dwelling, building and narrative beyond analogy or conceit. Do 
humans dwell narratively? Or, to what extent can we think of the human process of 
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dwelling in narrative terms? Notably, Heidegger argued in ‘Building Dwelling 
Thinking’ that dwelling is not a form of building identical with artistry, opening this 
essay with the clarification that ‘this venture in thought does not view building as an 
art or as a technique of construction’ (BDT, p. 347). Nonetheless, Heidegger’s work 
does suggest ways of thinking about the human relationship to the lived environment 
as unfolding through narrative processes of interpretation, an issue I will discuss here. 
Narrative and dwelling in Heidegger 
Whilst, for Heidegger, poetic language opened thinking of dwelling, this does 
not mean that narrative was not of importance in Heidegger’s thought.111 Laura 
Bieger has recently argued that humans do indeed dwell in narrative, citing the need 
to shape worldly ‘belonging as an anthropological premise of narration’.112 This 
premise is anthropological, for Bieger, and can be discussed in terms of human 
‘dwelling in narrative’, in part at least because our conceptions of narrativity and 
narrative identity rest on assumptions about human beings these thinkers inherited 
from Heidegger. For Bieger, whilst literary critical notions of interpretation and 
narrative as constituent dimensions of human being primarily enter literary 
scholarship through the work of Paul Ricoeur and, relatedly, Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
their debt to Heidegger’s fundamental anthropology requires further attention. 
Furthermore, Bieger contends, Ricoeur’s ‘work on the [the entanglement of life and 
narrative] is so deeply invested in matters of human temporality that its spatial 
correlative is simply ignored’.113 Glossing Heidegger’s notion of our originary 
thrownness as an impetus for narration, Bieger writes that ‘human beings experience 
themselves (especially in the early stages of gaining consciousness) as having been 
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involuntarily thrust (geworfen) into a world that must have preceded their own 
existence, and that, upon realizing their primary disjunction from this world, seems 
infinite and senseless. It is the realization of this fundamental lack of meaning and 
connectivity that imposes onto human beings the existential task of interpretation, to 
which the unknowability of death poses the greatest challenge’.114 
Taking such an anthropological approach to narrative is partly a process of 
acknowledging, as Bieger notes, that ‘assumptions about human being are at the 
bottom of any theorization of literature or culture’ and attempting to attend to these 
assumptions.115 In this view, Heidegger’s writings make it possible to think of 
narration, and so writing, as a basic constituent of human being, giving literary 
critical support to the understanding of writing as a practice which belongs to 
dwelling as outlined in my discussion of Ingold’s work, above. 
The question of narrative as constitutive of human being in Heidegger’s 
thought lies primarily, as Bieger’s discussion of human thrownness suggests, in 
Heidegger’s earlier work, and in Being and Time in particular. Whilst the issue — 
what Bieger and other commentators term the question of our ‘ontological narrativity’ 
— remains unresolved with regards to Heidegger’s thought,116 it is clear that Dasein’s 
temporal projection can be understood as a narrative process. Ben Roth, in particular, 
has developed a ‘Heideggerian theory of the narrative self’ based on an interpretation 
of Dasein’s temporal projection as a narrative arc, described as follows: 
[I]n their most fundamental terms—thrownness and projection—the two sides 
of our situated-being come together as two parts of a whole. Geworfenheit 
and Entwurf, thrownness and throwing forward, both play on the same root, 
the verb werfen. I am always in the middle of an arc […] thrown into the 
world and now projecting where I am going. Yet due to, as always, the more 
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important place of projection and possibility in Heidegger’s account, the 
notion that I enact one story is implausible. Rather, each of us finds ourselves 
amidst a whole network of possible narratives. These stories are not merely 
possible, various optional accounts we might offer of our situations. Rather, 
by Heidegger’s analysis of thrown projection, we necessarily find ourselves 
on an arc from givens to possibilities. […] We are the readers of our own 
existence. This claim is not merely a metaphor, however, and it says more 
than that we have a capacity for self‐interpretation. We understand who we 
are now by casting larger hypothetical arcs of plot in the same way that 
readers, when in the middle of a story, project where that story is going in 
order to understand the identity and situation of its characters.117 
Roth’s interpretation of narrativity in terms of a fundamental readerliness, and so of 
‘selves [as] readers (in the middle)’ is intriguing, in particular for the way it conceives 
of possibilities for being in which human actors are already embedded: ‘[t]his set of 
possibilities is constantly evolving, constituting a network of narratives, possible arcs 
of plot we might play out in our existence. The self is to be found where these various 
plotlines intersect’.118 
At the same time, even the literal interpretation of lived existence as reading 
here cannot account fully for the role that narrative language plays in 
phenomenological navigation of the lived environment in Heidegger’s later thought, 
nor can it account for the special way in which poetry, art and literature open the 
world to their readers or spectators. This is, in part, because in Heidegger’s later 
thought language becomes less a possession of Dasein and more a possession of 
being itself. As James Magrini and Elias Schwieler note, in Being and Time 
‘Heidegger philosophises language in terms of the ontological difference, making the 
distinction between language as Sprache and Discourse as Rede’. The authors 
continue, ‘language conveys meaning, but it is Discourse, in Being and Time, that 
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provides the initial ontologico-existential structure for the possibility of language’.119 
In Heidegger’s later writings, however, ‘reference to the ontological difference drops 
from his philosophy, and the understanding of language as a unique ontologico-
existential possibility of Dasein’s Being-in as Discourse, changes dramatically [...] 
reveal[ing] to Heidegger that language properly belongs to Being and not Dasein’.120 
Two repercussions of this shift in language (from Dasein to Being) are 
important to my argument here. The first is a shift in the conception of narrative to 
become more spatially oriented — something that establishes a different orientation 
between narrative and human existence which is more appropriate to the question of 
dwelling. This conception of narrative interpretation, of reading in fact, as a means of 
navigating the environment was not applicable in the same way when viewed from 
the perspective of Being and Time, where spatiality was secondary to temporal 
movement, suggested in Roth’s comment that ‘[b]ecause I am concerned with our 
temporal, ultimately narrative, self‐understanding, Heidegger’s analysis of our 
spatiality can be left aside’.121 The second consequence of this shift is that language 
now sits alongside discursiveness, and so is imbued with the same capacities for 
shaping being-in-the-world that were previously only afforded to discursiveness. This 
means that artworks, narratives and poetic language are able to open worlds and 
shape possibilities for Being in ways that were not thinkable in Heidegger’s earlier 
thought, when language was the possession of Dasein. The spatial dimensions of the 
entanglement between human beings and narratives, which are particularly important 
for considering the novel as an environment shaped through dwelling, can be drawn 
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out through further reference both to Heidegger’s writings, but also by turning to 
Hayden White’s work on narrativity.  
Narrative and dwelling in the lived environment 
Firstly, looking to Heidegger, in a discussion of Heraclitus’ fragment B50, 
Heidegger argues that, because early Greeks did not conceive of their language as a 
culturally and historically specific instance of the human capacity for discourse or 
discursiveness, for the early Greeks, logos (discourse or reason) was, as Jussi 
Backman notes, ‘inherently linguistic’.122 As such, ‘language was conceptualized 
“logocentrically” as a derivative material and vocal representation of λόγος [logos], 
as its culturally specific expression’.123 In this way Heidegger dislodges the 
‘hierarchy between discursiveness and language’ evident in his earlier thought, and 
instead positions meaningful existence as fundamentally grounded in the language of 
different historical communities.124 As Backman notes, although the Greeks, and so 
Heraclitus, interpreted the logos as universal, ‘there is no universal language; there 
are only particular languages that constitute particular historical communities and the 
particular ways in which they experience meaningfulness’.125 Whilst the global 
influence of certain languages, English above all, and the emergence of world 
literature will give us pause, here, there are also insights, into the relation between the 
Being of a people, and the language in which they dwell, that bears further 
consideration here. 
For Heidegger, Heraclitus conceived of the narrative, linguistic, process of 
worldly existence as a manifestation of Being itself through human experience: 
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The word logos names that which gathers all present beings into presencing 
and lets them lie before us in it. Logos names that in which the presencing of 
what is present comes to pass […] The laying that gathers assembles in itself 
all destiny by bringing things and letting them lie before us, keeping each 
absent and present being in its place and on its way; and by its assembling it 
secures everything in the totality. Thus each being can be secured and sent 
into its own. (EGT, p. 68) 
Heidegger goes on to argue, here, that reading (lesen), is a ‘predominant’ instance of 
this more originary capacity for discourse as a form of gathering: ‘[t]he lesen better 
known to us, namely, the reading of something written, remains but one sort of 
gathering, in the sense of bringing-together-into-lying-before, although it is indeed 
the predominant sort’ (EGT, p. 68). If Heidegger discusses reading as an example 
here, it is also the case, as the discussion above suggests, that this process of laying-
gathering is a more general principle of human experience that begins with bringing 
things into the protection of human dwelling. Immediately after the example of 
reading as a laying-gathering, Heidegger takes the example of the harvest, which 
‘gathers fruit from the soil’ (EGT, p. 61) and ‘grapes from the vine’ (EGT, p. 61). In 
this process Heidegger signals quite explicitly the connection between this process of 
laying-gathering and human dwelling and building:   
Picking and gleaning are followed by the bringing together of the fruit. So 
long as we persist in the usual appearances we are inclined to take this 
bringing together as the gathering itself or even its termination. But gathering 
is more than mere amassing. To gathering belongs a collecting which brings 
under shelter. Accommodation governs the sheltering: accommodation is in 
turn governed by safekeeping. (EGT, p. 61) 
Taking these examples together makes is possible to conceive of reading, when 
thought of in terms of dwelling, as a process of the phenomenological navigation and 
deliberation of narrative environments. Reading and dwelling are both positioned, 
here, as processes that gather entities together interpretatively to form meaningful 
associations. Thinking of narrative as an environment negotiated by a reader who 
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cultivates meaning somewhat repeats the tendency, discussed above, towards 
approaching narrative environments through readerly affordances. As I have 
suggested here, however, human dwelling unfolds in part through processes of 
‘cultivating’ and ‘gathering’ that are comparable with reading. In the perspective I am 
proposing here it would be necessary, to the extent of the parallel drawn above at 
least, to move a step beyond this and attend to the way that novels position their 
characters as likewise ‘readerly’, at least to the extent they too are positioned as 
responsive to the aesthetic dimensions of the text they inhabit.  
 If Heidegger’s writings suggest a narrative dimension to our processes 
of navigating, interpreting and constituting centres of meaning in an environment, 
Hayden White’s work offer insights to develop an understanding of our relationship 
to the centres of meaning that narratives produce. White famously draws attention, as 
Laura Bieger succinctly puts it, to the way that ‘historical storytelling […] absorbed 
[…] the basic modes and conventions of literary storytelling’ in its meteoric rise that 
dethroned theology and established history as the key social discourse in the early 
modern period: ‘a powerful token of narrative’s altered function in the modern 
world’. At the same time, White also argued that what he called the ‘historical 
imagination’ reached a point of crisis in the nineteenth century regarding the 
legitimacy and representative capacities of its own proliferating narrative 
methodologies.  
Highlighting that the Ironic ‘frame of mind is merely one on a number of 
possible postures that one may assume before the historical record’, White sought to 
provide ‘some of the grounds for a rejection of Irony itself’ which in turn would make 
possible a return to a productive plurality of different modes of historical thought.126  
Even whilst White was concerned about the loss of a meaningful relation to history in 
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an entrenched Ironic mode, his thought also evinces a deeper concern about the loss 
of a narrative centre which, in White’s view, would render human life devoid of 
value. Taking the example of the annalist from the middle ages in an essay titled ‘The 
Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality’, White asks the question: ‘what 
notion of reality’ does the annalist have? Without ‘a social center by which to locate 
[…] events with respect to one another and to charge them with ethical or moral 
significance’, the experience of the annalist is devoid of texture or meaning.127 
 As this quotation makes clear, White equally viewed events themselves as, in 
themselves, non-narrative. As Hanna Meretjoa has demonstrated in this regard, White 
felt that ‘narratives project a false order on the disorder of human existence’.128 
White’s work reveals our dynamic, often problematic and unresolved dependence on 
narrative forms, forms which have to be negotiated differently across historical 
periods and social contexts, and always from a position of emplacement – whether at 
the centre or the margins – of society, what White calls ‘social or physical space’. In 
this reading, our attachment to particular narrative modes – is a dynamic process of 
relation to a social space that can be both existentially supportive, and the source of a 
crisis when that narrativity becomes a problem and in turn threatens the ‘space’ of 
discourse itself. If belonging to narrative is uneasy but unavoidable, as White’s work 
suggests, this intimation provides some ground for addressing novelistic explorations 
of attachment to, and possibilities for dwelling in, narrative. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined coordinates for conceptualising dwelling in the 
novel, attending in particular to the proximity between dwelling and attunement, and 
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between dwelling and human beings’ entanglement in narrative — specifically, the 
interpretive processes of reading and writing. This discussion has aimed to 
demonstrate both the importance of narrative interpretation in the spatial navigation 
of environments, but also to draw out a fundamental connection between reading and 
dwelling. Heidegger’s writings on dwelling in language equally reveal, of course, a 
vision of dwelling as proximity to Being (as with early Greek logos) and as being-
amongst the fourfold (as with the attunement of the German people to Hölderlin’s 
poetry) which is alien to modern life. To rehearse this point is, of course, partly to 
rehearse part of the movement of Heidegger’s argument about dwelling itself. In 
modernity, our conception of human being as building, not dwelling; our relationship 
to technology as a framework, and to the world as a resource; our understanding of 
artworks as objects of experience, all divorce us from our essential nature. 
At the same time, as Hayden White’s writings on human narrativity 
powerfully suggest, it is perhaps equally the case that there is no way ‘out’ of our 
possession, and belonging to, narrative for human beings. The stories we tell, in this 
view, would be an expression of the condition of our dwelling, or more accurately an 
expression of our attempts at self-interpretation, and at negotiating the relationship of 
attachment to the particular forms in which we reflect on our changing condition. It is 
from this standpoint that I turn to the writers addressed in the remaining chapters of 
the thesis. 
I take up this question of our uneasy belonging in narrative, and its relationship 
to the modern technology of writing, in Chapters 3 and 4, which address most directly 
Heidegger’s suggestion that we ‘must ever learn to dwell’ (BDT, p. 159). In Chapter 
2, I first expand on other questions raised here about the aesthetic dimensions of 
dwelling in the novel. Addressing Zadie’s Smith London fictions, White Teeth and 
NW, I consider the issue of attunement as it presents in the world of Smith’s novels. 
This raises questions, firstly, about how the capacity for literature and art to shape our 
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worldly attunement might affect the condition of life in the novel, in ways often 
overlooked in literary criticism; and, secondly about how (attuned) characterological 
dwelling may be actively involved in processes of novelistic world-building. In doing 
so, I narrow the focus of my discussion of dwelling in the novel by addressing 
specific ways in which the contemporary novel both reflexively navigates its own 
worldliness (always at play with human worldliness), and interprets the possibilities 




Chapter 2: Mood, World and Ethics in Zadie Smith’s 
London Fiction 
 
‘Of the Old and New People of Willesden I speak; I have been chosen to speak for 
them, though they did not choose me and must wonder what gives me the right. I 
could say, “Because I was born at the crossroads of Willesden, Kilburn, and Queen’s 
Park!” But the reply would be swift and damning: “Oh, don’t be foolish, many people 
were born right there; it doesn’t mean anything at all. We are not one people and no 
one can speak for us’. 
– Zadie Smith, The Embassy of Cambodia 
 
In an essay from 2012 titled ‘Some Notes on Attunement’, Zadie Smith 
reflects on her ‘sudden, unexpected attunement’ to Joni Mitchell’s music: ‘I hated 
Joni Mitchell — and then I loved her. Her voice did nothing for me — until the day it 
undid me completely’.129 For Smith it is important not ‘to confuse this phenomenon 
with a progressive change in taste’, which ‘usually follows a conscious act of will’ 
through a concerted effort of engagement and an active cultivation of appreciation. 
Instead, what the author describes here is the revelatory experience of aesthetic 
attunement. On the day when Smith first truly hears Mitchell’s music, as if for the 
first time, she emerges from her car, ‘hardly aware that she was humming Joni, not 
yet conscious of the transformation she had already undergone’, and walks into the 
ruins of Tintern Abbey in the south of Wales. 
Something had happened to me. In all the mess of memories we make each 
day and lose, I knew that this one would not be lost. I had Wordsworth’s 
sensation exactly: “That in this moment there is life and food / For future 
years.” 
The version of attunement Smith describes here is primarily one of personal 
transformation, but it also contains a complex allusion to the relationship between 
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attunement and place. This is evident, firstly, in the way that Smith becomes aware of 
her attunement to Mitchell’s music not in the car where she is listening to it, but in the 
open spaces of the Abbey’s ruins, ‘[r]oofless, floorless, glassless, forced to accept the 
holiness that is everywhere in everything’. That Smith should feel she had the very 
experience she remembered from William Wordsworth’s poem, ‘Lines Written a Few 
Miles Above Tintern Abbey’ (1798) — what she calls Wordsworth’s ‘ecstasy’ — 
further foregrounds the influence of place in her unexpected aesthetic attunement.130 
Whilst Smith’s essay mostly focuses on musical attunement, another literary 
reference is the Exordium to Søren Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. Smith’s 
comments on this short story offer another view of literary attunement: ‘When I read 
the “Exordium”’, the author reflects, ‘I feel that Kierkegaard is trying to get me into a 
state of readiness for a consideration of the actual Biblical story of Abraham and 
Isaac, which is essentially inexplicable’. If such a transformation of readerly 
disposition and perspective is intended by Kierkegaard’s Exordium, this effect is 
secondary to, and seems to proceed from, the Exordium’s reflections on human 
attunement at the narrative, diegetic level. The Exordium is narrative of and about 
attunement, as it follows, in Smith’s words, the story of a ‘simple, faithful man […] 
who is obsessed with the Biblical tale of Abraham and Isaac but finds he cannot 
understand it’.131 After much rational deliberation, to which I will return later in this 
chapter, the man submits to his incomprehension, reflecting that ‘[n]o one was as 
great as Abraham. Who is able to understand him?’ (Kierkegaard). Yet, this 
submission is the necessary preparation for a different kind of knowledge, one that 
can emerge only through attunement; as Smith puts it, ‘the paradoxical truth: God 
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told me I would be fruitful through my son, and yet God is telling me to kill my son’ 
is beyond objective, rational explication; ‘no one can understand him [Abraham] — 
at least, not rationally. Faith involves an acceptance of absurdity’.132 In this chapter I 
attend to a comparable navigation of questions of human attunement in the narratives 
of Smith’s London novels White Teeth (2000) and NW (2012). 
Smith’s novels are key texts in discussions about the aesthetics and ethics of 
the contemporary novel, not least for Dorothy Hale, who has influentially recognised 
a nuanced exploration of the ethics of representation in Smith’s novel On Beauty 
(2005). For Hale, ‘the Anglo-American novel in the twentieth century is grounded in 
an ethical belief that the novel realizes its generic potential best when it has 
maximized the representation of social identities other to the author’s own’.133 
Smith’s writing pursues this aesthetics of alterity even whilst, as Hale notes, Smith is 
an outspoken proponent of the singular presence of the author in the text, what Smith 
calls the ‘way of being in the world that an author can’t help tell if [she] writes 
well’.134 For Hale, the ethical achievement of Smith’s twenty first century novel is a 
relativising of the representation of otherness in novelistic aesthetics. In this view, On 
Beauty situates the novelist’s identity, their way of being, in the midst of a range of 
perspectives that differ from their own, and ‘stages the encounter between points of 
view […] as an event that can itself be known only from a particular point of view’.135 
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In this chapter I read White Teeth and NW against the grain of this 
perspectivalism, exploring the neglected role of human attunements and moods, 
which in any case precede perspectival autonomy itself. The role of attunement is 
particularly influential in White Teeth, where characters’ individual perspectives are 
always secondary to their aesthetically mediated moods and dispositions. Whilst 
acknowledging the renewed attention to the autonomy of different identities and 
perspectives in NW, I extend the consideration of attunement to this novel to 
demonstrate the persistent influence of individual and social moods in shaping these 
others and their worldly dispositions. I examine the way that moods, dispositions and 
attunements unfold in the world of Smith’s London fiction, suggesting that these 
novels consciously feature populations attuned by the aesthetic dimensions of the 
works themselves. In doing so, I foreground the role of such diffuse social 
atmospheres and pre-reflective dispositions in shaping the restriction and expansion 
of autonomy which defines the ethics and aesthetics of the contemporary novel. 
I speak of the world, not worlds, of these two novels partly because of the 
continuity between the setting of the two works and their shared depiction of different 
generations of lived experience, in global, postcolonial London. Whilst NW is more 
localised in north west London than White Teeth, brief reappearances of figures from 
2000’s White Teeth in 2012’s NW suggest, as Michael Perfect has perceptively noted, 
‘that the fictionalised North West London in which NW’s characters live is in fact the 
very same one as that of White Teeth’.136 Individually, the two novels respond to the 
contemporary moments they respectively depict, but taken together they reflect the 
changing landscape of social and cultural relations in the global city of London across 
the time of their publications. They quite literally bookend a period of history that 
saw the arrival of a new millennium, the spectacular violence of the 9/11 attacks and 
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the subsequent US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, an intensification of global 
terrorism, the global financial crash of 2007 that sparked the Great Recession, and the 
rise of a global refugee crisis, with growing global conflict causing a vast and 
unprecedented increase in displacement and forced migration.137 Without wishing to 
elide the differences between these two works, which are many, I take the changing 
mood or climate of these two novels as the starting point for considering their 
continuities and differences. 
The first of these, White Teeth, was initially interpreted by critics and 
journalists as a celebratory account of intercultural relations, a view later brought 
under scrutiny by critics who questioned whether Smith’s debut really portrays what 
the novel itself had called a ‘Happy Multicultural Land’.138 As commentators have 
increasingly recognised, a critical scrutiny of multiculturalism is intrinsic to White 
Teeth, at least when the novel is approached from the historical vantage that the years 
since its publication provide. Part of my task in this chapter will be to demonstrate 
that White Teeth can be interpreted not as rejecting or embracing multiculturalism, 
but as making available to its reader the changing mood of multicultural life in 
London at the end of the last century. White Teeth traces both the emergence of 
multiculturalism, and its possibilities, permutations and transmutations as it makes 
contact with the historical threshold of the millennium. In the time between White 
Teeth and NW’s publications, the 7/7 bombings frayed cultural relations and made 
permissible a discourse that challenged the tenets of multiculturalism, epitomised in 
David Cameron’s ‘war on multiculturalism’,139 which condemned a ‘failed approach 
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[…] that stood neutral between different values’.140 London was also at the centre of 
the global financial crash, which saw the imposition of a policy of economic austerity 
and an incremental erosion of the welfare state. In 2011, there was rioting in a 
number of London’s boroughs and across the country, attributable in part to social 
tensions, increased unemployment and rising inequality. In the years following NW’s 
publication another essential context has emerged in the form of Brexit. 
Changes in the shifting landscape of social relations depicted across the 
novels produces two strikingly different narrative forms. In White Teeth, cross-
cultural encounters constitute a web of relations that support a multicultural society. 
In NW, by contrast, the foundations of social identity are continuously challenged as 
the relationships and places of belonging that constitute social identity fail to cohere 
and support the novel’s characters. Encounters that cross boundaries of race or class 
are fraught with misunderstanding, or lingering distrust, that appears increasingly 
insurmountable and is broadly reflective of the novel’s socially pessimistic 
atmosphere. Yet in themselves, these reflections on the changing nature of social 
experience in Smith’s London will attest only to the novel’s anthropological 
understanding of the historically particular realities of identity and belonging in 
London across these periods. To speak of these novels’ differing attunements to the 
nature of social reality would be to use the term in a way that still thinks of 
attunement in the sense of a correspondence to, or understanding of, that reality. 
Instead, as discussed above, my aim in this chapter is to attend to the more 
fundamental way that aesthetic elements affectively attune Smith’s characters to the 
world of her London novels, extending the ethical-critical focus on perspectivalism to 
include dispositions, moods and attunements. 
                                                 





As I approach the ethical dimensions of mood in Smith’s London fiction, 
which come to the fore in NW, empathy becomes important in my analysis as a 
particular mood. In this regard, I draw on Lawrence Hatab’s intimation that empathy 
presents itself as a ‘moral mood’ in Heidegger’s writings.141 In developing this 
argument I consider the aesthetically mediated revealing of a world in concert with 
Heidegger’s more originary considerations about how human beings come to find 
themselves in, and (so to speak) of, their world in the first place. In this respect, I 
draw on two of Heidegger’s fundamental insights: first, that the world is disclosed 
through attunement and, second, that our knowledge of the world is always coloured 
by, even made possible by, our being-in a mood. To prepare my analysis of the novels 
I first offer a reading of these issues as they are presented in Being and Time, to 
which I now turn. 
Attunement and being-in, being-with and empathy 
In Division 1, Chapter 4 of Being and Time, Heidegger asks ‘who’ Dasein is 
in its everyday dealings. This section precedes a discussion of the fundamental 
structures of Dasein which constitute everyday being-in-the-world in Division 1, 
Chapter 5. Reading these two chapters affords an understanding of the roles that 
attunement and being-with play in Dasein’s everyday being-in-the-world, an 
understanding which will support my reading of Zadie Smith’s two novels. I will 
begin with Division 1, Chapter 4, in order to discuss Dasein’s quotidian being-with, 
before turning to Division 1, Chapter 5, and Heidegger’s understanding of being-in-
the-world as comprised fundamentally by attunement. 
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In Chapter 4 of Being and Time Heidegger tackles ‘the Existential Question 
of the Who of Dasein’ (BT, p. 112), arguing that Dasein is fundamentally 
characterised by its being-with others. Heidegger begins this analysis by stating that 
‘Dasein is a being which I myself am, its being is in each case mine’ (BT, p. 112). 
Heidegger warns, though, against the ‘miserable egotism’ (BT, p. 112), what we 
might call the logical fallacy, of deducing that since ‘Dasein is a being which I myself 
am’, an enquiry into the ‘who’ of Dasein can proceed through an introspective 
analysis of the ‘I’. ‘Starting with the givenness of the I for Dasein itself and its 
obvious self-interpretation’ (BT, p. 113) risks producing an understanding of Dasein 
that is ‘abstract[ed] from everything else that is “given”’ (BT, p. 112). As Heidegger 
will go on to argue, if ‘I’ in itself does not describe Dasein, the ‘being which I myself 
am’, this is because Dasein is always already both in the world and with others. 
Understanding Dasein, then, means considering other entities, seemingly also 
‘givens’, such as ‘an existing “world”’ and ‘the being of the other “I”s’ (BT, p. 112). 
There is no ‘I’, then, without the world of the ‘I’ and the other ‘I’s in that world: ‘“the 
others” are always already there with us in being-in-the-world’ (BT, p. 113, emphasis 
in original). Heidegger warns again, though, against falling into the trap of enquiring 
into the ‘who’ of Dasein through an analysis of the ontic conditions of these ‘givens’ 
— self, others and world: this analysis ‘must not mislead us into thinking that the 
ontological structure of what is thus “given” is self-evident and not in need of an 
investigation’ (BT, pp. 113–114). In order to overcome this logical focus on the 
‘ontic, self-evident character’ of Dasein, it is necessary to overcome what Heidegger 
calls ‘the distorted presumption that the being in question really has, at bottom, the 
kind of being of something objectively present’ (BT, p. 114). This is to say that the 
temptation to understand the ‘I’ as a ‘given’ also entails a tendency to think of Dasein 
as an object in an environment populated with other objects, including the world itself 
and the others that Dasein recognises as fundamentally the same as itself. Heidegger 
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argues that Dasein is not an objectively present entity, but rather a way of being-in-
the-world. The ‘core’ or ‘substance’ of Dasein’s ‘being is not the spirit as the 
synthesis of body and soul, it is rather existence’ (BT, p. 114, emphasis in original). 
To understand Dasein is to understand, Heidegger suggests, its way of being-in-the-
world, and this necessarily involves a description of the world as Dasein relates to it 
in the everyday. The worldliness of Dasein is characterised by being-with others, and 
being-with others through things, which Dasein encounters through its care 
(Fursorge). 
As this discussion suggests, the world is never simply a collection of given 
objects. As the world is of Dasein, it reaches us bearing the mark of involvement and 
experience of others: ‘the world is always already the one that I share with others’ 
(BT, pp. 115–6). This discussion also has significant implications for understanding 
the others that Dasein encounters in the world. By stating that the world of Dasein is 
a ‘with-world’ (Mitwelt), Heidegger thinks of others in terms of an ontological 
sameness that is more fundamental than the alterity we prescribe to others in our lived 
experience: ‘“Others” does not mean everybody else but me — those from who the I 
distinguishes itself. Others are, rather, those from whom one mostly does not 
distinguish oneself, those among whom one also is’ (BT, p. 115). Encountering others 
through a shared world means that Dasein understands others through a shared 
horizon of experience: ‘they are not encountered by first looking at one-self and then 
ascertaining the opposite pole of a distinction. They are encountered from out of the 
world in which Dasein […] essentially dwells’ (BT, p. 116, emphasis in original). 
Ontologically, then, our being is always and irrevocably ‘being-with’ (Mitsein) 
others: we are never cut off from others, we are always in relation with them through 
being-in-the-world. 
We have seen that the world, the ‘I’ and the others there are normally taken as 
‘givens’ by Dasein in its everyday being-in-the-world. We have also seen that the 
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world is a with-world (‘the world is always already the one I share with others’ [BT, 
pp. 115–116]) and that others are those that share this absorption in the world. This 
being-with is ineluctable for Dasein, and is not dependent on being-with a particular 
other in a particular place and time: ‘Being-with existentially determines Dasein even 
when an other is not factically present and perceived. The being alone of Dasein, too, 
is being-with in the world’ (BT, p. 117). Heidegger goes on to propose that Dasein’s 
being-with is grounded in a disposedness or attunement (Befindlichkeit) towards 
others and the world — a disposedness or attunement which discloses the world to 
Dasein. 
As discussed in my previous chapter, this attunement that fundamentally 
discloses the there to Dasein, and grounds its everyday self-understanding and 
relation to the world, is for Heidegger closely related to the more ‘familiar’, 
‘everyday’ phenomenon of ‘mood’ (BT, p. 130). According to Heidegger, mood can 
be understood as an expression of the way the world is encountered through 
attunement. For instance, fear is a mood that indicates an attunement which 
‘discover[s] things at hand in the surrounding world as being threatening’ (BT, p. 
134). As such, mood precedes cognition by disclosing Dasein to itself, establishing 
the context, ‘the there’ (BT, p. 133) where Dasein finds itself and from which it 
thinks and acts. As a component of attunement, mood is ‘before all cognition and 
willing […] mood has always already disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole and 
first makes possible directing oneself toward something’ (BT, p. 132). Whilst not 
being a cognitive state, mood is neither something entirely external. Rather, ‘mood 
assails’ Dasein, ‘it neither comes from “without” nor from “within”, but rises from 
being-in-the-world itself as a mode of that being’ (BT, p. 133). 
Dasein is mostly ignorant of its unique relation to world, and understands 
world to be something given and pre-existing. Even in this forgetfulness, Dasein is 
always still in a mood, as attunement is fundamental to the disclosure of Dasein’s 
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world. Dasein always acts then from within a mood, as Heidegger demonstrates when 
he cites the way in which the public — ‘the they’ — ‘needs mood and “makes” it for 
itself’ (BT, p. 135). Heidegger takes the example of a public speaker, who ‘speaks to 
[the prevailing mood] and from out of it. He needs an understanding of the 
possibilities of mood in order to arouse and direct it in the right way’ (BT, p. 135). 
Whilst Heidegger acknowledges here that an already-existing mood can be ‘aroused’ 
or ‘directed’, moods cannot be consciously changed or constructed, arriving as they 
do prior to cognition or will. 
The first point I would like to draw from this discussion is that moods 
arguably have a social character. Heidegger tells us that moods emerge ‘from being-
in-the-world as a mode of that being’, and my discussion of Dasein’s everyday being 
noted that being-in-the-world is itself always existentially being-with others. As a 
result of this, we can propose that mood is a social phenomenon, something supported 
by Heidegger’s discussion in Being and Time. The second point is more basic: since 
mood discloses ‘being-in-the-world as a whole’ to Dasein, mood influences Dasein’s 
openness to the world. Being in a mood, Dasein discovers things, as in the case of 
fear, ‘as being threatening’ (BT, p. 134). In the case of ‘bad moods’, the world is 
‘veiled’ and Dasein’s ‘taking care is led astray’ (BT, p. 133). Both these examples 
demonstrate the influence that mood and everyday being-with others have on one 
another. 
When proposing that Dasein’s mood is influenced by its being-with, it is 
important not to overlook that being-with is not dependent on actually being-with 
others. Rather, it is fundamental to the way of being of Dasein, what Heidegger calls 
Dasein-with, and entails an immutable recognition of the being of others that share 
Dasein’s way of being. At the same time, it is also the case that this fundamental 
constitution means that others are always ‘a matter of concern’ (Fursorge) for Dasein 
(BT, p. 118, emphasis in original). In this way an awareness of Dasein’s fundamental 
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nature as Dasein-with accrues a proto-ethical quality in Heidegger’s analysis, which 
argues that, for the most part, Dasein’s concern for others is ‘deficient’ and forgetful 
of its fundamental nature as ‘being-with’ others. Heidegger cites a number of 
‘deficient or at least indifferent modes’ of concern and being-with, arguing that 
‘being for-, against-, and without-one-another, passing-one-another-by, not-
mattering-to-one-another, are possible ways of concern’ (BT, p. 118). These are all 
deficient modes in the sense that Dasein has not come to know its own being as a 
being-with: ‘the basis of being-with often depends on how far one’s own Dasein has 
actually understood itself […] upon how far it has made one’s essential being with 
others transparent and not disguised it’ (BT, p. 121). 
Mood, as we have seen, is a mode of being-in-the-world that discloses world 
itself to Dasein. The understanding of everyday modes of concern as related to 
Dasein’s more fundamental being-with (and hence its fundamental being-in-the-
world) suggests that everyday social interaction might in turn influence Dasein’s 
mood, and so the way it directs itself towards the world. This can be demonstrated 
more clearly by turning to Heidegger’s brief discussion of empathy in this same 
chapter of Being and Time. In contrast to the ‘deficient’ modes of concern cited 
above, Heidegger argues that empathy is misinterpreted when approached 
phenomenologically, as a phenomenon that ‘“initially” presents phenomenally a way 
of being-with-another that understands’ (BT, p. 121). This way of understanding 
empathy as that which ‘“originally” and primordially makes possible and constitutes 
being towards others’ (BT, p. 121) is a mistake. As we have already seen, being-with 
‘already exists with the being of Dasein’ (BT, p. 121), and as such, for Heidegger, 
empathy must emerge from this condition: ‘“Empathy” does not first constitute 
being-with, but is first possible on its basis’ (BT, p. 121). 
It is noteworthy that Heidegger develops his interpretation of empathy in 
relation to ‘deficient’ modes of being. Empathy is made possible, as noted above, on 
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the basis of Dasein’s constitutional being-with. Empathy arises or occurs, Heidegger 
suggests, in response to the deficient modes of being-with that are common in 
everyday life (which include being ‘against-, and without-one-another, passing-one-
another-by, not-mattering-to-one-another’ [BT, p. 118]). Heidegger writes that 
empathy ‘is motivated by the prevailing modes of being-with in their inevitability’ 
(BT, p. 121). As such, empathy is a mode of being-with which carries within it a 
disposedness towards understanding and caring for others. Heidegger’s discussion of 
empathy as a disposedness towards others that originates in Dasein’s constitution (but 
is expressed or revealed in response to the deficient modes of concern in everyday 
life) allows me to conceptualise empathy in terms of disposedness, and hence in terms 
of mood.142 
Heidegger’s definition of moods as modes of being-in-the-world, and of 
moods as responsive to our prevailing social existence, understood here as modes of 
being-with, already suggest the significance of moods as things that inflect 
understandings of social realities. Turning back to Smith’s novels now, I consider the 
possibility that White Teeth’s mood is both the narrative ground, and the aesthetic 
expression, of characters’ shared modes of being-in and being-with in the novel. I 
find that Heidegger’s description of mood as a mode of being is especially pertinent 
when reading White Teeth, a novel in which mood is established through its 
distinctive mode of narration. 
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Hysterical realism: (narrative) mood as a mode of (characterological) social 
being 
James Wood famously described White Teeth as an instance of ‘hysterical 
realism’, a term Wood coined to describe a proto-genre of ‘big, ambitious’ novels 
published towards the end of the twentieth century by writers including Don DeLillo, 
Salman Rushdie, Thomas Pynchon, David Foster Wallace and Smith herself. Wood 
argued that these works could be defined by ‘an excess of storytelling’, wherein 
‘stories and sub-stories sprout on every page, as these novels continually flourish 
their glamorous congestion’.143 Whilst Smith’s White Teeth shares an interest in the 
complexity of reality, amongst other things, with these writers’ works, I propose that 
the hysterical narrative mode of White Teeth is the aesthetic expression of a dominant 
social mood to which its characters are collectively attuned. This aesthetic dimension 
is not only the expression of their attunement, but also the means by which the 
narrative reality of the novel is disclosed to its characters, and so it also affectively 
orients and disposes them towards the world in which they find themselves. Put 
differently, Smith’s characters are at home in this hysteria, for it is the only world 
they know: the novel’s ‘hysterical’ narrative mode discloses the world to its 
characters, grounding their way of being-in-the-world and essentially establishing the 
world of the novel. Before discussing the ethical import of the way the novel 
mobilises this narrative mode, I briefly consider the aesthetic dimensions of White 
Teeth’s hysterical realism itself, and the way in which it structures characterological 
subjectivity. 
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White Teeth’s hysterical realism is characterised, primarily, by the overt 
commentary of an omniscient narrator. As Paul Dawson explains — commenting on 
the ‘surprising’ return of the omniscient narrator in contemporary fiction — 
omniscient narration can diminish the subjective coherence of individual characters: 
‘overt commentary is the chief means of projecting a narratorial self and 
demonstrating the omniscient narrator’s superior knowledge to the characters in terms 
of his or her moral sagacity, intellectual breadth and psychological and social 
insight’.144 Whilst this would correspond with Smith’s own declaration that she 
intends to convey her own way of being in her writing, discussed above, the workings 
of the hysterical mode also have important results for Smith’s characters. I am 
particularly interested here by the narratorial incursions in chapters of the novel, 
appropriately titled ‘Root Canals’, which delve into and reveal the biographical and 
ancestral histories of Smith’s protagonists. In one such instance, the narrator prepares 
for ‘a meticulous inspection that would go beyond the heart of the matter to its 
marrow, beyond the marrow to the root — but the question is, how far back do you 
want? How far will do? The old American question: what do you want — blood? 
Most probably more than blood is required […] Well, all right then’ (p. 83). 
The root canal proves an incisive metaphor for the effect of these chapters: as 
the deep canals of Smith’s characters’ pasts are travelled into by an unrelenting and 
exploratory narrator, the pain of that history is eliminated, leaving subjects who 
appear healthy but are in fact injured, and diminished, by the narrative’s exposure of 
their intimate histories. These incursions limit characterological autonomy in two 
ways: firstly, their foregrounding of historical connections suggest that the characters 
are determined by their pasts in ways they have little control over. Secondly, the 
synechdochic substitution of teeth for the subjects themselves means the root canals 
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render the characters’ affective relation to their pasts second hand, depriving them of 
the interiority needed to reflect on and navigate the possibilities that their past 
histories present by means of rooting out their private depths. The contingency that 
the novel celebrates in the present is likewise coloured by these root canals, suffusing 
the chaotic present with historical baggage that renders contingency identical with 
determinism. As Clare Squires argues ‘history and the past are formative and 
inescapable for the novel’s characters’.145 
In the main sections of the novel, set in London in the decades leading up to 
the millennium, the histories that these root canals excavate serve to build a sense of 
inevitability about new social connections that are forged in the cultural encounter 
between families from different backgrounds in Smith’s postcolonial London. In the 
novel’s 1980s, parents and first-generation Bengali immigrants Alsana and Samad 
feel isolated within their community, troubled by racist violence and their children’s 
exposure to what Samad views as Western debauchery: ‘worrying for themselves and 
their children, for what the terrible eighties were doing to them […] distance was 
establishing itself, not simply between fathersons, oldyoung, bornthere-bornhere, but 
between those who stayed indoors and those who ran riot outside’ (pp. 187–190). Yet 
the arrival of a new generation in the shape of twin sons brings with it social 
entanglements that establish new relations across previous divides, in particular when 
the youthful charisma and troublesome antics of their son, Millat, spark the interests 
of would-be protector Joyce Chalfen, the white middle-class parent of Millat’s 
classmate. The relationship between the two mothers, Alsana and Joyce, is primarily 
one of mutual mistrust, but Joyce and Alsana gradually recognise the inescapability 
of their relation as it is continually developed by the narrative voice of the novel. 
Alsana reflects her awareness of this inevitable drive to entanglement when she 
reflects: ‘[being] involved happened over a long period of time, pulling you in like 
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quicksand. Involved is neither good, nor bad. It is just a consequence of living, a 
consequence of occupation and immigration, of empires and expansion, of living in 
each other’s pockets…one becomes involved and it is a long trek back to being 
uninvolved […] something in the way Joyce said it, involved — wearied, slightly acid 
— suggested to Alsana that the word meant the same thing to her. An enormous web 
you spin to catch yourself’ (p. 439). In this sense, the perspectives of Smith’s 
characters again reflect the outcome of the root canals I have discussed above, where 
the excavation of personal histories makes them shared, public and socially 
deterministic. 
The hysterical realist mode also overrides the ethical reflection and agency 
evident towards the end of White Teeth, when Irie Jones tries to persuade now 
warring twins Magid and Millat to resolve their differences. When Joyce Chalfen 
charges Irie with visiting Millat and persuading him to meet with his brother Magid 
so that they might settle their protracted, destructive conflict, Irie reluctantly makes 
this journey out of a sense of duty to Joyce, Millat and Magid: ‘she didn’t want to be 
involved in the long story of those lives, but she was, and she found herself dragged 
forward by her hair to their denouement’ (p. 459). Irie lacks the autonomy to resist 
the demands of a responsibility that, as with the connections developed throughout 
the novel, is the result of an accumulation of unavoidable involvements. Joyce 
Chalfen’s retort to Irie’s complaints about this visit, ‘everybody owes everybody’, 
attests again to the way that an inescapable sense of collective involvement 
overpowers individual intention and agency in the novel. When Irie arrives at Millat’s 
house, she finds herself having to resist the temptation to succumb to her former 
hopes that she and Millat would love each other: ‘Irie wished she could give herself 
over to these past-present fictions […] You could drown in memories like these, but 
she tried to swim free’ (p. 459). However, the desire to resist these ‘fictions’ gives 
way, again, to the inevitable pull of a history of attraction, the ‘touch of memory […] 
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the touch of a long, long, history’ becoming an ‘inevitable’ physical embrace: ‘the 
result was inevitable […] before long their arms were involved, their legs were 
involved, their lips were involved’ (p. 461). 
The foreclosing of individual alterity through the root canals of Smith’s 
characters poses problems for traditional ethical modes of reading, something I will 
discuss in more detail below with reference to James Wood’s articles on White Teeth. 
It is worth making precisely clear, here, how this novel resists traditional appeals to 
the ethical value of literature. As mentioned in my introduction, there are two 
seemingly oppositional poles in recent ethical criticism which share underlying 
affinities. As Robert Eaglestone has argued, both ‘wings’ share in the positivism of 
the knowledge they produce through the process of reading; both approaches offer ‘a 
sort of positivist knowledge, which can offer—or be made to offer—axioms or 
propositions that correspond, even if not in a strict way, to […] reality’.146 
 Christopher Weinberger has similarly recently argued that, although critics 
differ widely on how we should apprehend and value novelistic representations of 
alterity, most ethically-minded critics fall on a spectrum dominated by two opposing 
poles. In Weinberger’s terms, these are productively reframed as an ‘ethics of 
identification’ and an ‘ethics of letting be’. The broad outlines of both these 
approaches will be familiar from my discussion above. In the humanist ‘ethics of 
identification’, the novel is valued for the way it ‘fosters sustained identification with 
narrative point of view and comprises representations of the language, speech, and 
thoughts of individuals other than the author or speaker’. In this view, the novel can 
‘present an ideal field of ethical encounter with other perspectives’. The ‘ethics of 
letting be’, associated with poststructuralist critics, values ‘moments in novels that 
refuse readerly sympathy, or else confront readers with the radical “unknowability” of 
characters, as ethical models of resistance to the colonizing force of sympathetic 
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imagination’. In this view, ‘identification may produce dangerously colonizing 
attitudes in readers, insofar as it encourages surmounting rather than respecting the 
differences that mark others as such’.147  
 It is in Hale’s work, discussed in my introduction, that these ethical 
approaches are conceptualised together in terms of a process of binding and 
unbinding. As mentioned there, for the poststructuralist this moment of unbinding 
produces an awareness of self-limit, a registering of the unknowability of otherness 
and a lesson about our own tendencies to reduce alterity to the familiar. For Hale, 
however, the poststructuralist focus on the resistance of the other to the colonising of 
the caring, liberal imagination is itself dependent on a continued movement of 
binding that precedes the ethical moment of unbinding that the encounter with alterity 
produces. Conversely, whilst Nussbaum’s approach to reading foregrounds readerly 
love and care for the other, it also entails an experience of self-limit, through the 
cultivation of a relation that involves being ‘truly vulnerable’ to ‘the experience of 
social restraint, of binding and being bound to the life of the other’.148 
In White Teeth, as I have been suggesting, an ‘ethics of identification’ is 
excluded by characters’ lack of interiority: the contingency of the decisions, the pre-
reflective involvement of characters and the historical determinism that surrounds 
their actions all contribute to this effect. Any sense that the reader is confronted by 
the ‘unknowability’ of Smith’s characters, and that these characters might present as 
‘models of resistance to the colonizing force of sympathetic imagination’, is equally 
foreclosed by the everyday familiarity of Smith’s characters, and above all by the 
violation of their interiority and personal histories – what Smith will call elsewhere 
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their ‘right to a secret’ – enacted by the novel’s ‘root canals’ which excavate the 
characters’ hidden depths for the reader.149  
As the examples in this section suggest, the protagonists’ embrace of 
contingent interactions and inevitable social connectedness are best understood as a 
shared cultural mood or disposition, one that is cultivated by the hysterical narrative 
that discloses the world they find themselves in. In the context of social division and 
fraught intercultural relations, the foreclosure of individual decision and reflection 
serves to reveal a world characterised by a surfeit of inextricable connectedness, what 
the novel aptly calls being involved. The novel’s insistence on involvement and 
being-with others at the expense of perspectival autonomy suggests again the 
significance of these modes of being in Smith’s writing. At the same time, the novel’s 
conscious foregrounding of a violation of characterological subjectivity discussed 
above suggests that Smith wants her readers to be aware of these violations and to see 
them in this light – suggesting again that they form part of the ethical thought at work 
in the novel. 
If White Teeth foregrounds its characters’ inescapable social entanglements, 
their ‘being with others’ (BT p. 121), it is importantly also the case that the novel 
does not privilege certain forms of connection, as Alsana’s comments suggest: 
‘Involved is neither good, nor bad. It is just a consequence of living’ (p. 439). Being 
with others and being involved can take the form of care, as it does eventually in the 
case of Alsana and Joyce, or it can take on the form of conflict and collision as 
between Magid and Millat, without the narrative giving privilege to either mode of 
connection.150 With this in mind, and having acknowledged the effects of this 
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hysterical narrative mode on characterological subjectivity here, I will now further 
draw out the proto-ethical dimension of this mode of narration and the connection it 
creates. In what follows, I suggest that this foreclosure of perspectival autonomy 
serves the purpose of revealing more originary modes of being that Smith seeks to 
foreground in her writing. 
Human, all too human 
A central complaint of James Wood’s first article on hysterical realism 
regards the narrative foreclosing of autonomous subjectivity that I have described 
above. In this essay, titled ‘Human, All Too Inhuman’, Wood protests that ‘[t]he 
characters in these novels are not really alive, not fully human; their connectedness 
can only be insisted on. Life is never experienced with such a fervid intensity of 
connectedness. So these novels find themselves in the paradoxical position of 
enforcing connections that are finally conceptual rather than human’.151 Similarly, it 
is the failure of individual agency which marks the limits of White Teeth’s thought for 
Jonathan Sell, who argues: ‘[c]hoice is the outcome of deliberation and reflection, and 
it is in this regard that Smith’s characters fall short of humanity and her ethical 
scheme reaches an impasse’.152 
These critical observations, that White Teeth’s characters fall short of 
‘humanity’, is reflective once again of the humanist ‘wing’ of the new ethics 
discussed above. Contrary to Wood and Sell, I suggest that such diminishing of 
subjective autonomy in Smith’s novel paradoxically underpins the novel’s revealing, 
and ethical foregrounding, of the fundamental human conditions of being-in-the-
world and being-with others. The ‘excess of storytelling’ in the novel produces an 
attunement that renders characters excessively ecstatic, so that they ‘stand out’ in the 
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world in such a way that forecloses reflective distance and interior consciousness in 
an exaggeration of sociality and interconnectedness. In these figures the essentially 
ecstatic structure of human being takes on excessive proportions, exaggerated and 
extended beyond the dimensions that are found in Being and Time’s analysis. 
Across different decades and generations, the intensification of 
characterological proximity and involvement as the narrative mode advances towards 
the millennium produces subjects who are excessive in their ecstatic being-in, 
immersed prior to (and to the point of foreclosing) the reflective distance that all-too-
often instigates a bifurcation between minds and world(s), selves and others. Figures 
like Irie are so greatly characterised by their attunement to this world — which, I 
recall here, literally means being found in a situation where things already matter — 
that they have no hope of extricating themselves from these involvements and 
entanglements. As such, White Teeth’s characters display an excess of being-in, of 
exposure, immersion and involvement that repeats the rhetorical gesture of Being and 
Time, which posited Dasein’s being-in-the-world as a challenge to philosophical 
conceptions of human consciousness as interiority. As I have noted above, what 
Heidegger calls our ‘disclosive submission to world’ is overwhelming here, and this 
is why Smith’s figures stand in more as exemplars of the world White Teeth is 
conceptualising, and its mood of involvement and connectedness, than as individual 
selves. 
If the ecstatic excess of White Teeth’s characters unfolds primarily in terms of 
their excessively being-in-the-world and being-with others, it is also the case that it is 
expressed in temporal terms, consistent with the ecstasies of temporality; ‘the 
phenomena of future, having-been and present’ that underpin our existence in Being 
and Time (BT, p. 314). Throughout the novel’s movement from its opening pages in 
1975, when central figure Archie Jones survives a suicide attempt, an experience 
which leaves him feeling ‘ecstatic’ (p. 240), to the climax at the arrival of the new 
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millennium, this teleological movement through time is entwined with the emergence 
of the narratively shaped mood I have been describing in this chapter.153 Archie’s 
lucky escape from death leaves him in a ‘past tense, future perfect kind of mood […] 
a maybe this, maybe that kind of mood’ that exemplifies the connection between 
temporality and attunement in the novel (p. 18, emphasis in original). The phrase 
‘past tense, future perfect’ most literally suggests a belief in the future as a resolution 
to past traumas, which could be described as feeling of optimism about the future.  
When considered grammatically, however, ‘past tense, future perfect’ 
suggests an interstitial moment between what has been (past tense) and what will 
have been (future perfect) which makes space for the contingency of the present 
moment.154 As such, it implies a form of projection that brings together past and 
future to constitute being-in-the-world in the present. For Mark Currie, the future 
perfect gives name to the temporality of narrative: being the tense that ‘refers to 
something that lies ahead and yet which is already complete, not what will happen, 
but what will have happened’, it is paradigmatic of the way that stories present us 
with a future which is unknown, but already told. Perhaps, then, Smith’s figures are 
also excessively novelistic, for the way they unite the ecstasies of past, present and 
future in a manner unique to the storytelling mode.  
The phrase, ‘maybe this, maybe that’, likewise suggests a commitment to 
contingency, reflected in Archie’s newly formed inclination to flip a coin when faced 
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with a decision; a trait that, for Jonathan Sell, makes him the ‘champion of the 
random workings of an Epicurean universe […] in which causation takes second 
place to contingency, and where the present takes priority over the past’. If the 
embrace of contingent possibility helps with Archie’s intention to cut ties with his 
past, taking decisions at random that lead to new encounters and connections in the 
present, it is also the case that the embrace of contingency by Smith’s characters is 
always in play with the determinism, described above, that such an appeal to fate or 
chance inevitably implies.155 Placing Archie in relation to a future which is contingent 
but also already determined in the narrative’s teleological movement towards the 
millennium, White Teeth figures the unity of the ecstasies of future, having-been and 
present in terms that further entangle and embed Smith’s characters into the narrative 
mode which grounds their existence. 
Importantly, the uncertainty and openness towards an unknowable future that 
White Teeth works to establish through its evocation of a ‘past tense, future perfect 
mood’ diminishes the omniscience of the narrator in White Teeth. The fate of the 
characters is left open at the threshold of the millennium which, despite being the 
centre of the novel, is not represented directly and is instead explored as the 
teleological destination which all narrative strands build towards and anticipate. 
Through communal moments at the end of 1975 and 1993, the social mood of the late 
twentieth century, and the approaching twenty first century, are further brought under 
scrutiny. As such, an acute sense of global reordering inheres through White Teeth’s 
narrative. The climax of the novel prepares its readers not for specific atrocities but 
for change itself, posing questions about the rebranding of Britain and who is willing 
to fight for this cultural reshaping. The optimism for the novel’s climax, a New 
Year’s Eve event where genetic engineers, animal rights activists, Jehovah’s 
witnesses and Islamic fundamentalists can cross the threshold into the uncharted 
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territory of the new year together is symbolic of the millennial threshold that White 
Teeth writes across. Smith works to maintain a plurality of possible futures which her 
novel seeks to force across the millennial threshold. In violent scenes at the end of the 
novel, Millat Iqbal (now a fundamental extremist) tries to shoot one of the 
FutureMouse project team, although Archie intervenes, saving the scientist and 
accidentally liberating the mouse from its display case, and a determined future. With 
this comes a growing sense of exposure to a world of conflicting social forces, of 
which the novel cannot be fully aware but which it anticipates at the national level 
through a parodic treatment of fundamentalism (KEVIN) that betrays a melancholic 
attunement to the unresolved problems that extend beyond the novel’s close.156 This 
is also made clear in the symbolic lab-rat of a future that is the FutureMouse. 
In this way, the agency of individuals and groups at this threshold is not 
valorised by a narrative that has centred the novel’s action around the play between 
contingency and determinism. Paul Dawson similarly argues that ‘[t]he narrative 
voice of White Teeth indicates that Smith herself can only imagine a world of random 
uncertainty, relativising the authority of her commentary’.157 Even though the voice 
that we are ‘forced to submit to’ is Smith’s, it is a paradoxically self-effacing, 
unaggrandising voice, one that finds events inexplicable and contingent, but that sets 
this contingency against a weight of unavoidable historical baggage. The achievement 
of the inevitability of connectedness and the absence of individual agency is a 
narrative eschewal of a certain ideology or cultural perspective. As such, the novel is 
morally self-effacing despite being one individual’s vision. It disperses moral agency 
across the whole social landscape of multicultural Britain, taking its place within that 
                                                 
156 For Sara Upstone, Hanif Kureishi’s The Black Album and White Teeth both ‘represent 
Islam as the most dangerous and current threat to British democracy’, in some sense 
valorising negative perceptions of British Muslims that would intensify after 9/11. Sara 
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157 Dawson, p. 154. 
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landscape and creating an atmosphere of being-with, of shared responsibility which it 
valorises, despite anxieties and certain prescient and melancholic insights, as a moral 
mood. The novel emphasises historicality and connectedness and drives a worldly 
community with shared multicultural responsibilities into the new millennium. 
Through the novel’s figuring of social connection and relational entanglement which 
precedes individual ethical deliberation, White Teeth depicts the experiential world of 
a London community at the end of the century through its evocation of a fundamental 
mood. At the core of its moral thought, this atmosphere is used to interrogate the 
emergent possibilities of this social world. As such, White Teeth conceives of its own 
narrative as world-opening or world-revealing, in ways comparable with the 
Heideggerian notions of revealing discussed in my previous chapter. 
The problem of ethics in White Teeth: attunement, perspectivalism and 
experience 
The unknowability of the world that Smith opens at the end of the novel 
through her sustained focus on being-with and being-in-the-world, reflected in the 
hysterical mood of the novel yet which simultaneously resists privileging, for 
instance, a particular mode of relating to others, can finally be addressed as an 
attempt to reveal a different world to her reader. To highlight this world-opening 
process of attunement I return to the essay ‘Some Notes on Attunement’ and the 
‘weird little novel’ Smith mentions there, the Exordium to Søren Kierkegaard’s 
philosophical treatise Fear and Trembling. As discussed above, it tells the story of a 
man, ‘not a thinker […] not an exegetical scholar’, who cannot understand Abraham’s 
decision to kill his son (Kierkegaard) and who, given his situation, resorts to telling 
himself four different versions of the tale in an attempt to understand Abraham’s 
actions.158 
                                                 
158 Smith, ‘Some Notes on Attunement’. Web. 
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Of particular interest is the play between the man’s final submission to the 
logic incomprehensibility of the Biblical story — where true faith trumps reason — 
and his failed attempt to understand the story, and Abraham, by narrating Abraham’s 
decision from four different perspectives. The play between attunement and 
perspectivalism in Smith’s interpretation of this story, and the eventual winning out 
of attunement, recalls the play between perspectivalist readings and a focus on 
attunement that I have been discussing so far. The Exordium, Smith reflects, ‘is a 
rehearsal’ which prepares its reader for Kierkegaard’s own propositions about the 
nature of true faith, and creates a ‘state of readiness for a consideration of the actual 
Biblical story’, which is ‘essentially beyond explication’.159 Likewise, reading White 
Teeth requires suspension of familiar readerly attempts to comprehend, identify, or 
submit to the otherness of social others in favour of attuning to the equally familiar, 
yet unknowable, character of the world itself. 
I will recall here, for instance, that Hale writes, in a discussion of Smith’s ‘On 
Beauty’ and the perspectival economy of the novel more broadly, that ‘within the 
novel itself point of view is formally structured as an ongoing negotiation between 
interpreting subject and interpreted world […] in the novelistic ethics of alterity, one 
can imagine the author as possessing a unitary and coherent self only in relation to the 
social other he attempts to depict’.160 If Hale is acutely aware of the paradoxes of this 
position, reading a novel like this in terms of attunement makes it possible to move 
the debate about novelistic aesthetic and ethics beyond the novelist’s own ‘self 
conscious awareness about the paradox of perspectivalism’.161 As I have argued so 
                                                 
159 Smith, ‘Some Notes on Attunement’. Web. 
160 Hale, ‘On Beauty as Beautiful?’, p. 832.  
161 Hale explains the double bind of perspectivalism here as follows: ‘To understand the novel 
as a whole as the expression of the author’s individual point of view is to forget the way the 
novel itself insists on the social contexts that produce and mediate authorial vision. And to 
understand authorial identity as point of view from the point of view of the novel’s form is, in 
turn, to forget that the novelist has created the story world that she pretends to recount and to 
find the objective measure of her perspective in the difference between her valuation of this 
world and its own autonomous existence’. Hale, ‘On Beauty’, p. 830. 
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far, the disclosive process of aesthetic attunement can serve to reveal to readers 
essentially ethical truths about the worlds they inhabit. In Smith’s White Teeth, what 
is uncovered, in part, is a world in which shared being-with others is more primary 
than the representation of differences, even whilst these differences are able to 
flourish and indeed confront each other in the space of a being-with others that is not 
reducible to a drive towards unity.  
At the same time, as my discussion has also suggested, White Teeth resists 
being read as a novel which puts forth the particular ethos of a community, or the 
values held by Smith herself as the narratorial presence in the text.162 As the epigraph 
to this chapter suggests, Smith’s fiction continues to negotiate with the possibility of 
giving voice to a community. The move to relativise Smith’s own voice in White 
Teeth, discussed above, is perhaps most suggestive of an attempt to allow Smith’s 
attunement to the character of the social context she represents to permeate her 
writing without foregrounding particular values. Like the short story from 
Kierkegaard, Smith’s novel tends towards an act of attunement that ultimately 
demands openness in advance of any deliberative or discursive understanding.163 
As a writer who is both concerned with literary ethics and highly active in the 
critical reception of her own work, it is not surprising that Smith has explicitly 
reflected on this perceived problem with White Teeth in the years since the novel’s 
publication. In an essay ‘That Crafty Feeling’, published whilst Smith was writing 
NW (and so relevant for the final section of this chapter which addresses that novel) 
the author reflects her own growing commitment to a poststructuralist ‘ethics of 
letting-be’: ‘It’s Derrida, and what surprises me is what a different piece of Derrida it 
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is than I would have chosen two novels ago. The quote is very simple: If a right to a 
secret is not maintained then we are in a totalitarian space. […] It’s awful to me now, 
that passion for human dissection I had, always entering the brains of characters, 
cracking them open, rooting every secret out’.164 Whilst acknowledging this change in 
the novelist’s disposition, I now turn to this novel with the question of attunement 
still in mind, in order to show how attunement operates in a novel where characters’ 
autonomy and individual perspectives are again at play with each other, rather than as 
secondary to an aesthetic revealing of a world. 
NW 
When compared with White Teeth, NW is a novel that focuses much more 
closely on the place of its setting, rarely venturing outside of north west London. NW 
does not trace the global histories of the British public as White Teeth did, but instead 
focuses on relations as they are actually negotiated within the city in day-to-day 
interactions. Smith’s interest in globality is not lost in the local focus of NW, 
however. London’s status as a global city means that global relations are negotiated at 
an increasingly local level. Kristian Shaw and David James have recently proposed, 
in this vein, using the terms ‘(g)local’ and ‘worlded localisms’ respectively to 
describe the local spaces of NW.165 But what exactly does it mean to engage with 
local others in a global or worldly way? Whilst agreeing with other commentators 
that Smith aims to develop a localised global scene, I argue that it is necessary to 
contend with the way that the ethical dimensions of this worldliness, often described 
as cosmopolitanism, are fostered in the novel. I argue that worldliness and 
cosmopolitanism are similarly negotiated in the novel as dispositions towards the 
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165 Kristian Shaw, ‘“A Passport to Cross the Room”: Cosmopolitan Empathy and 
Transnational Engagement in Zadie Smith’s NW (2012)’, C21 Literature: Journal of 21st-
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world, dispositions opposed to more narrow and parochial visions of the world. When 
discussing worldliness or cosmopolitanism, it is important to remember that these 
qualities cannot be contrasted straightforwardly with narrower frames of reference or 
group identity, be they national or otherwise, primarily because even the most 
parochial, xenophobic or homogenous cultural configurations have a relationship to 
the world. This is especially true of the kind of intensely localised world that NW 
depicts. In responding to NW’s focus on specific local encounters, engagements and 
conflicts, I argue that worldliness as an ethical quality must be reckoned as something 
that is always negotiated in, and often emerges in response to, a social world. In 
advancing this argument, I aim to bring a different perspective to the discussion of 
worldliness and cosmopolitanism in NW by exploring the novel’s stance on the 
individual human capacity for worldliness. Ultimately, I argue that the individual 
capacity for worldliness is set up by the novel as the locus for worldly engagement, 
displacing the focus on local place as the foundation for cosmopolitan ethics. 
NW’s first chapter, titled ‘Visitation’, opens with a scene that exemplifies the 
values of hospitality and openness that are celebrated aspects of cosmopolitanism. In 
this scene Leah Hanwell opens the door of her flat to help Shar, a desperate young 
woman who has been left screaming for help in the road by other local residents who 
refused to acknowledge her pleas. Leah’s welcoming Shar is an act of hospitality that 
can been read in global terms, as an analogy of the opening of closed national borders 
to global otherness. Kristian Shaw argues that this scene evinces a Derridean 
‘cosmopolitan hospitality’. Leah’s actions can also be understood as stemming from 
an empathic response to the suffering of another person. Shaw, for instance, uses the 
terms ‘cosmopolitan hospitality’ and ‘cosmopolitan empathy’ to describe the ethical 
vision of the novel. What, though, provokes this empathic response from Leah, when 
the rest of her neighbours have ignored Shar and left their doors open? One 
explanation is proffered by NW’s narrators: ‘Leah is as faithful in her allegiance to 
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this two-mile square of city as other people are to their families, or their countries’.166 
Smith’s narrator also invites her reader to understand this encounter in relation to 
familiar representations of the suffering of more distant others. Looking down at 
Shar, Leah thinks of a ‘[w]oman begging the public for witnesses. Woman in a war 
zone standing in the rubble of her home’ (p. 5). If Leah’s response is grounded in her 
relationship to a local community, it is also implicitly provoked by her connection of 
Shar’s suffering to familiar figures of suffering from a global context. 
Through Leah’s encounter with Shar, a localised scene offers a vision of 
expansive empathic involvement and responsibility that rivals the parochial models of 
community based around family and national identity. Yet it remains unclear that an 
allegiance to a local context will provoke the empathic response Leah feels towards 
Shar, nor inspire the connection Leah makes between the quotidian presence of a 
destitute, drug-addicted woman, and a woman whose life is destroyed by violent 
conflict. Neither, it should be added, does this empathic response guarantee Leah’s 
decision to open the door to Shar and welcome her into the house. Smith has spoken 
in interviews of her intention, in this novel, to humanise the suffering of others which 
can appear as banal or unreal, taking the example of the distance that a provincial 
citizen might feel when reading in the newspaper about the murder of a black ‘youth’ 
stabbed on a street in London. If Shar’s suffering is, as the novel suggests, an 
experience as distant to Leah as the images of victims beamed into her home from 
foreign war zones, how do we explain Leah’s overcoming this experiential gulf and 
welcome of Shar into her home? 
As other critics have noted, Leah’s decision to help Shar rests on her 
misunderstanding the reality of the situation — the fact that Shar needs money for 
drugs. This divergence between Leah’s understanding of the situation and that of her 
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neighbours can be described in terms of a differing attunement to a situation. It is not 
only Leah’s neighbours that understand the situation differently to Leah, but also 
NW’s reader. Smith foregrounds the actualities of the situation for her reader through 
Leah’s observations of Shar, making more apparent the discontinuity between Leah 
and Smith’s implied reader. ‘Her clothes are not clean’, ‘she smells’, ‘perhaps Shar 
needs money’, thinks Leah, whilst remaining seemingly unaware that Shar’s mother’s 
heart attack is a fabrication (p. 15). Where Leah perceives ‘the girl’s face is dreamy, 
slow. Touched, the Irish say. Possible that she’s touched’, Smith’s reader already 
suspects the influence of drugs and addiction as the real cause of Shar’s crisis. Leah 
does not attune to the realities of the situation, and so arguably does not share their 
access to the reality of Shar’s experience or suffering (p. 15). Yet, without 
understanding the realities of the situation (‘it is obvious to everyone except Leah’) 
she establishes a connection with Shar’s suffering that exceeds what is possible for 
her mother, her husband and Smith’s implied reader. 
I have suggested that Leah’s focus on Shar’s suffering, as opposed to the 
particularities of her suffering or veracity of her explanations, emerges from a 
particular situational attunement. Leah’s response is strikingly different to the 
neighbours who ignored Shar’s cries for help, which are established in the novel as a 
more common, if problematic, disposedness towards others. Leah’s identification 
with Shar’s suffering and her disposedness towards helping Shar make it possible to 
describe Leah’s attunement as a form of empathy. Leah’s association of Shar with a 
woman ‘in a war zone standing in the rubble of her own home’ suggests, furthermore, 
that distances of a global scale can operate at even the most local of levels, whilst also 
potentially fostering Leah’s empathic response. 
Leah’s empathic disposition puts her at odds with her husband Michel, who 
virulently condemns Shar’s actions and seeks to confront her and retrieve Leah’s £20. 
Leah’s divergence from Michel on this issue pits her not only against her husband, 
106 
 
but also against the dominant social atmosphere of her time. Unlike Leah, Michel is 
implicitly connected to the rest of society by his aspirational individualism and 
embrace of market capitalism. Michel is acutely aware of the negative effects of the 
Great Recession and seeks to embrace the possibilities for material gain that this 
adverse social and economic situation appears to present: ‘“You have to work very 
hard to separate yourself from this drama below!”’, he tells Leah. ‘“Market is so 
crazy right now […] the smart guys get right back in the game”’ (p. 4). Michel takes 
to gambling the couple’s inheritance in an attempt to forge a financial space between 
themselves and those that are struggling in the contemporary social environment. In 
his view, ‘“not everyone can be invited to the party. Not this century. Cruel opinion 
— she doesn’t share it”’ (p. 3). As such, Leah has to deal with the consequences of 
Michel courting financial insecurity by gambling the only money the couple have in 
their savings. At the same time, her work role distributing lottery money to charities 
and other social enterprises involves making good ‘the nation’s bad debts’, 
overseeing the process by which these individual losses ‘morph into a semblance of 
collective good’. Leah’s antagonistic position in relation to her husband’s 
management of the couple’s finances, and his attempt to profit from financial 
misfortune, is a microcosm for a fraught relationship she has with the national 
disposition towards self-interest and pursuit of individual benefit. 
At Leah’s work in the charity sector, her supervisor claims that the role is 
about caring for others: ‘this work requires empathy and so attracts women, for 
women are the empathic sex’ (p. 34). Yet the conditions of employment, the ‘box 
cramped Victorian damp’ office, and relations between the workers, suggest a wider 
failure of empathic relations in the novel.167 The office is equally deficient in its care 
for employees, suggesting a society where moral values such as empathy have lost 
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their meaning, subsumed within market forces. The threat of ‘efficiency savings’, 
‘meaning your job and mine’, loom, whilst Leah ‘sits on a replacement chair 
borrowed six years ago from the break room just flooded with empathy’. This 
insecurity and the prospect of unemployment complicate the presumed distinction 
between people like Leah that handle charity funds and those in need of them, whilst 
pointing towards the limits of empathy as a response to social indifference and 
inequality. Rather than being an inherent trait, empathy emerges in NW as a response 
to deficient social relations. If empathy is defined as the experience of the suffering of 
others that brings with it the will to help, then the charity workers’ exposure to 
hardship and their role distributing charitable funds would mark them out as empathic 
individuals. Leah’s unhappiness and anger in her workplace as she doodles ‘I am so 
FULL OF EMPATHY’ (p. 34) further demonstrates that empathy can inspire a 
negative response towards others, described by Lawrence Hatab as a ‘flight from the 
suffering of others’.168 In a social environment where ethical action is frustrated, 
empathic involvement has become for Leah a socially problematic form of 
disposedness towards the world. 
It is against this social background, significantly, that Leah makes the 
decision to offer hospitality and assistance to Shar. Leah is able to engage with Shar 
only by departing from the dominant social mood, even as her response is figured by 
the novel as emerging from this dominant social atmosphere and the deficient modes 
of being-with others that surround Leah. Leah’s reaction to Shar and their encounter 
further negotiates the different responses to empathy that are possible, and the way 
that empathic involvement is always negotiated in the midst of, and in response to, 
this already-existing social world. Leah’s relationship with Shar further exemplifies 
the ways that empathy can inspire diverse social responses, ranging from the desire to 
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help others and to alleviate the suffering to aversive action, a taking flight to alleviate 
one’s own suffering. Whilst these two reactions can be seen as oppositional, NW 
explores the complex ways they are negotiated simultaneously. Leah imagines 
running away with Shar, “waking up by their long black hair and eyes, in her mouth. 
Phoning home from fantasy boxes that still take the old 2ps” (p. 76), and imagines 
Shar taking her hand: ‘Shall we run? Are you ready? Shall we run? Leave all this! 
Let’s be outlaws!’ (p. 76), even as she finds herself aggressively confronting Shar, 
calling her a thief and demanding her money back. The narrator’s interjection that 
‘[d]esire is never final, desire is imprecise and impractical’ (p. 76) further suggests 
that empathy does necessarily provoke or lead to compassion. Leah has the uncanny 
experience of opening an envelope of photographs at the pharmacy and finding 
pictures of Shar, laughing and drinking in one photograph, ‘now sat on the floor, 
looking destroyed’ in the next (p. 94). Before the pharmacist takes back the 
photographs, Leah faces what can only be an apparition of an alternative self, in a life 
she has not lived, ‘a skaggy redhead, skin and bone and track marks, with a fag 
hanging out her mouth, and if you squinted […] Like a riddle in a dream’ (p. 95). 
Through Leah’s relationship with Shar the novel suggests that empathic involvement, 
and the ethical action that it can give rise to, are not reducible to charity, but rather 
are a complex form of social entanglement which can act as the starting point for 
transgression of social and geographical boundaries. 
The third section of NW, ‘Host’, focuses on the life of Leah’s friend Natalie 
Blake (black, British and of African parentage), whose childhood name was Keisha. 
In contrast with Leah, Natalie is an individual who struggles with a sense of 
belonging to a particular place, presenting a challenge to the rooted cosmopolitan 
ethics rightly identified, by Shaw, with Leah. Natalie’s individual development, 
building to a middle-aged crisis, is a story of an ever-changing being-in-the-world, an 
identity navigated through a fraught and changing relationship to her local world. In 
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this section of the novel, comprised of 148 numbered fragments that relay episodes 
from the girls’ shared adolescence, Smith’s reader learns that Leah has always been in 
the habit of crossing social boundaries, something that resurfaces with Leah’s 
hospitality towards Shar, who also went to Brayton with Leah and Keisha. Leah was a 
girl bestowed with ‘universal good feeling’ (p. 180), who ‘befriended everyone 
without distinction or boundary’ (p. 180). Unlike Leah, Natalie has never moved 
freely across cross boundaries of status and identity. Leah’s diverse sociality ‘did not 
alienate her from the popular and vice versa and how this was managed Keisha Blake 
had no understanding’ (p. 180). As the girls get older, Leah’s ability to move between 
different groups effortlessly and without judgement from others is revealed to Keisha 
as a privilege afforded by her whiteness. For Keisha, ‘the state of “being Leah 
Hanwell’s friend” constituted a sort of passport, lending Keisha a protected form of 
access in most situations’ (p. 191). Faced with the difficulties of being a young black 
woman of African parentage living in London, Keisha changes her name to Natalie, 
one episode in a lifetime spent constructing an appeasing, middle-class identity, to 
avoid ‘giving them a reason’. 
For Shaw, NW’s Willesden is a ‘microcosm of global cross-cultural 
encounters’, representing a shift in cosmopolitan engagement that is local rather than 
global in its outlook. Leah, as noted, is an individual who feels a strong sense of 
belonging and loyalty to the place she lives. Kristian Shaw argues that Leah’s actions 
are representative of a locally rooted cosmopolitanism, and mark a movement past 
White Teeth’s focus on cultural roots, where legacies of colonialism and national 
identities circumscribed identity, to a time where characters’ sense of rootedness 
relates primarily to the place they live. This cosmopolitanism, for Shaw, is the 
domain of ‘bounded individuals not subject to transnational mobility and untroubled 
by questions of geographical or ethnic belonging’.169 If Leah’s sense of local 
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rootedness is significant here, her ethical action is also grounded, as I have observed, 
in an attunement that emerges from a world in which Leah already finds herself. 
After university Natalie does not return to the neighbourhood, instead living 
in a mansion with her children and husband, investment banker Frank. Eventually, 
becoming a commercial barrister affords Natalie an identity that transcends barriers 
of race and class. Her law firm’s promise of ‘the highest standards of legal 
representation in today’s fast-changing world’ (p. 256) will protect not only her 
clients but Natalie herself, securing an identity that escapes vulnerability and 
judgement, being universally respected and admired by virtue of her success and 
morally unthreatening commercialism. The successful pursuit of this career 
transforms Natalie’s ethical worldview. As Natalie’s career develops and her 
financial situation changes, she finds herself not speaking to her family, who have 
lost her childhood savings and are unable to support her career development. 
Alienated from the place and culture she grew up in, Natalie is equally dislocated in 
her new middle-class life. Afflicted by a fundamental sense of inauthenticity, Natalie 
enters a crisis of self-identity that almost leads her to suicide and the annihilation of 
her being-in-the-world itself. 
Towards the close of the novel, Natalie, her marriage in tatters, bedraggled 
and worn, wanders back near Caldwell, the estate where she grew up. With her ‘big 
T-shirt, leggings and a pair of filthy red slippers’, Natalie appears to a policeman ‘like 
a junkie’ (p. 299). This physical transformation, and the state of crisis Natalie is 
experiencing, put her in touch with Nathan Bogle (black, British), a destitute drug 
addict who went to school with Natalie and Leah, and who helps Natalie connect with 
her childhood identity. Natalie re-enters Caldwell with Nathan, previously unable to 
physically cross the boundary wall without him, ‘she walked along the wall from one 
end to the other and back again. She seemed to be seeking some perforation in the 
brick’ (p. 300). Nathan helps Natalie over the wall and back into Caldwell life, urging 
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her to embrace her former identity as Keisha. This departure from one world into 
another enables Natalie to see her own problems differently by regrounding her, in 
another world with its own relations and connections. The Sartrean dictum from 
White Teeth about being ‘on the other side of despair’ surfaces again here when it 
‘struck Natalie that […] dread was the hardest emotion in the world to hold onto for 
more than a moment. She couldn’t resist this display of the textures of the world: 
white stone, green turf, red rust, grey slate, brown shit. It was almost pleasant, 
strolling to nowhere’ (p. 310). In these scenes, Natalie is liberated from her 
connection to Caldwell’s boundary walls and her own home, with its gating and 
insulated Land Rovers. Whilst walking ‘they crossed over, Natalie Blake and Nathan 
Bogle’, across the street but also implicitly across the boundaries that separated them, 
their names sitting side-by-side for the first time, displaying an unmissable similarity. 
As they walk away from Caldwell and Natalie’s nearby house, out of their 
NW postcode and away from local places of belonging, Nathan and Natalie reach 
Hornsey Lane Bridge in the London borough of Haringey, locally known as the 
‘Suicide Bridge’ for the number of people have their own lives by jumping off. As 
Peter Boxall has noted, this wandering is figured by Nathan in terms of an approach 
to nowhere, ‘middle of nowhere up here’ (p. 318), a denotation repeated by Natalie 
first when she storms out of the house, and again when she contemplates suicide as 
‘going nowhere’ (p. 318). Boxall argues that the ‘annihilation’ Natalie contemplates 
here ‘makes of the bridge […] a bottomless void’, representative of an ‘emptiness at 
the heart of the geographies and histories that the novel depicts’.170 The possibility of 
an escape from place itself, out into nowhere, emerges as the only viable solution to 
Natalie’s troubled relationship with home: 
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[W]hen it came to the city, she was not mistaken. Here nothing less than a 
break — a sudden and total rupture — would do. She could see the act 
perfectly, it appeared before her like an object in her hand — and then the 
wind shook the trees once more and her feet touched the pavement. The act 
remained just that: an act, a prospect, always possible. (p. 319) 
The day after her wandering with Nathan, after peering over the void, Natalie is able 
to loose herself from defensiveness and empathise with the suffering of her friend 
Michel. Liberated from identities that are bound up in different positions and 
ultimately in the defence of these positions, Natalie is able to open up to Michel’s 
suffering: ‘normally all of her energies would be in defence — she was trained in it 
— but as he spoke her mind travelled to what felt like open ground, where she was 
able to almost imagine something like her friend’s pain and, in imagining it, create 
some version of it in herself’ (p. 328–329). This evocation of ‘open ground’ suggests 
Natalie’s temporary transcendence of her fraught relationship to place, something that 
is reaffirmed when she reflects on the sense of freedom now experienced through 
relinquishing the places she grew up in favour of attachments that are unbound by 
physical proximity: 
The Cock Tavern. McDonald’s. The old Woolworths. […] Whoever said 
these were fixed coordinates to which she had to be forever faithful? How 
could she play them false? Freedom was absolute and everywhere, constantly 
moving location. You couldn’t hope to find it only in the old, familiar places. 
Nor could you force other people to take their clothes off and give it to you 
like a gift. Clarity! (p. 329) 
In these scenes, NW contemplates the possibility of a cosmopolitanism not grounded 
in an untroubled relationship to place, or in a relationship to place at all. Such a 
cosmopolitanism would arguably be ungrounded, emerging from the worldliness of 
Dasein itself. The abyssal freedom that Natalie experiences here points towards a 
world that is not grounded in a relationship to place, but rather in the world-disclosive 
capacities of Dasein. Mark Wenman has proposed that ‘the void of human freedom 
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represents nothing more than a moment of radical possibility, from which might 
emerge a new principle or a distinctive set of values, and through an opening up of 
the world’.171 This abyssal cosmopolitanism finds its expression in the establishment 
of embryonic social ties between Nathan and Natalie, ties which emerge through a 
relinquishment of a relationship to place, rather than through the grounded hospitality 
that can be attributed to Leah’s welcoming of Shar to her home. 
At the same time as it holds up this utopian vision of cosmopolitanism, the 
novel portrays the fleeting nature of this possible world, precisely a result of a return 
to the exigencies of everyday existence. The sense of abyssal freedom achieved for 
Natalie through liberation from a search for rootedness and a place to ground herself 
does not last long. Days later, Natalie meets with Leah and they discuss Shar and 
Nathan, who they suspect of a murder they have read about in the newspaper. 
Considering reporting them to the police, Natalie argues that the world is 
fundamentally just and that people’s misfortunes are generally their own 
responsibility: ‘this is one of the things you learn in a courtroom: people generally get 
what they deserve’ (p. 332). Here, Nathan’s empathic response to Natalie’s suffering 
is lamented as a naïve mode of being-with in contemporary London. Whilst Nathan 
saved Natalie by showing her that being honest with her husband Frank about 
cheating on him, and submitting to his judgement, will not result in any punishment, 
Natalie and Leah reclaim moral superiority with the provocation that ‘people 
generally get what they deserve’. Leah and Natalie’s ability to help more vulnerable 
members of society — in court as a barrister and with Leah’s job distributing 
charitable funds, will justify their elevated status. Nathan is sacrificed in order that 
Natalie can avoid Leah’s judgement, and in turn that Leah is able to accept her life as 
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privileged and free from moral scrutiny and judgement by others who she in fact has 
the right to judge. 
Natalie calls the police to report Nathan Bogle. Seemingly disavowing her 
connections to Nathan, Natalie moves away from her past life and in turn from 
Keisha as an identity contributing to her self-understanding. Natalie makes the call in 
Keisha’s voice, however, which reveals her investment in Caldwell life if only 
through her continuing participation in that life as Keisha, something attested to by 
the nostalgic joy that Leah and Keisha feel as they press their ears to the telephone 
like they used to do as teenagers when phoning boys they fancied. The fact of Nathan 
Bogle’s importance in Leah’s life when she was growing up, his centrality as a 
romantic figure, reportedly a physical model for Leah’s husband Michel — ‘the guy 
she married even looks like you’ — also appears significant. We might assume that 
Leah enjoys judging and punishing a man who can stand in for her own husband, 
whilst also benefitting from the shared purpose and sense of alliance with Michel and 
Natalie that the campaign to intervene in the lives of Nathan and Shar provides. 
Leah was deeply disturbed by Shar’s situation, and due to her attempts to 
reach out to Shar, was harassed by Nathan. Natalie and Leah suspect Nathan of 
controlling Shar and acting as her pimp. As such, by reporting Nathan for Felix’s 
murder, Natalie attempts to help Leah by alleviating her concern for Shar.6 Natalie 
uses this news to help rebuild her relationship with Leah, and does this by drawing 
Leah slightly closer to her own, and Leah’s husbands, way of viewing the world, once 
again demonstrating that moral disposedness is social, and emerges from our being-
with others. In the midst of all this, NW’s narrator urges Natalie to open up to Leah 
about motherhood and her difficulties with Frank, to see ‘that the perfect gift at the 
moment was an honest account of her own difficulties and ambivalences, clearly 
stated, without disguise, embellishment or prettification’ (p. 331). Natalie’s choice to 
protect herself from judgement and move the conversation away from the issue of 
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children leads Leah to offer a more abstract problem for consideration: ‘I just don’t 
understand why I have this life […] Why that girl and not us. Why that poor bastard 
on Albert Road. It doesn’t make sense to me’ (p. 331). In instances like this, the 
affordance of interiority and individual agency to characters who act against the 
wishes of an omniscient narrator again suggests that moral dispositions are navigated 
at a level that is increasingly local and fractured. 
Conclusions 
Whereas in White Teeth social relations are guaranteed by a mode of narration 
that continually generates new entanglements and connections, in NW, social relations 
are conducted with a degree of individual deliberation and interiority. The individual 
characters are differently disposed towards the world, something that is most 
noticeable in characters who transcend the limited horizons of circumspection and 
concern that the novel suggests currently dominate contemporary being-in-the-world. 
Reading NW, I have allowed Heidegger’s insight that we always already find 
ourselves in a world to elucidate an understanding of local globality that is not an 
analogy for transnational relations, but is rather grounded in worldliness as a 
potentially ethical attunement or mode of dwelling. In doing so I have developed an 
alternative understanding of local cosmopolitanism by demonstrating that empathy 
does not emerge from a relationship to place in this novel, but from a particular 
disposedness towards the world that emerges from the navigation of world that exists 
as a result of Dasein’s way of being. This disposedness can be described as a mood or 
a mode of dwelling, and it emerges out of the involvements and interactions that are 
part of the everyday experience of being-there. 
The movement from White Teeth to NW traced in this chapter is perhaps best 
understood as a movement from an attunement to being-in and being-with and the 
worldly possibilities these open, in White Teeth, to the emergence of a particular 
disposition — empathy — that emerges in NW in response to deficient modes of 
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socially being-with others in the novel. There is perhaps in this way a retreat, in NW, 
from the openness to unqualified being-with and being-in-the-world in White Teeth. 
At the same time, this retreat is one that seeks to build a world again by retaining the 
positive possibilities inherent in Dasein’s worldliness. By tracing the divergent 
dispositions of its characters, NW foregrounds the way that individual social actors 
can create a world. To adopt Heidegger’s words, individuals ‘against the 
overwhelming sway […] throw the counterweight of their work and capture the world 
[…] that is thereby opened up’ (IM, p. 65). In this way NW reconceives the form’s 
capacity for world-opening, instead focusing on the ethical possibilities of contrasting 
human dispositions towards the world, dispositions that emerge through local social 
relationships and struggles. In this reading, the movement of Zadie Smith’s aesthetics 
would not be understandable as the development of an attempt to attain subjective 
autonomy, or the ‘right to a secret’ for her characters, and so render coherent their 
alterity, but rather to attain for them the essential freedom of a social existence that 
expresses and allows to flourish their fundamental being-with and being-in-the-world. 
 The next chapter turns to the question of dwelling and technology of 
writing highlighted in Chapter 1. If dwelling was antithetical to modern technology, 
then in what form does the search for dwelling reside, and present itself, in a novel 
which is singularly concerned with the destruction of the technology of writing? In 
this chapter I turn away from the ‘new ethics’ to demonstrate the relevance of a 
‘dwelling perspective’ to strands of criticism that respond to the affective, political 




Chapter 3: Finessing Finitude, and Remains: 
Unconcealing ‘Earth’ in the ‘Age of the World Picture’ 
 
Tom McCarthy’s Remainder (2005) is narrated by an unnamed British man in 
his early thirties whose life was transformed by a catastrophic accident.172 This 
‘traumatized mind’ (p. 5) is primarily afflicted by the sense that his access to the 
world around him, his own body and interiority, is ‘second hand’ (p. 50), subject to a 
fragmentary dissonance between experience and experiencing subject. ‘Most of my 
past had eventually returned’, explains the narrator of the past that he cannot 
remember after the accident, not as the recovery of authentic selfhood, but ‘in 
instalments, like back episodes of some mundane soap opera’ (p. 6). The world 
around the narrator after the accident is not a realm of meaningful involvement, but 
rather a series of representations that he cannot relate to. Through this breakdown of 
the subject Remainder enacts what Zadie Smith productively describes as a ‘nervous 
breakdown’ of realist narrative.173 
I explore this narrator’s breakdown and its relation to human dwelling here by 
drawing again on one of the insights of Heidegger’s fundamental anthropology: in 
this case, the argument that immersion and immediacy are the essential states of 
Dasein’s being-in-the-world. This is evident, in particular, in Being and Time’s 
argument that we fundamentally encounter entities as ready-at-hand equipment, and 
that we encounter entities only as present-at-hand objects when there is a breakdown 
in this more originary worldly involvement. This insight provides a starting point 
both for my discussion and for the novel that I am discussing here, as I will 
demonstrate below. From this starting point, I go on to discuss how this breakdown in 
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worldly orientation figures in both Heidegger’s writings, and in Remainder, as a 
result of technologies of representation that divorce the human subject from their 
more originary relation to things in the world. Through comparative readings of two 
of Heidegger’s discussions of worldly representations, in ‘The Age of the World 
Picture’ and ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ respectively, I explore the possibility 
that Remainder is a novel not so much concerned with the breakdown of the novel, as 
with possibilities for shaping a new relation to the technology of representation which 
overcomes the distorted relation to our worldly belonging that Heidegger’s writings 
diagnose in modernity. 
Remainder’s disruption of the relationship between the novel protagonist and 
the world that they move within invites us to read the novel as an affront to literary 
realism. In a landmark essay titled ‘Two Paths for the Novel’, Zadie Smith set 
Remainder against the ‘lyrical realism’ of Joseph O’Neill’s Netherland, arguing 
Remainder succeeded in breaking with novelistic convention by treating the 
specificities of space as ‘a series of physical events rather than emotional symbols’.174 
In the years since Smith’s essay, McCarthy has confirmed his own commitment to 
write against the ‘liberal-humanist sensibility [that] has always held the literary work 
to be a form of self-expression’.175 I will not be the first to read Remainder as a 
meditation on the conditions of life structured by representation, or as an 
experimental attempt to dismantle the representational codes of the novel form; the 
novel has become a central text for critics of contemporary fiction, in part ever since 
Zadie Smith proclaimed that the novel ‘offer[s] an alternative road down which the 
novel might, with difficulty, travel’.176  
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Namwali Serpell, highlighted in my introduction as a critic writing in 
response to the new ethics, addresses Remainder in detail in her book Seven Modes of 
Uncertainty, as does Arne De Boever, who addresses the novel’s self-conscious 
negotiation of its own inescapable tendency towards incarceration.177 Alongside De 
Boever and Serpell, Pieter Vermeulen notably argues that Remainder represents 
McCarthy’s ‘attempt to embody a clean break’ with the commercial novel, ‘especially 
with its most recent incarnation: the trauma novel’.178 Vermeulen views McCarthy’s 
novel as an attempt to break with the trauma novel by virtue of it being 
‘conspicuously indifferent to the ethical dimensions of artistic engagements with the 
extreme violence and the psychological suffering that characterize trauma’.179 The 
author demonstrates that, where trauma fiction often deigns to represent trauma 
through homologous formal and narrative devices, Remainder departs from this 
tradition in its depiction of a narrator devoid of emotional responses, with a blank and 
affectless subjectivity that rejects the psychological depth inherent in the novel form, 
leading to an ‘unleashing of non-subjective affects that confront the reader with an 
evacuated subjectivity that, precisely because it does not offer a position to identify 
with, cannot leave the reader unaffected’.180  
Nonetheless, for Vermeulen, the re-enactments eventually lead to a return to 
traumatic subjectivity in the novel, re-introducing a subject whose maniacal 
obsessions with mundane details increasingly mean that the novel’s attempt to excise 
psychological depth gives way to an identifiable representation of traumatic 
subjectivity: ‘The studied flatness and neutrality of the narrative voice can 
retroactively be understood as an expression of post-traumatic numbing rather than as 
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a radical affront to the novelistic evocation of psychological depth’.181 Ultimately, 
then, Vermeulen argues that ‘McCarthy performs the deliberately “improper burial” 
of the novel—a form unable to disappear and surviving itself in the transmission of 
affects that no longer belong to a proper subject’.182  
If Vermeulen celebrates the experience of unruly, non-subjective affects 
released by Remainder, Namwali Serpell comparably conceives of the novel in terms 
of emotional affordances derived from the novel’s structuring. Serpell suggests that 
the novel’s deployment of the conventions of trauma narrative, what Vermeulen 
called ‘a narrative grammar of compulsive repetition’, creates a temporally 
synchronic movement through narrative, an experience that produces uninterpreted, 
yet structurally determined, affective perturbances in its reader.183 These affective 
perturbances have certain ethical potentialities when they are codified as emotions by 
the reader, but importantly they do not arise from identification with a coherent 
subject or character in the text, rather instead from the structuring form of the novel 
itself.184 Read collectively, Serpell’s and Vermeulen’s writings on Remainder offer an 
account of the emotional perturbances made possible by the novel form, when the 
distortion of coherent subjectivity produces not identification or readerly binding but 
defamiliarised affects. 
Like Vermeulen, Arne De Boever ties the novel’s rejection of realist 
conventions to new possibilities for characterological life, ‘the biopolitical 
implications of realism’s aesthetic collapse’.185 De Boever suggests reading the 
narrator’s re-enactments as biopolitical projects, ‘as the obsessive search for life and 
for an apparatus that would be able to capture it, as authentically living’.186 In this 
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view, the narrator’s project is ‘not so much about killing subjects but about keeping 
them alive, almost until the point of death (for the life they lead can hardly be called a 
life)’.187 De Boever develops his biopolitical reading of the novel form by suggesting 
a homologous relationship between it and the concentration camp, drawing on Ian 
Watt’s Rise of the Novel to argue that the novel and the camp are joined together by 
their essential and emblematic modernity.188 Remainder is an instance, in this view, of 
a strain of novels that ‘distance themselves from the dubious politics with which the 
rise of the novel as a genre is aligned’. In this case, ‘paradoxically, Remainder 
achieves this distantiation by its representation of a narrator who creates camps. 
McCarthy’s novel, clearly, can be read as such a camp. And yet it is the narrative’s 
breakdown that makes such a reading impossible’.189 Moments of trauma and death, 
when the narrator’s biopolitical management of life breaks down, by contrast provide 
a glimpse of life itself: ‘trauma provides the contact with life, the authentic, the real 
that the narrator desires’.190 By finding a way into the heart of the novel as a form, for 
De Boever Remainder releases the pharmacological potential of the form, releasing 
the potential for life that exceeds the biopolitical model of perfect representation and 
perfectly managed life. 
In this chapter I draw on, and respond to, Vermeulen’s suggestion that 
Remainder performs an ‘improper burial’ of the novel form, one that unfolds through 
McCarthy’s ‘dismissal of psychological realism’ and so the burial of the ‘proper 
subject’.191 This idea of the emergence of an ‘improper subject’ is present, as I will 
explain below, in De Boever’s biopolitical reading of the novel as a refusal of the 
‘biopolitical perfection’ of realism.192 The idea suggested by Vermeulen of 
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Remainder as a form of crypt which paradoxically buries, but sustains, life within its 
pages, is also at play in De Boever’s discussion of Derrida’s writings on biopolitics 
and the novel, The Beast and the Sovereign: Volume II.193 Whilst only briefly 
mentioning Derrida’s writing on biopolitics and the novel, De Boever introduces 
pertinent questions regarding the relation between life and the technicity of the novel 
form. The questions that De Boever poses (‘[d]oes the novel keep the life that it 
narrates alive? Can it be a “living repetition of the living,” to quote from “Plato’s 
Pharmacy”? Or does the novel bury within its pages any life that it tries to represent? 
Can there be a living work of art?’ [De Boever, p. 8]) concern the ontological status 
of life in the novel, and the conditions under which life survives in the novel form.  
In this chapter I expand on these critics’ notion of the novel as a crypt, and the 
implicit suggestion that the emergence of new forms of life and affectivity are 
achieved in Remainder through the novel’s instantiation of an ‘improper’ subject. I 
seek to explain the trajectory of Remainder, centring as it does around the narrator’s 
increasingly violent re-enactments, as the product of the novel’s ongoing engagement 
with the capacities of representation for capturing and transforming the ontological 
status of human life. McCarthy’s C (2010) likewise foregrounds its own status as a 
technological crypt that lifelessly transmits signals and codes, examining the effects 
of the rise of communications technology at the beginning of the twentieth century on 
the psyche of its protagonist, Serge Carrefax. Satin Island (2015) follows 
Remainder’s explorations on the act of writing, presenting a failed attempt at a grand 
ethnographic project, the Great Report. Even amongst these two related novels, 
Remainder is unique in its attempt to reformulate a proper relationship, in modernity, 
with writing as technology.  
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Whereas Vermeulen and De Boever attribute the violent nature of the re-
enactments to the return of the protagonist’s subjective interiority, and to the 
addictive nature of traumatic opioids respectively, I attribute this violence, and the 
destruction of life it entails, to a (necessary) intensification of representation that 
unfolds across the novel. Drawing on Heidegger’s understanding of the ‘proper’ 
relation to the technology of writing being handwriting, I suggest that the ‘improper 
burial’ of the form is best read as the paradoxical liberation of another ‘proper 
subject’, an argument which likewise has repercussions for biopolitical readings of 
the novel. To develop this Heideggerian reading, I locate this pursuit of ‘proper’ life 
in Remainder’s vexing of the limits of representation, and suggest that the novel 
intensifies the objectifying exigencies of representation to such an extent that the 
immaterial ground that supports these objectifications and gives them meaning comes 
into view as the novel unfolds. Ultimately, this elucidation of the unbridling of 
representational energies within the conceptual frame of the novel enables a reflection 
on the indebtedness of McCarthy’s novel to a certain thanatopolitical strain in 
Heidegger’s thought, one that likewise permeates the critical reception of the novel 
and remains to be unearthed as part of that conversation. 
Handiness and representation 
The disruption to the landscape of the novel mentioned above is evident, at 
the beginning of Remainder, in the narrator’s suffering realisation of the disruptive, 
insistent materiality of the carrot that he attempts to lift as part of his recovery. No 
longer ‘a hollow, carved space for [him] to grasp and move’, the carrot exerts its own 
material presence and become ‘more active’, reflects the narrator, ‘than me’ (p. 21). I 
now turn to a brief discussion of the relationship between representation and the 
rupture of a more originary relation to the entities in the world in their 
equipmentality, from the perspective of Heidegger’s fundamental anthropology. 
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As mentioned above, the control that Remainder’s narrator seeks to recover 
after his accident initially presents itself as what Heidegger called the ‘handiness’ of 
entities when they are encountered as ready-to-hand equipment (BT, p. 69). 
Heidegger draws this distinction between the detached contemplation of entities and 
their encounter the immediacy of ‘handiness’ as follows: ‘The less we just stare at the 
thing called the hammer, the more we take hold of it and use it, the more original our 
relation to it becomes […] [t]he act of hammering itself discovers the specific 
“handiness” [“Handlichkeit”] of the hammer. […] No matter how keenly we just look 
at the “outward appearance” of things constituted in one way or another, we cannot 
discover handiness’ (BT, p. 69 emphasis in original). 
This loss of handiness is explored in Remainder, when, after relearning basic 
bodily movements that before had seemed entirely natural, ‘rerouting’ (p. 19) the 
pathways that control motor function through an undamaged part of the brain, the 
protagonist cannot extinguish an abiding sense of distance between himself and his 
actions. This produces a novel, if unwanted, awareness of the complexity of his 
actions: ‘No Doing without Understanding: the accident bequeathed me that for ever, 
an eternal detour’ (p. 22). Understanding proves more difficult than the narrator might 
have hoped, something he learns when, after imagining the ‘simple’ action of raising 
‘more than a thousand imaginary carrots to your mouth, or one imaginary carrot more 
than a thousand times’ (p. 20), he is unable to overcome the awkward materiality of 
an actual carrot when tasked to pick it up. It was ‘gnarled, dirty and irregular in ways 
that your imaginary carrot never was […] it felt: that was enough to start short-
circuiting the operation’ (p. 20, emphasis in original). 
This breakdown in what Heidegger called our ‘original […] relation’ (BT, p. 
69) to entities in the world reveals the things which the narrator encounters in the 
novel as theoretical objects, insisting on their status as mere representations which, 
despite their ‘outward appearance’, are not substitutes for the entities we encounter, 
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originally, as ready-to-hand equipment in the world (BT, p. 69). In this way 
Remainder likewise disrupts the status of the human in the novel, drawing our 
attention to the limits that realist representation abuts in any attempt to create and 
sustain characterological life. In order to further demonstrate the relation between the 
loss of handiness and the novel form itself, it is necessary to observe that Heidegger’s 
notion of ‘handiness’ is underpinned by his view that the world and its entities are not 
‘given’ objects, but rather the result of being delivered over to a horizon of 
involvement, what Heidegger in Being and Time calls the ‘throwness’ that constitutes 
human worldliness. In the years following his fundamental anthropology of Dasein, 
Heidegger lamented that modern society’s tendency towards objectifying the world 
and its entities ever more increasingly drew Dasein away from the circumspective 
involvement with entities that as ready-to-hand equipment described above. In a 1938 
essay ‘The Age of the World Picture’, published in German with ‘The Origin of the 
Work of Art’, Heidegger deploys ‘world’ as a term that ‘serves, here, as a name for 
beings in their entirety’ (AWP, p. 54). Heidegger makes the distinction of this 
everyday understanding of ‘the world’ from the fundamental worldliness described in 
Being and Time clear when he seeks to distance the fundamental ontology of Being 
and Time from his current concern with ‘the world’ as a mere totality of beings, 
writing, in one of the essay’s appendices: 
‘[T]he conception of the world as developed in Being and Time is to be 
understood only within the perspective of the question about “being-there 
[Dasein].” This question remains […] closely connected with the fundamental 
question concerning the meaning of being (not of beings).’ (AWP, p. 76) 
This essay argued that Western modernity, dominated by metaphysics (Heidegger 
explicitly mentions Americanism in the essay, and describes Americanism as a 
European phenomenon), is unable to think the proper relation of Dasein to its being, 
and is afflicted by what Heidegger called a ‘forgetfulness of being’ itself. In the 
modern age that Heidegger describes, essential phenomena such as science, machine 
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technology, aesthetics, culture and the loss of the gods contribute to a relation to the 
world as a totality of knowable entities, a totality which exists only by virtue of the 
human subject (AWP, pp. 57–58). 
In his attempt to recover a relationship to entities in their ‘handiness’, 
Remainder’s narrator is forced to reflect on his connection to a society in which, as 
Heidegger argued in ‘The Age of the World Picture’, objectification and relation to 
entities in the world as present-at-hand objects has become commonplace. The 
narrator reflects, ‘I’d always been inauthentic. Even before the accident […] I’d still 
be thinking: Here I am, walking down the street, smoking a cigarette, like someone in 
a film’ (p. 24, italics in original). Understanding that authenticity involves a 
negotiation of representations, the narrator surveys a group of young people hanging 
out in the streets of Soho and detects a similar ‘inauthenticity’ in their gestures: 
[They] have the same ad in mind as me. I could tell. In their gestures and their 
movements they acted out the roles of the ad’s characters […] their bodies 
and faces buzzed with glee, exhilaration − a jubilant awareness that for once, 
just now […] they didn’t have to sit in a cinema or a living room in front of a 
TV and watch other beautiful young people laughing and hanging out: they 
could be the beautiful young people themselves. See? Just like me: 
completely second-hand. (p. 50) 
The narrator is confronted by his insurmountable sense of the inauthentic nature of 
the life around him: the people in the street, like the narrator himself, are inauthentic 
or ‘second-hand’ precisely because they relate to the world and themselves through 
representations of it. Yet, as I will discuss in this chapter, the representations of life 
that he sees around him, and knows to be inauthentic, still promise themselves as a 
mode of authentic life that he would like to recover. In the midst of his protestations 
of their inauthenticity, the narrator betrays his desire to bridge the sense of remove he 
feels from this gleeful crowd who might, he proposes, be ‘[j]ust like me’ (p. 4). 
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In order to elucidate the narrator’s attempt to change his relationship to 
representations in the rest of the novel, it is important to foreground, too, that ‘“world 
picture” does not mean “picture of the world” but, rather, the world grasped as 
picture’ (AWP, p. 67). Modern society grasps the world through its own 
representations, understanding these representations not as a copy or picture of the 
world, but as the world itself: ‘“[p]icture” means, here, not a mere imitation, but 
rather that which sounds in the colloquial expression to be “in the picture” about 
something’ (AWP, p. 67). Being ‘in the picture’ is then a way of knowing the world, 
a relation to world, which equates the totalising nature of human knowledge with the 
totality of the world itself: ‘[b]eings as a whole are now taken in such a way that a 
being is first and only in being insofar as it is set in place by representing-producing 
humanity [vorstellend-herstellenden] […] [t]he being of beings is sought and found in 
the representedness of beings’ (AWP, pp. 67–68). 
What exactly does Heidegger mean by representing and representedness here? 
The representedness of beings that Heidegger describes here is figured, in the 
language of Being and Time, as the installation of the present-at-hand as the everyday 
way of relating to beings in the world: ‘[r]epresentation [Vor-stellen] means here: to 
bring the present-at-hand before one as something standing over-and-against, to relate 
it to oneself, the representer, and, in this relation, to force it back to oneself as the 
norm-giving domain’ (AWP, p. 69). In this age, for the first time, ‘there exists such a 
thing as the “position” of man’ (AWP, p. 69). Man now stands over and against a 
world which is totally knowable and depictable, and as such becomes a subject 
through his capacity, Heidegger argues, ‘“to represent”: to put forth and relate to 
oneself. It is through this that the being comes to stand as an object and so first 
receives the seal of being. That the world becomes picture is one and the same 
process whereby, in the midst of beings, man becomes subject’ (AWP, p. 69). As 
much as man becomes subject, for whom the world is a picture, he also becomes 
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subject to representation himself, becoming an object in the picture by virtue of his 
‘position’, as we saw, ‘in the picture’. In Heidegger’s words: 
[H]e places himself in the scene; in, that is, the sphere of what is generally 
and publicly represented […] man sets himself forth as the scene in which, 
henceforth, beings must set-themselves-before, present themselves – be, that 
is to say, in the picture. Man becomes the representative [Repräsentant] of 
beings in the sense of the objective. (AWP, p. 69) 
In this way Heidegger theorises the relationship between subjectivity and 
representation in the modern age. The modern subject is constituted in 
representations, representations of which she becomes ‘representative’ for the way in 
which they represent the subject to themselves. The problematic of how to live a life 
structured by objectified representations in an immediate, authentic way, becomes the 
organising refrain of the narrator’s experience as the novel unfolds. With this 
understanding in place I now return, in more detail, to a conception of these modes of 
being as a play between ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ forms of life in the novel and 
Heidegger’s thought. 
The proper and the improper 
Proper and improper life 
Implicit in Vermeulen’s discussion of McCarthy’s intention to perform a total 
destruction of the novel, which ultimately results for Vermeulen in its improper 
burial, as discussed above, is a notion of the ‘proper’ as a form of writing that 
McCarthy’s project aspires to. Conversely, the ‘proper’ (and an implied ‘improper’) 
was foregrounded by Heidegger in his lecture course on the early Greek thinker 
Parmenides, to describe a changing relationship to being through its mediation by 
writing. The original encounter of entities in the world in their ‘handiness’, familiar 
from Being and Time, is extended by Heidegger in Parmenides to a consideration of 
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handwriting as the ‘proper’ form of writing that allows a relation to being. Heidegger 
writes: 
[T]he hand in its essence secures the reciprocal relation between “beings” and 
man. There is a “hand” only where beings as such appear in unconcealedness 
and man comports himself in a disclosing way towards beings. The hand 
entrusts to the word the relation of Being to man and, thereby, the relation of 
man to beings. […] Writing, from its originating source, is hand-writing. […] 
In handwriting the relation of Being to man, namely the word, is inscribed in 
beings themselves. (P, pp. 84–85) 
The relation to being of man is revealed in the word, and it is the hand — as the 
origin of writing — that constitutes the essential intermediary between man and 
being. With the emergence of technological forms of writing, such as the typewriter, 
the hand withdraws and loses what we might call its ‘handiness’, and ceases to be a 
hand that opens the relation of man to being at all: ‘when writing was withdrawn 
from the origin of its essence, i.e., from the hand, and was transferred to the machine, 
a transformation occurred in the relation of Being to man […] In the typewriter the 
machine appears, i.e. technology appears’ (P, pp. 85–86). 
With the emergence of this new technology, man’s relation to being is 
transformed ‘in an almost quotidian and hence unnoticed’ process (P, p. 86). The 
word, now rendered as communication, ‘no longer comes and goes by means of the 
writing hand, the properly acting hand, but by means of the mechanical forces it 
releases’ (p. 81). In a line of argument recently traced by Timothy Campbell, 
Heidegger’s writing suggests a degradation of life tied to the arrival of a technology 
that tears man away from his ‘proper’ relation to being, establishing a distinction 
between ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ forms of lived existence, positing ‘Western man as 
requiring saving from the pernicious effects of technology on man’s proper relation to 
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being’.194 As such, the ‘proper/improper’ distinction which I take up in my reading of 
Remainder binds representation together with biopolitics to form the indivisible 
problematic pursued in this chapter. 
It would make sense, reflexively, to set the novel at a distance from the 
‘improper’ writing that Heidegger argues life is subject to in the modern age. Where 
Heidegger criticises the depersonalising effect of technology that transforms the 
‘word’ into ‘communication’, for instance, it is possible to point to the individual 
style of novel writers, the distinctive modes of narration and the greatly different 
visions of life as presented in diverse novelistic traditions. Yet, the change in life that 
technological reproduction elicits is rooted in the very familiarity of writing that 
circulates amongst mass readerships in the modern age. Through repetition and 
circulation, life subject to improper writing is transformed: ‘the typewriter leads again 
to the typesetting machine. The press becomes the rotary press. In rotation, the 
triumph of the machine comes to the fore’ (P, p. 85). Man loses his relationship to 
being through technological mastery, becoming what Heidegger calls a ‘kind of man 
[…] alone capable of carrying out the “mastery” of technology’ (P, p. 87). The 
essential change in this kind of man is separated from being, ‘the transformed relation 
of being to man, appearing in technology, is of such a kind that Being has withdrawn 
itself from man and modern man has been plunged into an eminent oblivion of Being’ 
(P, p. 86).195 
Proper and improper death 
As mentioned above, the notion of the novel as a space of a technologically 
‘improper’ burial of the modern subject can also be found in Jacques Derrida’s The 
                                                 
194 Timothy Campbell, Improper Life: Technology and Biopolitics from Heidegger to Agamben 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), p. 9. 
195 It should be noted that the two stages that Heidegger mentions here, typesetting and 
rotation, literally perform the ‘setting in place’ of representation highlighted in ‘The Age of 
the World Picture’, and the circulation that Heidegger will associate with the standing reserve 
in his later writings on technological positionality or Gestell. 
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Beast and the Sovereign: Volume II. As Arne De Boever has observed, in this text 
Derrida develops a connection between biopolitics and the novel in a close reading of 
Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe.196 In an imagined dialogue between a student and 
professor (whom we take to be Derrida himself), the student compares Crusoe to 
someone returning to the world, claiming Crusoe ‘came back from his island alive 
and well […] more alive as he returned to the English coast than some astronauts re-
entering the atmosphere’.197 Derrida reminds his student that he cannot, as 
protagonist, return to the world, because ‘there is no Robinson Crusoe outside the 
book’.198 Being inseparable from the narrative entitled Robinson Crusoe, Robinson 
the character cannot escape the confines of the text of the book: ‘dying a living death 
can only be a fantasmatic virtuality, a fiction, if you like’, but a fiction that can only 
occur in fiction, ‘as dying a living death, in the present, can never really present itself’ 
in life.199 The book, then, is the place where Robinson Crusoe is buried alive: ‘kept 
alive by millions of inheritors — this survival that is indeed that of the living dead’, a 
‘living narrative’ that is also dead by virtue of its technicity. For Derrida ‘the 
machination of this machine’ lies in the fact that it entrusts the trace to this capacity 
for living on, which Derrida will call ‘survivance’:  
A dead thing that resuscitates each time a breath of living reading, each time 
the breath of the other or the other breath, each time an intentionality intends 
it and makes it live again by animating it, like, as the Husserl of the Origin of 
Geometry would say, a “geistige Leiblichkeit”, a body, a spiritual 
corporeality.200  
                                                 
196 See Arne de Boever, ‘Biopolitics in Deconstruction’ and ‘Derrida’s Theory of the Novel’, 
<http://derridaseminars.org/workshops> 
197 Jacques Derrida, The Beast & the Sovereign: Volume Two, ed. by Michel Lisse, Marie-
Louise Mallet, and Ginette Michaud, trans. by Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2017), p. 128. 
198 Derrida, Beast, p. 129. 
199 Derrida, Beast, p. 130. 
200 Derrida, Beast, p. 132. 
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In this sense, the circulation of the form of life that the novel embodies produces it as 
precisely the ‘improper life’ that is inevitable under the subjection of modern 
technology. Reduced from the ‘mineness’ of Heidegger’s writing hand, the novel is 
opened to the infinite circulation of ‘improper writing’, Crusoe’s life is the production 
of a form of ‘improper life’, surviving beyond its initial death, that marks the essential 
condition of life in the novel form. 
Continuing the comparison of the novel with a form of burial, Derrida writes 
that, in death and mourning, we make a thing of the other: ‘it is a question of love, but 
a love that appropriates what it loves to make of it the thing it loves’.201 Whilst the 
sovereignty of the living who make a thing of the dead is the primary example here, 
such sovereignty also exists, Derrida suggests, in love more broadly. Derrida 
questions whether loving, like mourning, ‘does not mean loving so as to make it one's 
lovable thing, to the point of having it at one’s disposal, to love eating and drinking it 
alive, keeping it in oneself, burying it or burning it to keep it living-dead in oneself or 
right up close to oneself, which can also be as far as can be from oneself. 
Everywhere’.202 In the case of death and mourning, this loving finds its privileged 
expression in the ‘funeral itself’, one of a ‘set of technical procedures whereby we 
[…] deliver the corpse over to its future, prepare the future of a corpse and prepare 
ourselves as one says prepare a corpse’.203 This transformation presupposes an 
understanding of death as total exposure to the other, being ‘delivered over with no 
possible defense [sic], once totally disarmed, to the other, to the others […] those who 
might survive me, survive my decease and then proceed as they wish, sovereignly, 
and sovereignly have at their disposal the future of my remains’.204 
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Derrida is keen to emphasise the technicity of survivance achieved through 
the literal return to earth: we are speaking, he argues, of ‘a procedure, and so already 
of arrangements that are both technical and juridical, which have themselves left the 
order of what is called in the current and belated sense nature’ (p. 126, emphasis in 
original). As such we are ‘in the opposition of nomos, tekne, thesis to physis in the 
late and derived sense’. Death, in this view, does not come ‘naturally’ to the modern 
subject but rather is enacted through technical practices which ‘make’ the dead. This 
departure from the ‘order of […] nature’ nonetheless entails an entry into the earth 
that bears the remains of the dead, something Derrida recognises in his description of 
the burial as ‘a procedure, a path, a movement along a path, a path of departure or 
return’.205 Derrida employs Heidegger’s language of the fourfold, of earth, sky, 
divinities and mortals, in order to explore the way in which the technical performance 
of burial and mourning sustains a relationship with the dead, and in turn prepares 
their future, what Derrida calls ‘death as survivance’.206 Passing into the fourfold 
mirror-play of the thinging thing, occurs then through a techne, ‘the respect or pomp, 
funereal by vocation, with which he or she will treat that singular thing they call my 
remains’.207 
The earth is privileged for Derrida in the schema of Heidegger’s fourfold, for 
its proximity to the remains of the other. Derrida complicates the distinction between 
the earth and the remains by stating that the earth is ‘what, remaining, bears’ (p. 126). 
The earth ‘gather[s] them, water and stone, what grows (the plant) and the animal 
(Gewasser und Gestein, Gewachs und Getier)’ (p. 126). As such, the earth supports 
the emergence of new environments and spaces of meaning in the crossing and 
gathering together of worldly entities: water, stone, plants and animals (and the 
remains it bears form part of this process). Earth straddles two registers here, existing 
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134 
 
as the literal ground that bears my remains and supports worldly entities, and as a 
conceptual ground, an inexhaustible plenitude through which all worldly existence 
moves in perpetual emerging and receding, ‘a path of departure or return’.208 
Technically mortal 
Derrida’s adoption of Heidegger’s fourfold demands further treatment before 
I proceed. The focus on earth as privileged element in the technical procedure of 
preparation for death makes conspicuous another element of the fourfold, that of 
‘mortals’. Indeed, a key target of Derrida’s critique in The Beast and the Sovereign is 
the view he finds in Heidegger that man is the only being who can die meaningfully, 
through awareness of his own mortality. In Derrida’s response to Heidegger, ‘men are 
doubtless rational animals, but if they are to be worthy of their human essence, they 
must become not only rational living beings, animals endowed with reason and that, 
qua animals, do not die, but they must become mortals’.209 In this way, Derrida 
prepares an understanding of the human not as a being that will recover its ‘proper’ 
relation to being, but as an irreducibly ‘improper’ form of life that recovers a relation 
to mortality precisely through technological means. 
For Derrida, technical practices of burial, the ‘exercise or discipline of 
preparation for death’ provide a certain access or relation to mortality, precisely 
through the survivance, the future beyond death, that they prepare for. The rational 
animal retrieves a relation to its ‘mortality’ through its attempts ‘to become immortal, 
or a-mortal, basically like beasts’.210 If ‘dying remains impossible’, Derrida asks (and 
here I read Derrida as referring to a ‘proper’ relation to death, impossible for modern 
humans), is this not ‘pretty much the same thing? Living death beyond life, live to 
death, living death, etc. This is perhaps the same circle’, writes Derrida, as that 
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pursued by Heidegger.211 Derrida’s worrying of the distinction he finds in Heidegger, 
here, between Dasein as that being which can die, and other beings (animals) which 
merely perish, rests on the way that technical procedures establish the relationship of 
worldly remains with a certain beyond, an ontological plenitude conceived under the 
everyday heading of ‘earth’.212 
The primacy that Derrida gives to the technical procedure mediating between 
earth and world points back to Heidegger’s treatment of the artwork in ‘The Origin of 
the Work of Art’, which I will address in the next section of this chapter. In this 
essay, the objectification of life in the modern aesthetic relation to art and the 
possibility of overcoming the representational logic of ‘The Age of the World 
Picture’ is pursued in detail. Despite the forgetfulness of a modern society that knows 
the world as the ‘name for beings in their entirety’, Heidegger is at pains to make 
clear that this conception of world is not exhaustive, even in the modern age: ‘even 
nature and history — interpenetrating in their suffusion and exceeding of each other 
— do not exhaust world. Under this term we include the world-ground [Weltgrund], 
no matter how its relation to world is thought’ (AWP, p. 67). Heidegger’s ambiguous 
statement about the ‘world-ground’ which points to the presence of an unrepresented 
beyond that supports the knowable world, ‘beings in their entirety’, will be crucial to 
understanding Heidegger’s challenge to the age of the ‘world picture’ in this essay 
and ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. In ‘The Origin’, to which I will now turn, 
Heidegger demonstrated the way that objectifying representations can themselves 
reveal the relationship between world and earth — that invisible beyond previously 
described as ‘world-ground’. 
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212 Though Derrida refers to the fourfold in order to trouble the demand that he finds, in 
Heidegger’s later writings, that ‘we must become mortals’ in order to die, the privileging of 
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earth and world. 
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Earth and world in the work of art 
In ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, Heidegger performs a reading of Van 
Gogh’s ‘A Pair of Peasant Shoes’ which seeks to overcome an understanding of the 
artwork as aesthetic representation of an object. Heidegger’s attempt to depart from 
the age of the world picture through recourse to a picture itself informs my reading of 
Remainder, and the narrator’s attempt to achieve a more integrated involvement in 
the world. As such it is necessary to elucidate the argument Heidegger advances 
about this painting. 
Heidegger argues that Van Gogh’s ‘A Pair of Shoes’ does not present the 
shoes it depicts as objects for aesthetic contemplation, and so is not simply a 
representation. The work, Heidegger elicits, presents the shoes not as objects, but as 
equipment that was all but invisible (in their ‘handiness’) to their wearer, who enjoys 
a primordial relationship with them based on their use and reliability. Yet, as Iain 
Thomson rightfully comments, the choice of a picture that presents the shoes not in 
their use, as equipment, but rather as objects in a ‘still life’ is clearly paradoxical, 
functioning as a direct challenge to the aesthetic approach that would claim the pair of 
shoes as represented objects.213 Whilst reading the work as evidence of a more 
primordial relationship to entities in the world, one based in equipmentality, 
Heidegger also draws our attention to the great difficulty of uncovering ‘what 
equipment in truth is’ (OWA, p. 34) through aesthetic experience or 
phenomenological description. ‘As long as we simply look at the empty, unused 
shoes as they stand there in the picture, (OWA, p. 33), Heidegger observes, we will 
not capture the work’s evocation of the primordial experience of integral involvement 
with equipment in engaged use. We might ask at this point, then, what it is about the 
work that Heidegger holds can lead us into this more primordial mode of being-in-
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the-world, and out of entrapment within a relation to the world as a series of objects 
made available to consciousness as representations? 
Heidegger’s attempt to overcome the grip of representational logic, a relation 
to artworks as objects of aesthetic experience, proceeds, as suggested above, through 
his complicating the apparently obvious fact that Van Gogh’s painting is a 
representation of a pair of shoes. Heidegger does not deny that the painting is a 
representation of a pair of shoes, making a point of stating that the painting is a 
representation. However, the essay develops by attending to the way in which the 
shoes bring into view a world of integral involvement that has been overlooked in 
their aesthetic understanding as an objectified representation. As Heidegger 
acknowledges, ‘there is nothing surrounding this pair of peasant shoes to which and 
within which they could belong; only an undefined space. Not even clods of earth 
from the field or from the country path stick to them, which could at least point 
toward their use’ (OWA, p. 33). This quotation introduces one usage of the term 
‘earth’ in Heidegger’s essay, earth that — like in Derrida’s essay — is the literal 
ground that supports and guides the farmer and bears the fruits of her labour.  
Despite the absence of physical residue on the shoes themselves, Heidegger’s 
phenomenological inspection of the objects finds that the shoe ‘accumulates’ the trace 
of the farmer’s movements in her earthly environs: ‘in the crudely solid heaviness of 
the shoes accumulates the tenacity of the slow trudge through the […] furrows of the 
field swept raw by wind. On the leather lies the dampness and richness of the soil. 
Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls’ (OWA, p. 33). 
In this way the shoes bring into view the relationship the farmer has with the earthly 
ground: ‘the shoes vibrate with the silent call of the earth, its silent gift of the ripening 
grain, its unexplained self-refusal in the wintry field’ (OWA, p. 33). As equipment, 
the shoes mediate and sustain this relationship between the earth and the world of 
meaning which the earth grounds, gives itself to and supports. As such the equipment 
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is also ‘pervaded’ with the world of meaning that the farmer cultivates from the 
supporting ground of the earth: ‘worry as to the certainty of bread, wordless joy at 
having once more withstood want, trembling before the impending birth, and 
shivering at the surrounding menace of death’ (OWA, p. 133).214  
It is important to recognise that the equipmentality the farmer enjoys in the 
world of the fields, sustained by her shoes, is an everyday mode of being-in-the-
world. The relationship between world and earth is not intelligible for the farmer in 
the same way that, Heidegger proposes, it is made intelligible through the 
phenomenological approach to Van Gogh’s work. As Heidegger comments, ‘perhaps 
it is only in the picture that we notice all this about the shoes. The peasant woman, by 
contrast, merely wears them. If only this simple wearing were that simple’ (OWA, p. 
33).  
Heidegger’s argument is not limited to this intimation, however; the farmer’s 
world and her relation to earth depend, too, upon the usefulness and reliability of the 
equipment: ‘[i]n virtue of this reliability the peasant woman is admitted into the silent 
call of the earth; in virtue of the reliability of the equipment she is certain of her 
world’ (OWA, p. 34). Following this quotation, Heidegger gestures to the way that 
the technological mode of existence in modernity has eroded this form of ‘simple’ use 
that is characteristic of equipmental being. Whereas in Being and Time the 
breakdown of equipment revealed equipmental being itself, making visible the 
relation to the ready-at-hand object that had previously been nearly invisible in its 
use, Heidegger now explicates a more common situation where ‘[t]he individual piece 
of equipment becomes worn out and used up’ (OWA, p. 34).  
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supports the world and the world that emerges from it: ‘this equipment belongs to the earth 
and finds protection in the world of the peasant woman’ (OWA, p. 33). 
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With the using up of the piece of equipment comes a loss of the reliability that 
sustained the relationship to earth and world enjoyed by the farmer. The shoes come 
to be understood once again merely as useful objects, but not as that which makes 
possible the relation to world itself for their user. With the erosion of the equipment 
comes the disruption of equipmental being. Attention is returned to the fabrication of 
equipment, to utility as a property of the shoes themselves, rather than to 
equipmentality as the mode of being and an openness to the world sustained by 
equipment. As Heidegger explains, ‘the worn-out usualness of the equipment then 
obtrudes as the sole kind of being that is (it seems) exclusively its own. Now nothing 
but sheer utility remains visible. It creates the appearance that the origin of equipment 
lies in a mere fabrication which gives form to some bit of matter’ (OWA, p. 34). 
As such, Van Gogh’s painting allows Heidegger (and potentially any viewer) 
to understand equipmentality not primarily a property of certain objects, ‘mere 
equipment’ resulting from ‘mere fabrication’ (OWA, p. 34), but instead as a property 
that emerges from the shoes’ secure resting in themselves, their ‘belonging’ to the 
earth and their ‘protection’ in the world of the farmer. In Heidegger’s words: 
The equipmental being of equipment was discovered. But how? Not through 
the description and explanation of a pair of shoes actually present. Not 
through a report on the process of shoemaking. And not through the 
observation of the actual use of shoes as it occurs here and there. Rather, the 
equipmental being of equipment was only discovered by bringing ourselves 
before the van Gogh painting. It is this that spoke. (OWA, p. 34) 
How is it that Van Gogh’s painting depicts the shoes’ equipmental being, their resting 
in belonging to earth and in the protection of the farmer’s world? 
For Heidegger, Van Gogh’s depiction of the shoes overcomes aesthetics, its 
logic of objects presented for the experience of a viewing subject, precisely in the 
way it sets up the shoes in the foreground of the painting whilst making visible the 
‘nothing’ which supports the shoes and from which they emerge. In their world, the 
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shoes make this inexhaustible earthly support from which they emerge visible: ‘The 
world grounds itself on the earth and the earth juts through the world’ (OWA, p. 54). 
Through the artist’s use of his materials, they are not used up in the production of 
aesthetic objects that fall into habitual exchange and consumption. Instead, the work 
makes intelligible the earth from which it emerges, an earth which is the source of all 
intelligibility in the world (thus cannot be exhausted) and which makes possible ‘the 
creative preserving of truth in the work’ (OWA, p. 69): 
This setting forth of the earth is what the work achieves by setting itself back 
into the earth. The self-seclusion of the earth is, however, no uniform, 
inflexible staying-in-the-dark, but unfolds, rather, into an inexhaustible 
richness of simple modes and shapes […] To be sure, the painter, too, makes 
use of pigment; he uses it, however, in such a way that the colors are not used 
up but begin, rather, for the first time, to shine. (OWA, p. 46) 
This ‘nothing’ is the formal earth to which, as in the world of the peasant, the shoes 
belong and from which they emerge into their world. Iain Thomson explains how, 
when we turn from Heidegger’s phenomenological reading to the painting itself, we 
see that: ‘the background of the painting not only inconspicuously supports the 
foreground image of the shoes but, when we turn our attention to this ordinarily 
inconspicuous background, we can see that it continues to offer up other inchoate 
shapes that resist being firmly gestalted themselves’.215 As Thomson’s analysis 
suggests, this painting, like Hölderlin’s poetry, enables Heidegger to set about 
attuning his reader to seeing things in the world differently. In particular, Thomson’s 
analysis helps with understanding that, for Heidegger, the ‘nothing’ in the 
background of the painting is not an empty void, but is rather the immaterial ground 
from which the shoes emerge in their intelligibility. 
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By affording this ‘nothing’ a certain substantiality and drawing our attention 
to the inexhaustible background from which the shoes emerge, Van Gogh’s painting 
helps Heidegger demonstrate the truth of the shoes as equipment: the shoes are not in 
fact objects that exist in stable presence, but rather they exist in the earth which the 
swirling, suggestive darkness of the painting’s background suggests. Heidegger 
explains as such that this background, which he also describes as earth, is ‘nothing’ 
only in the sense that it challenges our ordinary notion of beings as objects which are 
present-at-hand: ‘by nothing is meant the mere not of that which is, if we here think 
of that which is as an object present in the ordinary way’ (OWA, p. 69). 
The peasant woman in Heidegger’s discussion of Van Gogh’s work enjoys a 
proper relation to being because she does not exert technological mastery over the 
world, something that the earth plays a part in, made clearly visible in the earth’s 
withdrawal in the cold, winter months. The anxiety and joy are significant as 
emotions because they indicate her precarious dwelling in the eternal struggle 
between earth and world: her uncertainty is part of this eternal struggle, a signal of the 
impossibility of mastering this movement between concealment and disclosure. The 
farmer is, perhaps unknowingly, ‘admitted into the silent call of the earth’ (OWA, p. 
33) by virtue of her dependence upon the ‘reliability’ of the tools that she uses. The 
reliability of the tools that mediate between earth and world being, as Andrew 
Mitchell notes of this passage, is ‘all the certainty we can ever have’. 216 It is this 
uncertainty of the world of objects that Van Gogh’s painting reveals to Heidegger in 
his phenomenological reading. 
It is important that the shoes in the painting rest by themselves, or in-
themselves, unsupported by human use or by any literally existing ground or earth. 
Heidegger’s displacement of objectification in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ rests 
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in the releasement of the pair of shoes from their status as mere equipment and in 
allowing them their ‘being-in-themselves’, their existence beyond merely appearing 
as a tool or machine, an expendable resource for human use. In the logic of aesthetics 
that, for Heidegger, structures the experience of art in the modern age, where the 
world exists as ‘picture’, the shoes exist only in relation to the human they are 
produced by and for. Denied any existence independent of their human use, the shoes 
are subject to the emerging human position in relation to representation, the position 
that takes humans as the representative of all beings.217 
The proper relation to being that Heidegger uncovers in his phenomenological 
reading of Van Gogh’s painting can be elucidated by comparison with other artworks. 
Fredric Jameson’s somewhat sketchy summary of Heidegger’s reading of Van 
Gogh’s pair of shoes, as a work where ‘objectal form is taken as a clue or a symptom 
for some vaster reality which replaces it as its ultimate truth’, and the famous 
comparison of Van Gogh’s work with Andy Warhol’s shoes that follows, rest on a 
technological distinction that is already at work in Heidegger’s thought.218 The 
technologically rendered shoe presents itself to its viewer as ‘some inexplicable 
natural object […] a random collection of dead objects hanging together […] as shorn 
of their earlier life world as the pile of shoes left over from Auschwitz or the 
remainders and tokens of some incomprehensible and tragic fire in a packed dance 
hall. There is therefore in Warhol no way to complete the hermeneutic gesture and 
restore to these oddments that whole larger lived context of the dance hall or the ball, 
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the Culture 9 world of jetset fashion or glamour magazines’.219 If the repeatability of 
‘improper’ representational production is associable with a world or life beyond 
picture at all, in this reading, it is life destroyed, rendered unrecognisable by 
technological reproduction and knowable only as the remnant of traumatic 
annihilation. 
Proper writing and equipmentality in ‘The Age of the World Picture’ 
The paradoxical starting point of Heidegger’s analysis of Van Gogh’s 
painting, with a representation, a painting, rather than a description of a piece of 
equipment in its use, provides a point of comparison and understanding when 
considering the seemingly paradoxical investment that Remainder’s narrator holds in 
representations as portent of authentic, equipmental being. The paradox of the 
narrator’s idealisation of integral involvement with the world is that he locates this 
modality of existence not in the everyday actions of his contemporaries, but in the 
refined movements of Robert de Niro in Mean Streets. In contrast to his own, 
inauthentic second-handedness, De Niro’s representation effortlessly and fluently 
relates to entities in the world in their equipmentality: ‘Opening fridge doors, lighting 
cigarettes. He doesn’t have to think about them because he and they are one. Perfect. 
Real’ (p. 23). Angered by the imitation of an advert by the media types of Soho, yet 
willing to accept the movements of an actor as unmediated and natural, the narrator 
holds the belief that representations can produce the living being through an exacting 
control of the entities that they manipulate. 
This relationship to authenticity, or circumscribed involvement, implies an 
understanding of life as mediated by representations to such an extent that self-
understanding and involvement in the world mimics, and derives from, aesthetic 
representations themselves. As discussed above, Heidegger argues that ‘to represent 
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means here, of oneself to set something before one and to make what has been set in 
place secure as something set in place’ (AWP, p. 82). For the narrator of Remainder, 
Robert De Niro’s performance in Mean Streets situated him within a representation 
that secured his authenticity by ‘setting in place’ his identity within the infinitely 
repeatable and assured realm of a filmic representation: ‘My movements are all fake. 
Second-hand. […] It’s about just being. De Niro was just being; I can never do that 
now’ (p. 23). Heidegger, elsewhere, comparably takes the ‘movies’ as an example of 
the way that representations of ‘lived experience’ inform the self-understanding of the 
subject in modernity (CPE, p. 109). This construction of a simulated experience of 
authenticity emerges as the central event of the opening chapters of the novel, as the 
narrator sets about constructing a space in which to ‘re-enact’ the authentic self that 
he saw in a vision, in an imagined and idealised representation of his own life. 
An evocative moment of déjà vu provides the narrator with a self-
representation that inspires the first re-enactment project of the novel. At a friend’s 
party, the uncanny familiarity of a fissure in a bathroom wall produces a ‘vision’ of a 
‘remembered building, spreading outwards from the crack’ (p. 61), with ‘the force of 
an epiphany, a revelation’ (p. 62). The narrator vividly remembers not only the 
building but the other inhabitants, and the embodied, bodily experience of being in 
that space. Against his current sense of inauthenticity and detachment, he remembers 
how his ‘gestures had been seamless, perfect […] They’d been real; I’d been real — 
been without first understanding how to try to be’ (p. 62, italics in original). The 
narrator’s obsession with the reality of this remembered space and time is not 
diminished by his sense that the building, and his experience of a coherent, authentic 
subjectivity, is likely itself simply a fabrication emerging from his consciousness: ‘It 
was more complex. Maybe it was various things rolled together: memories, 
imaginings, films, I don’t know. But that bit’s not important’ (p.76). He now 
imagines that the realisation of his ‘vision’ (p. 76), the building of the memory itself, 
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will offer the opportunity to retrieve, or rather to produce, in reality, for the first time, 
the imagined state of natural, wholesome presence and being: ‘I wanted to reconstruct 
that space and enter it so that I could feel real again. I wanted to; I had to; I would’ (p. 
62). 
When Remainder’s protagonist first remembers the idealised past that his 
initial performance is based on, he seeks out to rebuild it, to realise this imagined past 
so that he might move around within it and recover the lost sense of authenticity, of 
being ‘real’, that is the condition of his way of being after the accident. He sets out ‘to 
reconstruct that space and enter it so that I could feel real again’ (p. 62), in a logic that 
relies on the reproduction, or representation, of the ‘vision’ (p. 76) that constitutes the 
basis of this soon-to-become three-dimensional, ‘space’ (p. 62).220 McCarthy’s 
Remainder, as is well known, was originally published as an art book, and McCarthy 
has commented in interview that the novel was the attempt to realise an art project 
that could never take place in real life.221 
Privileging representation as something that can paradoxically liberate him 
from objectification and return him to a pre-objective encounter with equipmentality 
in the world, the narrator seeks a mode of existence which is more authentic than that 
which relates to the world as something external to the self, accessible only ‘second-
hand’ through representations. For all that the narrator of Remainder aspires to 
perfect representation, his attempts to construct an idealised past are underpinned by a 
sense that he is excluded, by virtue of his existence as a traumatised subject in the 
wake of his accident, from the authenticity that he affords to the assured, effortlessly 
repeatable representation. In order to make sense of the narrator’s relationship to 
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representations, it is then necessary to take account of the traumatic accident, which 
has stripped him of any possibility of relating with naturalness to entities in the world 
because he has to relearn all his movements. Cut off from direct contact with his past 
life, his way of being and the worldliness which this entailed, the accident stands out 
as a traumatic event that can mostly account for the narrator’s current idealisation of a 
representation of his past self. 
Trauma in ‘The Age of the World Picture’ 
Taking account for the place and role of trauma in Remainder, it is clear that 
trauma initially functions to reveal to the narrator the partiality of all attempts to 
capture, stabilise and bring life to presence through the ‘setting in place’ of 
representations. The catastrophic event inscribes a traumatic loss into the narrator’s 
history, which the re-enactments are designed to master by affording the experience 
of authentic selfhood. The re-enactments also function to return the narrator to the 
traumatic event, as is quickly revealed once the re-enactments begin. Perfecting his 
motions during the re-enactments gives the narrator the sense of authenticity he 
craves, ‘the immersion, the contentedness’ (p. 151), but the re-enactments are also 
compulsively addictive because of the traumatic opioids flooding the narrator’s brain 
during these experiences. The narrator feels a pleasurable sense of being exposed 
during the re-enactments, the mundane vision of a concierge in the building’s lobby 
‘seemed to emanate an almost toxic level of significance […] being this close to her I 
felt overexposed’ (p. 139). This significance is the result of phenomenological 
experience, the extreme detail of the representations signalling an inexhaustible realm 
of significance that is paradoxically revealed by the attempt to dominate and control 
all meaning. All excessive or uncontrolled materiality threatens to escape the re-
enactment zone, and hence has to be mastered and brought to objective presence by 
the narrator, in order to sustain his sense of immersion in the representation. The 
narrator’s attempt to ‘capture’ a patch of oil left by the motorcyclist re-enactor — ‘its 
147 
 
shape, its shade. These were important, and I didn’t want to lose them’ (p. 142) — is 
consistent with the narrator’s desire to objectify and master unruly materiality 
through representational capture. 
The limits of representation that the narrator explores also put him in contact 
with trauma, with the inaccessible beyond of experience. Arne De Boever has 
discussed these aspects of the re-enactments in detail: 
It might very well be that his trauma — the event that reconfigured his 
existence — operates for him as the real to which he does not have access. 
Not remembering it, and not being allowed to talk about it publicly, our 
narrator’s existence is ultimately scripted by a foundational event that is 
inaccessible to him. […] [t]he narrator is trying to get back to that originary 
moment […] in order to access the real.222 
Because the accident makes the narrator aware of the inauthenticity of his life, it 
stands out to him as an encounter with the authentic, inaccessible ‘real’ itself. Such a 
reading is consistent with trauma theory (about the secondary image as traumatic 
return). Whilst trauma makes possible the break out of the representational mode, in 
this view, it also structures the limits of intelligibility and makes authenticity, or ‘the 
real’ in De Boever’s terms, knowable only in negative terms, since what is ‘broken 
into’ is defined as unintelligible, or is intelligible only in its explanation as trauma. 
Likewise for Vermeulen, the increasing violence of the narrator’s re-enactments is 
attributable to the narrator’s traumatised condition: Remainder’s attempt ‘to debunk 
the pieties of trauma fiction […] is progressively complicated as the narrator gets 
caught up in obsessively detailed re-enactments of seemingly random scenes’.223 This 
resurgence of individual psychology against its attempted erasure marks the limit of 
McCarthy’s attempt to ‘bury’ the novel for Vermeulen: ‘McCarthy’s own 
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programmatic attempt to hasten the death of the novel paradoxically inaugurates the 
afterlife of an undead and improperly buried form’.224 
From the perspective of Heidegger’s ‘Age of the World Picture’, the 
paradoxical practice of negotiating a relation to an inaccessible traumatic event, 
understood as the ‘real’, through representational practices signals the existence of 
disruptive trauma that presents itself as what John Roberts calls ‘an epistemological 
limit that threatens to reveal the partiality of its ontological mode of disclosure, that 
of Gestell, or enframing’.225 Roberts argues that the ‘crisis in representation’ posed by 
trauma threatens to become ‘a blind spot’ for the sovereign modern subject, who 
himself has to constitute the objective, analytic ground of his own representations. 
The kind of modern subject thought by Heidegger necessarily has to incorporate and 
regulate trauma into the regime of representations that make the world knowable: 
‘such aporias must be integrated into a metaphysics supporting the subject’s own 
capacities for representing the world, and coming to knowledge’.226 
Following this line of reasoning, it is possible to see clearly the process by 
which the narrator is attempting to integrate the authentic beyond of the traumatic 
event into his re-enactments. Whilst, as discussed above, the narrator does not mourn 
an authenticity, ‘essence’ or soul lost through trauma, the inauthenticity that the 
traumatic event reveals is sufficiently threatening to impel the narrator to pursue 
(inauthentic) representations that will ‘set in place’ a stable life. In Roberts’ terms, 
‘trauma threatens, whilst reflecting brightly a meaningful life lived transparently, with 
relatively certain choices, against background narratives of continuous and coherent 
biography’. 227 If the re-enactments, with their easily identifiable characters (‘the liver 
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lady’, ‘the motorbike enthusiast’, ‘the piano teacher’) and manageable, manipulable 
events represent such a life, trauma is a motivating factor in the pursuit of these 
reconstructive practices. Threatening negation of this realm of ‘immersion and 
contentment’, trauma also presents a limit point that the narrator finesses in his 
attempt to suffuse his reconstructed ‘life’ with authenticity. 
In foregrounding the intimate bond between representation and trauma in 
modernity discussed by Roberts I intend not to focus on the traumatic opioids that the 
re-enactments release, or on the re-enactments as mimetic of the narrator’s 
traumatised mind, but instead on the way that trauma drives the intensification of 
enframing representation in the modern age. In this view, trauma in Remainder would 
also function as a literary analogy for a cultural trauma, the loss of authentic 
historicality common to all living in the age of the ‘world picture’. As a threat that 
leads technology into an aporetic reflection of its own limits, trauma leads the subject 
to seek new forms of knowledge that exceed the drive to mastery in objectifying 
representation. In this way then, traumatic experience is the motivation for 
representations that would secure a lost sense of identity in the wake of the accident.  
The traumatic accident destabilises representation in the novel by revealing 
the absence of any ‘authentic’ past, but also paradoxically secures representation as 
something worth aspiring to, by creating an insistent sense that what was lost in 
traumatic experience might have been the narrator’s authentic subjectivity: the ability 
to relate to representations without consciousness of the traumatic threat that secures 
them in place as ‘life’. This paradoxical bind leads the narrator to position himself in 
the realm of the performative. His disavowal of trauma as something that secures 
representation is not a radical break with representation but is instead a movement 
into a form of representation that changes relationships with the past, to see it not as a 
lost soul but as a history of representations themselves supported or grounded by a 
traumatic absence, a ‘nothing’ or ‘world-ground’ that the novel works to reveal. 
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Intensification of objectification: from representation to positionality 
The narrator’s strained relationship with representational objectification 
intensifies as he attempts to exercise increasingly exacting control over the 
representation of his idealised past, in the house he has purchased and transformed for 
his re-enactments. However, as mentioned above, the displacement of 
representational logic that develops across Remainder does not occur through its 
simple rejection, but through an intensification of representational logic that leads the 
re-enactments to transform the lives of all those involved — the protagonist, his re-
enactor staff and his ‘executor’, Naz. Through exacting control of the specificities of 
the ‘remembered building’ and the actions performed therein, and by refusing to 
contextualise, or explain the meaning of their performances to the hired re-enactors, 
the narrator maintains a monopolising control over the economy of significance and 
meaning attached to the building and the re-enactments. Challenged by a hired re-
enactor, the ‘motorbike enthusiast’, over the narrator’s desire to preserve the remains 
of his performance, a ‘patch of oil [that] had formed’ (p. 141), the protagonist makes 
it clear that he controls the derivation of meaning from the other’s performance, that 
‘[i]t meant whatever I wanted it to mean: I was paying him to do what I said’ (p. 142). 
The re-enactor’s desire to ‘capture’ (p. 141) the remains of their performances, to 
mediate any new material produced in the process of re-enactment, repeats the 
process of drawing the environment and its inhabitants into the narrator’s economy of 
meaning. In this way, the staff hired as re-enactors are denied or reduced of any form 
of subjectivity, meaning or selfhood outside of their ‘life’ as models of lived 
experience within the representational economy. 
Despite the sovereign control of the narrator over his re-enactments, the 
‘seamless merging with reality’ the narrator pursues demands constant technological 
innovation. As the re-enactments continue and the staff performing them are expected 
to be available and ready to perform, their way of being is radically transformed such 
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that they have no life outside of the life experiences that they are employed to 
perform. This shift in the life of the re-enactors made clear when the protagonist tells 
Naz that ‘they’ll have to get used to being in two modes […] on and off’ (p. 81). The 
confusion and elision between representation and reality does not depart significantly 
from, in fact still corresponds with, the logic of machination that I have discussed 
above. Nonetheless, the continuous availability that is demanded of the re-enactors 
(such that even when they are in “off” mode, they are still immediately available and 
primed for consumption) transforms the ontological nature of their being and sets 
them in place as what Heidegger terms ‘standing-reserve’ (QCT, p. 17). 
In one notable instance in the novel, a pianist re-enactor that the narrator has 
hired uses a tape recording of himself playing in order to evade the narrator’s 
expectation of continuous performance. When the narrator spots the pianist moving 
around the building whilst his recording plays, he explains that is it ‘a recording of 
me. I made it myself, especially. It’s the same thing more or less. Isn’t it?’ (p. 147). 
The narrator places him under surveillance, destroying the trace he left of being 
otherwise made possible by his inactivity. This intensification and extension of the 
logic of the aesthetic logic of objectifying representation into technological 
‘enframing’ of reality is helpfully evoked by Jean Baudrillard, who argued in the 
1990s that the logic of modern aesthetics means artists are ‘always close to the perfect 
crime: saying nothing’.228 By ‘nothing’ here Baudrillard is referring to the seamless 
transformation of the aesthetic into reality, the production of artworks such as the 
readymade and the soup can painting which, in being more real than the reality they 
enter, enact the murder of reality by its aestheticised double and the disappearance of 
the aesthetic, the illusion, through its materialisation. Baudrillard describes this 
                                                 




‘perfect crime’ as the ‘transformation of all acts and events into pure information […] 
the extermination of reality by its double’. 
The aestheticisaiton of the everyday in Warhol’s soup can paintings marked 
the end and failure of art’s utopian ideals, for Baudrillard, but also presages a more 
thoroughgoing virtualisation of reality as culture more broadly is characterised by the 
facility with which it is becomes an aestheticised object of experience. The presence 
of a doubled reality is intensified in Warhol’s soup can artworks, which can be read in 
Baudrillard’s thought as precursors in a transition towards virtuality, a situation which 
imagines ‘the closing of reality and the extermination of the real by its double’. 
Happening without a trace, this virtualisation is, for Baudrillard, the perfect crime, a 
precursor of the virtual for and, in this sense, one stage in a wider story told by 
Baudrillard: the ‘story of a crime — the murder of reality’. My primary interest in the 
term ‘transaesthetics’ lies in Baudrillard’s conviction that the artist is a figure with the 
capacity to expose the crime. Warhol is not an artist because he says nothing, leaves 
no trace — in his perfect works he is a machine. Artistic practice is in fact turning 
away from this crime, the artist’s work ‘is the trace of that criminal imperfection. The 
artist is the one who, with all his might, resists the fundamental drive to not leave 
traces’. Duchamp’s ‘Fountain’ and Warhol’s soup cans, for instance, make present 
this ‘nothing’, concealing their status as aesthetic objects such that they merge 
perfectly with reality, leaving no trace of artistry or imperfection. 
Baudrillard’s warning of the eternal drive towards transparency, towards the 
‘saying nothing’ that eliminates the difference between aesthetic object and reality, 
offers an opportunity to reconsider the role of the ‘nothing’ in Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Van Gogh’s ‘Pair of Shoes’, and towards the re-enactment projects 
in Remainder. Where ‘nothing’ for Baudrillard signals the elimination of the trace, 
the obliteration of any reality outside the economy of representational objectivity, in 
Remainder the ‘nothing’ of the piano re-enactor’s inactivity points towards a 
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differential escape from objectification. When Heidegger valorised the ‘nothing’ from 
which the shoes emerged as a representation, he described it as ‘the mere not of 
beings […] if we represent the being as that which is present in the ordinary way’ 
(OWA, p. 44). Against the drive towards transaesthetic transparency, the piano 
player’s own use of a representative double renders visible the ‘not of beings’ that the 
re-enactment sought to deny in its drive towards totalising objectification. Like the 
swirling background in Van Gogh’s picture, the disruptive presence of the piano 
player, walking through the background of the re-enactment, reveals the 
representation of him as ‘piano player’ as a representation, unresting it from the 
attempt to ‘set in place’ the re-enactment as an authentic lived reality. 
It is tempting to articulate the resistance to objectification that the piano player 
achieves in this passage in terms of ‘detournement’, the turning of an apparatus of 
power — in this case representational technologies — against its dominant 
deployment. This reading is particularly appealing when we consider Remainder’s 
overall project can be thought of as an undoing, detournement or ‘burial”’ of the 
realist novel. The piano player’s detournement amounts to a moment of inoperative 
agency, in the vein of Bartleby the Scrivener’s pronouncement ‘I prefer not to’. 
Whilst it is ultimately necessary to move beyond such a reading of the re-enactments 
in Remainder as they become not merely biopolitical but violent and traumatic, for 
reasons I will explain, the inoperative relation to the representational technology of 
the re-enactment adopted by the piano player points towards the ‘proper’ relation to 
representational technology that McCarthy’s novel tends towards. Bartleby’s refusal 
to write does not disavow his relation to the technology of writing, rather it affords 
him the potential both to be or not be a writer. This ‘whatever being’ is conceived, 
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too, by Giorgio Agamben as a proper relation to technology, pointing back towards 
Heidegger’s description of ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ writing.229 
The liberation of life in Remainder does not occur through relinquishing the 
improper relation to technology, however, which continues to increase its capture of 
life in the novel. In order to become real by creating a perfect aestheticisation that 
will merge with reality without a trace, the narrator has to fix the existences of his re-
enactors and deny them their potential for being otherwise. The expendability of the 
cats that fall from the roof of the house in the re-enactments demonstrates the 
totalising demand on materiality for becoming representation. The narrator calculates 
that, ‘a loss rate of three every two days, I’d say [I need] quite an amount. A rolling 
supply. Just keep putting them up there’ (p. 146). As the re-enactments continue, the 
performances lose their attachment to the individuals and become iterations or 
repetitions of a pattern or sequence which is repeated endlessly, at different speeds, 
even rewound and looped back, and often slowed down until it stops entirely in 
suspended animation: 
[A]gain and again and again. Hundreds of times. More. No one counted — I 
didn’t, at any rate. I’d break the sequence down to its constituent parts […] I 
laid out the constituent parts of the whole sequence and relished each of them, 
then put them back together and relished the whole — then took them apart 
again.’ (p. 151) 
The microscopic expansion and examination of the sequences of events and actions 
that provide the protagonist his sense of authenticity mark the culmination of a 
process of objectification that has rendered the human as a raw material, an 
expendable commodity that has no meaning or value outside of its consumption. 
These representations now reduce the other to a life experience, bringing the ‘life’ 
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that it signifies entirely to view such that its exposure is total, it has nothing 
significant to hide. 
The struggle between earth and world 
Affect in the struggle between earth and world 
When viewed from the perspective developed in this chapter, the narrator’s 
re-enactments are a (conscious) intensification of the subjection of life to a form of 
technological, improper writing that seeks to reach the beyond of representation. In 
one such instance, the narrator tasks the ‘liver lady’, an elderly character in the 
reconstructed building where the re-enactments take place, with lifting a bag of 
rubbish to her doorstep as he moves past her through the re-enactment zone. With 
each repetition of the movement, the narrator’s original intention of “setting in place” 
life as an objectified representation becomes more successful. The increasing physical 
suffering of the old lady, who delivers the line ‘harder and harder to lift up’ (p. 138) 
lends the aesthetised performance a foundation of accumulated reality, a real 
suffering that is lends the aesthetic performance a ‘transaesthetic’, material reality. 
Edging towards aesthetic perfection, her task becoming as weary and mundane as the 
lived reality of an old lady that the protagonist envisages reproducing. As the re-
enactments continue, however, the intensified repetition and circulation of this 
materialised representation disrupt the mimesis of the performance, and its 
recognisable emotional content. ‘Break[ing] the sequence into its constituent parts’, 
the narrator ‘spent a whole morning going back and back over the moment at which 
her faced switched from addressing me with the last word of her phrase, the up, to 
cutting off eye contact, turning away and leading first her shoulders then eventually 
her whole body back into the flat’ (p. 151). Through the technological expansion of 
moments of the re-enactments the narrator liberates the performances from the realm 
of mimetic representation. 
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In this way, the re-enactments share a striking similarity with Bill Viola’s art 
projects, in which videos of actors performing emotional states — joy, anger, sorrow 
and fear — are then slowed down to reveal interstitial moments in the passage of 
these emotional states that are invisible under natural conditions. As the narrator 
‘[lays] out the constituent parts of the whole sequence’, recognisable emotions are 
rendered imperceptible, and are instead replaced by the (normally invisible) minute, 
autonomous affective responses that precede emotional responses. Reading the 
representation of bodily expressions of minute affective processes, normally invisible 
to the human eye, that inform and underpin identifiable human emotions in the art of 
Bill Viola, in similar terms, Mark Hansen argues that ‘the dissolution of the between‐
two of images and its replacement by a between‐two of emotions or, better, by 
affectivity as the very medium of the between’.230 
 Brian Massumi argues that such affective escape is the condition of human 
culture and history itself: 
If there were no escape, no excess or remainder, no fade-out to infinity, the 
universe would be without potential, pure entropy, death. Actually existing, 
structured things live in and through that which escapes them. Their 
autonomy is the autonomy of affect.231 
Affect, which as I have mentioned has proven a powerful conceptual tool in the 
critical reception of Remainder, particularly in Vermeulen’s and Serpell’s work on 
this novel, might well be the inexhaustible source of worldly significance, the ‘earth’ 
that sustains and makes possible all worldly significance. Significantly for my 
argument, though, is the fact that it is through the violent subjection of life to 
Remainder’s improper writing that the objectified representation of authentic emotion 
is unsettled, no longer ‘setting in place’ life but instead making available for 
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contemplation the inexhaustible background of representative emotions in the 
circulation and rotation of the standing reserve. In Heidegger’s phenomenological 
evocation of ‘The Pair of Shoes’, its shifting, swirling background prevent a stable 
representation of the peasant’s world being ‘set in place’, signalling the uncertainty of 
her existence and also her ‘proper’ relation to being. In a paradoxical move in 
Remainder, this same movement towards exposure and vulnerability, enacted in the 
violent destruction of representations and the intensification of ‘improper writing’ 
wrend the world from its ‘place’, conveying the inexhaustible background of affective 
energy that will make the narrator’s project of ‘capture’ impossible.   
 
Matter in the struggle between earth and world 
After perfecting the actions and sequences in the remembered building, the 
narrator seeks to reveal what ‘lay beneath the surfaces of these — on what was inside, 
intimate’ (p. 197). He begins to re-enact murder scenes; much like his own accident, 
the traumatic events at the end of the victims’ lives puts them in touch with the 
beyond of representational objectification, a form of authenticity that the narrator 
seeks to capture and render as pure information. By contrast, as Johnny Boy in the 
crime film Mean Streets, De Niro was infinitely secure, ‘set in place’ by a 
representation of a world rendered as a series of manipulable entities, a representation 
of authentic ‘handiness’. The traumatic beyond that these victims encounter marks 
their liberation, for the narrator, from the authentic repeatability of the foundational 
authentic representation of ‘life’ in De Niro’s performance. As Zadie Smith notes, 
McCarthy’s narrator ‘wants to become the thing beyond the pale, the inconvenient 
remainder impossible to contain within the social economy of meaning’.232 The 
victims of gun violence have lost their proper relationship to being, first through their 
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subjection to the improper writing of the newspaper reports that render their traumatic 
deaths impersonal and interchangeable. Unlike the farmer of Van Gogh’s painting, 
made secure in her world only through the reliability of her shoes, which situate her 
in the ‘eternal struggle between world and earth’, the modern subject is unable to act 
in this ‘proper’ way. In death, the narrator imagines, the victim achieved a sense of 
immediacy that he himself has pursued in the re-enactments: 
[He] merged with the space around him, sunk and flowed into it until there 
was no distance between it and him – and merged, too, with his actions, 
merged to the extent of having no more consciousness of them. He’d stopped 
being separate, removed, imperfect. Cut out the detour. Then both mind and 
actions had resolved themselves into pure stasis. (pp. 184–185) 
Being’s negation in death here symbolises for the narrator the concretisation of a pure 
form of presence, made possible by the assimilation of human substance with the 
matter of the external world, presence preserved as ‘pure stasis’ in matter. The space 
where the ‘black man’, human ‘symbol of perfection’ (p. 184) died becomes, for the 
narrator, ‘sacred ground, blessed ground — and anyone who occupied in the way he 
occupied it would become blessed too’ (p. 185). The narrator will attempt to 
appropriate that which animated the body of the ‘black man’, his ‘soul’, by drawing 
the material space where the event occurred under his own control: 
I started wondering where this black man’s soul disappeared to as it left his 
body. His thoughts, impressions, memories, whatever: the background noise 
we all have in our head that stops us from forgetting we’re alive. It had to go 
somewhere: it couldn’t just vaporize — it must have gushed, trickled onto 
some surface, stained it somehow. Everything must leave some kind of mark. 
(p. 185) 
Performance here produces a significance that resides in the materiality of the street, 
not lost in the flow of time but rather maintained forever in a welling of significance 
and intensity that is characterised by ‘pure stasis’. In a reworking of the narrator’s 
earlier desire to invest a constructed space with a meaning not emanating from its 
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materiality, the narrator now attempts to extract and ‘capture’ the significance that, 
McCarthy’s novel suggests, resides in matter itself. 
The drive to perform and reveal all aspects of authentic life, to render each 
imperceptible detail visible and recordable, as aesthetic experience, stops the subject 
of the re-enactment settling into deathly stasis. Subject to the technological capacity 
not only for representation but replicability, the life of the ‘black man’ loses its 
singular significance as a life when its peaceful resolve into ‘pure stasis’ is demanded 
to return to a restless repetition of reproduction and recirculation. This starts first with 
the newspaper articles where the narrator reads about this man’s death, a form of 
improper writing that motivates the re-enactments. As further victims of gang 
violence also die, a chain or sequence of destruction that renders each life as available 
for annihilation as that which preceded it begins to emerge. 
The point of recognition of the failure of this attempt to render life a resource 
that could be made available for ordering and consumption develops when the 
narrator reflects, ‘I felt a huge wave of sadness […] for not having managed, in my 
re-enactments, to fill the instant of their death with so much space that it retrieved 
them, kinked them back into life. Impossible, I know, but I still felt responsible, and 
sad’ (p. 223). Paradoxically, to be reduced to a representation of authentic ‘life’ 
would merely be to exist within a logic of representational objectification which only 
recognises that which exists in representation. In this way the drive towards 
producing the authentic life as standing reserve reveals the very impossibility of 
reducing a life to a representation. 
The challenge posed by the technology of the re-enactment to this supposed 
object of representation to come forth in its entirety, to make available and exterior its 
most intimate interiority, is what proves the very impossibility of representation. The 
process of disintegration and the ongoing, continuous challenging for greater detail 
and greater deconstruction of the object of representation maintains its separation 
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from the world (of representations) that the narrator hopes it, and so he, will merge 
seamlessly with. The desire to capture the remainder necessitates rendering the 
contents of the world as standing reserve, as decontextualised information that can be 
taken up at will and in the service of the will. Yet, as Andrew Mitchell argues, the 
failure of the desire to merge seamlessly with the world is the condition of the kind of 
technological activity that signals towards the thing in the first place: 
For the thing to thing it can be nothing self-contained and identifiable. If it 
were simply the thing it would not gesture the world. It would be contained in 
that world and seamlessly merge with it. The thing needs the technological 
challenge in order to keep it from being the thing […] the singularity of the 
thing is dependent upon its very replaceability.233 
Once again, in the pursuit of ‘that which is on the inside, the intimate’, the narrator 
gains a glimpse of the ‘beyond’ of representation. The victim achieved the 
authenticity that the narrator ascribes to him in the moments before his death, but 
instead only in his death itself and in the handling of this death in the re-enactment. 
The authenticity afforded by reliability that the narrator attributes to the victim in the 
moments before his death is, in fact, an inaccessible beyond that can only be 
approached through the destruction that improper writing enacts. This ‘improper 
writing’ stops the subject disappearing into death as the mere negation of being and 
instead motivates the restless circulation of the affect, or the inexhaustible ontological 
plenitude from which all meaning emerges and recedes. 
Following this reading, I am now in a position to conceive of the ‘proper’ 
relation to representation (writing) that McCarthy’s novel circles towards. As 
discussed above, affect and matter itself both point to a beyond of representations that 
is inaccessible in the age of the ‘world picture’. As I have attempted to show, this 
beyond can be understood as the earth which the modern age has forgotten in its 
                                                 
233 Mitchell, p. 311, emphasis in original. 
161 
 
oblivion of being, a loss of the proper relation to being that began with the entry into 
improper forms of writing and self-representation. Whilst the narrator first sought to 
recover a sense of authentic ‘handiness’ through immersion in authenticating 
representations, it soon becomes apparent, as Arne De Boever notes, that the re-
enactments only become an elaborate means to return to his trauma, to make contact 
with this beyond that is the inexhaustible ground of the world experienced as 
‘picture’. The re-enactments do not disavow or escape representation in the pursuit of 
this ‘earth’ that they encounter as the abyssal ground of the world. Instead, they 
proceed through in intensification of technological violence, further demonstrating 
the impossibility of acting with a ‘proper’ relation to being-in modernity. The 
susceptibility to violence and the ongoing annihilation of life in the novel repeats the 
gesture of affirming the novel as an ‘improper’ form of writing that, by virtue of its 
very technicity, cannot create a representation of life that restores its ‘proper’ relation 
to being. On the contrary, the pursuit of authentic representation only leads to an 
ever-increasing capture and technological destruction in an attempt to render life as 
available information or ‘standing reserve’. It is in this escalating attempt of 
‘improper writing’ to render affect, trauma and matter as available for consumption 
with a representational economy that the ‘eternal struggle’ between earth and world is 
revealed. In this view, Remainder is a merely an intensification of the novel’s 
essentially ‘improper writing’, that is to say an intensification of the ‘improper burial’ 
of life the novel always performs (since Defoe’s Crusoe). In an age where the world 
is lived as ‘picture’, the destruction of the subject of ‘improper writing’ brings the 
forgotten relation of this ‘improper life’ to a beyond of representation into view. As 
with Derrida’s discussion of the technical burial which returns the subject to ‘earth’, 
the novel reveals the relation of improper life, in its world of representations, to the 




Where, in the previous chapter, I took as a starting point a novel — White 
Teeth — where the perspective and autonomy of characters is foreclosed and 
secondary to their attunement, in this chapter I take as a starting point a character 
whose breakdown is integral to the technology of representation, through which this 
character is bound to negotiate the possibilities of autonomy and ‘coherence’ to which 
the new ethics appeals. 
In Remainder, as discussed here, the embrace of the technological re-
enactment transforms life through its translation into standing reserve, a transition 
from machination to standing reserve that is figured by Heidegger in terms of an 
intensification of circulation of the entities that come to exist as standing reserve. This 
is evident in Heidegger’s discussion of modern technology, when he writes that: 
‘Gestell / Ge-stell means the gathering together of the setting-upon that sets upon 
man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the actual, in the mode of ordering, as 
standing-reserve’ (QCT, p. 24). As I have shown here, the intensification of the 
gathering-revealing of technology, the transition from technological machination to 
standing reserve, incurred as an intensification of a process of gathering-revealing, 
explodes the stable existence of the entities therein and paradoxically engenders the 
possibility of a new form of being, albeit one which never materialised outside of the 
frame of violent destruction. In this example, the modern technological imposition on 
man is a technological mode of existence in which it has become necessary to gather 
things, to bring them to presence, not as objects for machination but as endlessly 
circulating, decontextualised resources available for consumption. 
Whilst in this chapter I have cited the enframing tendencies of technology and 
the role they played in the narrator’s attempts to construct an environment for living 
authentically, and have focused on the standing reserve here as a mode of gathering, it 
is the case that this mode of gathering is itself a technological variation on a more 
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fundamental mode of gathering and concentring through which, for Heidegger, things 
are brought to presence and given meaning by Dasein. In the next chapter I 
demonstrate that this more fundamental notion of gathering, central to dwelling for 
Heidegger and which appears in his thought much earlier than his writing on modern 
technology and the standing reserve, can deepen an understanding of the way that 
narrative functions to reveal and bring entities into their dwelling. As such, whilst this 
chapter was concerned with writing as a technology, the next chapter takes up the 
relation between narrative and dwelling from a different viewpoint: that which 
emerges in Don DeLillo’s 2001 novel The Body Artist.
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Chapter 4: Dwelling and The Literary Thing: ‘Narrative 
Gathering’ in Don DeLillo’s The Body Artist 
 
‘It felt like home, being here’ – Don DeLillo, The Body Artist 
 
If dwelling for Heidegger involves a movement of gathering, of drawing 
together into a play of relations, and if reading and narration are likewise to be 
thought of as processes of interpretative gathering, can the ‘search for dwelling’ 
accommodate dispersion and loss, change, transformation and newness? Similarly, if 
dwelling as a mode of being is essentially narrative in character, as I have suggested it 
is, can a narrative of dwelling respond to trauma, loss and dispersion without either 
becoming a narrative of loss, or reducing traumatic loss by domesticating it in the 
process of shaping a comfortable dwelling? Does this interpretation of human being 
as a mode, albeit selective, of collating and gathering entities into meaningful 
associations allow sufficiently for absence or traumatic loss without reducing it to 
interiority? In this chapter I address these questions through an in-depth reading of 
Don DeLillo’s 2001 novel, The Body Artist.234  
I explore the underestimated importance of place in this novel, which has 
been read primarily as unfolding in a ‘non-place’ of mourning and grief, and test the 
implications of foregrounding the experience of place in the novel against 
Heidegger’s own turn to place in his later philosophy. In doing so, I return to some of 
the core philosophical concerns in Heidegger’s work on dwelling, in particular what 
commentator Nader El-Bizri has called our ‘being-at-home amongst things’, and 
Heidegger’s related thinking of dwelling in terms of homecoming.235 In doing so, I 
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argue that DeLillo’s novel is an examination of the potential for narrative to shape 
just such a being-at-home amongst things, and an examination of the ethics of such a 
return home.  
In recalling the importance of homecoming, and of place, in DeLillo’s novel, 
I repeat Heidegger’s gesture of foregrounding thought, or at least in this case the 
thought at work in DeLillo’s novel, as itself a movement of returning to place, as a 
homecoming.236 In conjoining, as Heidegger does, ‘ideas of remembrance with that of 
the return home’ I risk levelling on myself and this novel the charge commonly 
brought against Heidegger, noted by Jeff Malpas, of thought that ‘contains an 
essential nostalgia within’ it.237 With this said, a thinking of remembrance and 
homecoming is exactly what I find at the heart of DeLillo’s novel. These issues 
revolve instead around the ethics of remembrance and homecoming in the face of 
traumatic absence and are tied into a reflection on the capacity of the novel and its 
narrative conventions to accommodate human existence when it is characterised by 
rupture, dispersion and loss. As such, if the thought of DeLillo’s novel shares with 
Heidegger’s this nostalgia, it must be of the radical kind that Malpas points towards 
in Heidegger’s defence, a form of nostalgia that must be thought of ‘through the 
connotations suggested by its Greek etymology as precisely a longing for the return 
home — a return that cannot be achieved — a form of homesickness, and so as 
discomfiting rather than comfortable, as bringing with it a sense of the essential 
questionability of our own being in the world’.238 The search for dwelling as a 
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questioning of our own being-in-the-world necessarily unfolds through thought that 
remembers, recollects and reflects upon the nature of that being and its unfolding in a 
particular place. 
This chapter builds on a conviction that The Body Artist is singular in 
DeLillo’s oeuvre — in the proximity it creates between the practices of negotiating 
and living in an environment, creating artworks, reading and writing/narrating. I am 
interested in the specific way this novel brings DeLillo’s longstanding interests in our 
language-bound existence, our individual creative practices and our attachment to 
place together, in the process of negotiating possibilities for recovery, redemption and 
resurrection. By foregrounding a certain discursive process of interpretive and 
focalising gathering inherent in narrative, reading, remembrance and navigation of the 
environment, I think of these acts together, and so in turn reflect on how they function 
together to shape human dwelling. At the centre of each of these processes are things 
that mediate the process of gathering. Considering narrative as something that gathers 
entities into meaningful relation, I foreground DeLillo’s sustained evaluation, and 
extension, of narrative’s capacity to function as a means for exploring and shaping 
worldly belonging, as well as the novel’s implicit deliberation on human investments 
in narrative as a means of shaping meaningful inhabitation. I also explore the 
possibility of thinking of dwelling as a process of narratively shaping meaningful 
relations in environments and physical contexts where subjects live, and the 
implications of adopting this view of human flourishing in times of crisis. 
This chapter is made up of six sections, the first of which situates my 
argument about The Body Artist in the context both of developments in DeLillo’s 
oeuvre from the 1990s onwards, and of examples from recent criticism which address 
environmental concerns in DeLillo’s work. The remaining sections involve a detailed 
reading of the novel itself. As such this chapter is loosely structured around the 
movement of the novel itself, with the thematic concerns explored within this overall 
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movement. In particular, the second section of the chapter focuses solely on the 
novel’s opening scene, in order to introduce the novel’s framing of dwelling and 
subjectivity as constituted in and through narrative processes. Here I foreground the 
importance of things in shaping dwelling, and consider the possibility of thinking 
narrative processes as unfolding in relation to thinging. In the third section I examine 
the emergence of Mr Tuttle and relate this central event of the novel, once again, to 
processes of gathering and thinging, this time thought not in relation to narrative 
interpretation or mediation, but to technological media. Remembrance, and 
particularly the remembrance of place, are at work from the beginning of this chapter, 
but come into focus in the fourth section, through a consideration of the issue of 
Rey’s ‘aliveness’ in the figure of Mr Tuttle. In the fifth section I discuss in detail the 
relation between art and dwelling in the novel, contrasting the potentials for recovery 
entailed by Lauren’s performance piece Body Time with the unproductive, ‘festive’ 
creativity which unfolds in her remembrance of Rey at the remote seaside home. In 
the final section of the chapter I address Lauren’s recovery, and her achievement of 
an ethical relation to Rey (the lost other). My reading of Lauren’s recovery 
foregrounds the relationship between Lauren’s remembrance of place, her return 
home, the recovery of dwelling and the recovery of narrative. 
The Body Artist and environmental consciousness in DeLillo’s late 
fiction 
The opening chapter of The Body Artist introduces a vision of the idealised 
dwelling, or worldly belonging, of a recently married couple, Lauren and Rey, at their 
remote home near an unnamed coastal town in North America. This opening scene 
precedes Rey’s unexpected departure and suicide later that day. The traumatic rupture 
from worldly belonging that Rey’s death brings into the life of his surviving partner, 
body artist Lauren Hartke, orients the rest of the novel. What follows is a creative 
exploration of the limits and intersections of narrative, architecture, the body and 
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performance art, as Lauren mourns Rey’s death and seeks new possibilities for 
worldly belonging and selfhood in his absence. In this sense, The Body Artist builds 
on earlier works’ exploration of writing and professional artistry as modes of self-
reclamation. With DeLillo’s Valparaiso (1999), the novel shares an exploration of 
celebrity and public life in contemporary American society.239 In this play, struggling 
businessman Michael Majeski seeks to seize the Janus-faced opportunity of 
transforming his identity after accidentally becoming a minor celebrity and media 
spectacle. The Body Artist also shares Mao II’s (1991) interest in the private and 
public dimensions of professional artistry.240 In that novel, author Bill Gray’s 
resistance to finishing and publishing his novel, and his reclusion from the society 
that his writing documents, create a paranoid projection of mass consumption as 
destructive of the individual creative subject. The Body Artist develops these interests 
in the way that creative acts shape private and public selves: through artist Lauren 
Hartke’s production of a performance artwork, created in isolation following her 
husband’s suicide and titled Body Time, which emerges from Lauren’s period of 
mourning and questions the possibility of reclaiming identity through professional 
artistry and its public consumption. 
Unlike Bill Gray in Mao II, one of DeLillo’s failed artists who, in Elise 
Martucci’s words, has ‘removed themselves from the world they are trying to 
represent through art’,241 Lauren’s location at the remote seaside house shapes her 
creative practices, which, in turn, form a new sense of belonging as the novel unfolds. 
In DeLillo’s work, a search for embeddedness in place persists in play with the 
persistence of non-places in his works, of which the supermarket in White Noise is 
perhaps the best example. The Body Artist’s interest in the relation between place and 
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artistry, in particular, builds on ideas explored in Underworld, in particular what 
Martucci, who offers rare critical recognition of the significance of place in DeLillo’s 
oeuvre, has described as that novel’s investment in ‘the altered landscape as an 
essential background for [characters’] creations, and […] the importance of particular 
places in an effort to adapt to and survive the damaging effects of our consumer 
culture’.242 
The ‘environmental unconscious’ of Underworld, revolving for Martucci 
around consumerism and human environmental impact, presents differently in The 
Body Artist. The importance of place and creativity remains, however, as Martucci’s 
title suggests, submerged, not least in the critical reception of the novel, but also in 
the exploration of place in terms of loss and absence. Whilst Underworld engaged 
with creative responses to the destructive impact of human consumption, waste and 
pollution on lived environments, DeLillo’s most recent works — Point Omega (2010) 
and Zero K (2016) — engage more explicitly with human existence in the 
Anthropocene.243 In Point Omega, as Pieter Vermeulen has argued, confrontation 
with death in the vastness of a desert landscape resituates human experience in 
relation to the vast scale of geological time in which human history is implicated.244 
In a similar way to The Body Artist, artworks attune DeLillo’s reader to such 
exceptional temporalities in that novel. In the opening scene of Point Omega, an art 
gallery displays Douglas Gordon’s art installation 24 Hour Psycho, in which 
Hitchcock’s film is reproduced across a full day, slowed down almost until the point 
of stasis. Instead of familiar events, this alien temporal register reveals to its viewer 
the interstices in recognisable emotions previously expressed by Hitchcock’s 
characters, effecting what Mark Hansen has called the ‘technical expansion of self‐
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affection’ made possible by new media.245 This expansion of the temporal register of 
human behaviour prepares DeLillo’s reader to think of humanity in relation to the 
vast, and often imperceptible, scales of geological time which Vermeulen locates in 
the vast deserts of this novel. Body Time has a comparable role of attuning Lauren, as 
I will demonstrate, to possibilities for being which are explored and realised through 
her navigations of the lived environment. 
If the expansion of affect and temporality in Point Omega begins to take the 
measure of the human in relation to the vast scales of geological time, remapping the 
possibilities of human existence in the process, Zero K extends these concerns into a 
deliberation on the posthuman existence of Artis Martineau, who is frozen at the 
moment of her death. Contemplating the sight of ‘the dead, or maybe dead [...] the 
cryogenic dead, upright in their capsules’, Artis’ stepson Jeffrey reflects that ‘this was 
art in itself, nowhere else but here’.246 If the narration of Artis’ preserved 
consciousness recalls Samuel Beckett’s late work, for instance Company, with its 
evocation of existence sustained only, yet inexhaustibly, in language, it also looks 
back to Lauren’s extinguishing of selfhood in The Body Artist. The name Artis and 
her physical transformation before her preservation likewise recalls Lauren’s own 
body artistry. If Artis’ preservation is another version of Lauren’s body art, the event 
of her preservation in a remote and architecturally impressive desert compound 
littered with human sculptures, which Jeffrey calls ‘mannequins’, also recalls the 
‘land art’ of Underworld.247 Artis’ preservation in one of the ‘body pods […] super-
insulated plastic tubes’ paradoxically exposes her to the vast physical and temporal 
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scales of the planet itself, entangling the possibilities of her life with the unknown 
future of a world facing destruction through human activity.248 
If these works can be said to constitute DeLillo’s contribution to thinking 
human life in the Anthropocene, it is the case that these themes exist at the margins of 
The Body Artist’s exploration of the way death and mourning instantiate a radically 
altered experience of time. It is the case, too, that The Body Artist steps back from, or 
had not yet arrived at, these more explicitly ecological and political concerns, in its 
detailed exploration of how phenomenological experience of the lived environment 
supports human creativity. The novel brings together earlier interests in the 
redemptive capacities of art with a new engagement in thinking narrative and the 
novel form as entangled with the lived environment. More so than any other work in 
DeLillo’s oeuvre, The Body Artist considers the novel itself as a lived environment, 
an equally architectural and textual space for artistry, self-transformation and 
recovery. DeLillo’s exploration of postmodern simulacrum, consumerism and human 
detachment from the lived environment in modernity has, as Martucci recognises, 
always been accompanied by a broadly environmental ‘concern with our 
consciousness of the material world’.249 As yet underexplored (though addressed in 
this chapter), however, is the role that The Body Artist plays in shaping the transition 
from this ‘environmental unconscious’ to the explicitly anthropocentric concerns of 
his most recent novels.250 
If place and the lived environment have been underrepresented in criticism of 
The Body Artist, the importance of narrative in Lauren’s recovery has received critical 
attention, primarily in terms of Lauren’s departure from a non-time of grief and 
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mourning into a newly emergent relation to narrative time at the novel’s conclusion, 
which is an interpretation I broadly agree with. In particular, the release from grief 
and sense of recovery that Lauren experiences at the close of the novel has been read 
as a product of the novel’s narrative closure. As Rachel Smith observes, at its close, 
The Body Artist ‘succumbs to the narrative temporal requirements of the novel form’ 
which itself affords a degree of comfortability and stability to Lauren’s worldly 
existence through a return to a more recognisable temporalisation.251 At the same 
time, I find that a purposeful discussion of the relationship between narrative, the 
lived environment and human flourishing in this novel has been somewhat foreclosed 
by this critical focus on The Body Artist’s rendering of the loss, and return of 
narrative in temporal terms, specifically in terms of the stilled, uncertain, non-
narrative temporality which Lauren experiences after Rey’s suicide. Smith’s analysis 
of the creative and political possibilities of the non-time of mourning — for instance 
the focus on the way that The Body Artist ‘delinks time from its mediating spatial 
structures and exposes its indeterminacy and discontinuity’ (p. 104) — is indicative 
of the wider critical suppression of place and the lived environment.252 DeLillo’s own 
comment in 2003 that ‘The Body Artist is about time, language and grief’, quoted in 
Cleopatra Kontoulis and Eliza Kitis’ article, itself titled under these three headings, is 
indicative of the frame in which the novel has been received.253 This holds 
particularly true amongst some of the commentators who observed close affinities 
between DeLillo’s novel and Heidegger’s thought, for instance Cornel Bonca’s and 
Kalvado’s. Whilst Smith’s statement that time is ‘delinked’ from its ‘mediating 
spatial structures’ acknowledges the structuring role of the lived environment in 
shaping temporal experience, the separation of time and experience from these 
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‘mediating structures’ has often led critics to focus on Lauren’s experience of a ‘non-
place’ that emerges in the time of mourning. 
Writing of this departure from place through a discussion of ‘landscape’, 
Tyler Kessel develops an understanding of the time and space of mourning as a form 
of Outside. Kessel rightly notes it is necessary to think ‘of the house as a concept, 
which involves an economy between inside and outside’.254 Yet for Kessel, the 
threshold of the household is superficial, and precedes the crossing of another 
threshold as the novel enters into the space and time of mourning no longer governed 
by the crossing of a threshold in literal space but by a departure from physical space 
into an Outside, a ‘landscape of estrangement’ beyond time and space.255 Kessel 
conceives of the ‘landscape’ of the novel, ‘the Outside’, as having little relation to the 
landscape or environment itself, as the unconditional hospitality that Lauren offers to 
Mr Tuttle creates an absolute Outside that is a total departure from the lived 
environment into the non-space of the event. In this way, Lauren’s welcoming of Mr 
Tuttle into her home unravels the distinction between guest and host, and the 
distinction between the interiority of the house and the exteriority that Mr Tuttle 
represents, fulfilling the ethical role of Derridean hospitality without condition: 
‘Lauren’s welcoming of [Mr Tuttle], of his interruption, signifies a welcoming of the 
Outside that constitutes an absolute hospitality’.256 This ethical analysis risks 
underestimating the remembering of, and return to, place and home in the constitution 
of this encounter between Lauren and the otherness Mr Tuttle embodies. 
This Outside, a departure from space, is mirrored in the critical discussion by 
Hikaru Fujii’s conception of the Outside in the novel in temporal terms, as Mr Tuttle, 
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rightly arguing that ‘the linear movement of narrative time […] guarantees that those 
moments [of death and grief] will pass out of the present. Tuttle defies this promise of 
time’.257 In this way, Mr Tuttle constitutes, as should be clear by this point, the 
experience of a temporal Outside; in Fujii’s Deleuzian register, ‘[t]ime becomes a 
subject because it is the folding of the Outside’.258 Both these discussions reflect the 
concerns in Peter Boxall’s description of the ‘non-place’ and ‘non-time’ of 
mourning.259 
Given the increasing critical awareness of the role of the environment in 
DeLillo’s fiction, discussed above in relation to Martucci, and the recent evocation of 
human entanglement in the vast scales of planetary time in his writing, for instance in 
Vermeulen’s essay, it is surprising that the criticism of The Body Artist cited above 
has tended to overlook the importance of the lived environment in Lauren’s 
negotiation of mourning and eventual recovery in this novel.260 In addressing 
recovery not in relation to Lauren’s return to public life but in terms of a search for 
worldly belonging, I seek to reorientate discussion of the novel to address Lauren’s 
creativity as an issue relating to dwelling, or perhaps as the recovery of dwelling 
itself. I now turn to the opening chapter, which presents Lauren and Rey’s ‘final 
morning’ together, and a poignant moment of dwelling before Rey’s death. 
‘This final morning that they were here’ 
The primary narrative of the novel unfolds at ‘a large house on an empty 
coast’ (p. 36) where Lauren and Rey live, until Rey’s suicide, and where Lauren 
returns to mourn and recover from her husband’s death. The novel’s opening scene 
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follows Lauren and Rey taking breakfast in the kitchen of the seaside house directly 
before Rey’s departure and eventual suicide later that day. The scene renders the flow 
of dwelling through narrative, both by building the household through its narrative 
structure and by shaping the event of dwelling that unfolds there. The opening chapter 
also works retrospectively to memorialise and preserve the memory of this mode of 
belonging, both invoking and mourning the departure of the Woolfian confidence in 
the capacity of art to ‘make of the moment something permanent’.261 Boxall 
comments of this morning scene: 
The prose reaches for a crispness, a fineness and a brilliance in the depiction 
of this unshadowed scene, a forensic separation of the components of the 
morning, that allows for the time of this day to be chiselled out, to stand 
stoneclad in all its presence and clarity. It is difficult to think of a stretch of 
prose, since Woolf’s depiction of the fleeting moment, that has stilled time 
this effectively or this cleanly.262 
This opening scene reflects this formal inheritance of modernism through its 
exploration of identity and worldly belonging in narrative, rendering the flow of 
dwelling through narrative. In this way, as I will show, the narration of this scene 
contemplates the capacity for the novel form, and its narrative conventions, to support 
worldly belonging. 
Dwelling and being-at-home in narrative 
Befittingly of a breakfast scene, there is little dialogue in the opening chapter. 
As a result, the narration introduces Lauren and Rey primarily through their 
performance of certain habits and preferences. The narrative builds through repeated 
descriptions of Lauren and Rey’s actions (‘Rey sat with the newspaper, stirring his 
coffee’) and through the acknowledgement by Lauren’s narrating consciousness of 
these actions as markers of identity: ‘It was his coffee and his cup. They shared the 
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newspaper but it was actually, unspokenly, hers’ (p. 8). Throughout, Lauren and Rey 
also perform gestures which demonstrate their unspoken knowledge of each other’s 
preferences and routines: making ‘his’ toast, ‘Lauren flipped it down again because it 
took two flips to get the bread to go brown’ (p. 8). In response, Rey turns on the radio 
and finds the weather for Lauren, ‘absently nodd[ing] his acknowledgement because 
it was his toast and his butter and then he turned on the radio and got the weather’ (p. 
8).263 
By circumscribing all narrative movement within this domestic scene, the 
opening chapter creates in its reader a strong sense of immersion in the particular 
narrative environment. DeLillo arguably builds an analogous relationship between the 
novel form and the household itself, an effect further developed by the intensity of 
Lauren’s own experience of belonging and identity in this time and place: ‘You know 
more surely who you are on a strong bright day after a storm when the smallest 
falling leaf is stabbed with self-awareness’ (p. 7). When Lauren describes how birds 
perched around the house might view it, she reflects the sense of immersion in a 
bounded narrative environment which I am pointing to here: 
What impossible worlds they see. Think. What a shedding of every knowable 
surface and process. She wanted to believe the bird was seeing her, a woman 
with a teacup in her hand, and never mind the folding back of day and night, 
the apparition of a space set off from time. (p. 22) 
At the same time, this exacting narration monumentalises not so much the household 
itself as a space, but the moment of Lauren and Rey’s dwelling in which this place 
comes into being. Put differently, the household itself as an enveloping architectural 
structure emerges here only as the space of the event of Lauren and Rey’s dwelling. 
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To demonstrate further what I mean by this I turn to some examples of the 
way that Lauren and Rey’s dwelling depends on their shared attunement to the lived 
environment around them. Elsewhere, Lauren’s repeated assertions of individual 
identity, ‘[t]hey shared the newspaper but it was actually, unspokenly, hers’ (p. 8); 
‘they both used the computer but it was spiritually hers’ (p. 12) have a similar effect, 
of representing subjects whose identities are inseparably bound up in one another. 
Above all, it is Lauren’s narration which gathers together Rey, Lauren and the things 
in their environment into a scene of harmonious belonging-together. The repetition of 
things and technologies associated with each person, and of personal pronouns 
themselves, accumulate in this scene, simultaneously distinguishing between Lauren 
and Rey whilst also depicting identity as relational, differential and performative — a 
product of the ‘sedimented acts’ of speech,264 citation and corporeal performances 
which Judith Butler argues shape individual subjectivity.265 
The gathering effect of Lauren’s narration is exemplified in the heteroglossic 
nature of Lauren’s narrative interpretation and mediation of the scene. One moment 
unfolds like this: ‘Rey was always saying, or said once, and she carried a voice in her 
head that was hers and it was a dialogue or a monologue […] a voice that flowed 
from a story in the paper’ (p. 16). The inclusion of a conjunction here (‘Rey was 
always saying, or said once, and she carried a voice in her head’) renders it uncertain 
as to whether it is Rey who told Lauren that she ‘carrie[s] a voice in her head’, or that 
it is Lauren’s reflection we are hearing, or perhaps an interjection from an 
undramatised narrator. Whilst the statement cannot be grammatically attributed 
to Rey, his voice still enters Lauren’s as that voice in her head, even if the reader does 
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not have access to it. In this way the narrating consciousness, ‘hers’, contains alterity 
within it, and is shaped not only by Lauren’s thoughts but by Rey and by things in the 
environment they inhabit, too. 
Remembrance 
When read with knowledge of Rey’s death, the opening chapter carries subtle 
intimations of violence which might previously have seemed innocuous: when Lauren 
comments that Rey has cut himself shaving, Rey replies ‘I want God to see my face’ 
(p. 14); when Lauren mentions a strange noise in the house (that later turns out to be 
Mr Tuttle) Rey answers, ‘Good. I’m glad […] You need the company’ (p. 19). 
Likewise, Lauren’s reflections on how the birds perched around the house might view 
it further as an ‘apparition’, discussed above, further reflect a growing view of this 
moment as something fleeting, ghostly and alien, as if accessible only from beyond a 
divide that is impossible to bridge. The dwelling that unfolds in the opening scene 
threatens, in this view, to become a mode of belonging after Rey’s death, accessible 
only through an act of memory, as if from Outside. Knowledge of Rey’s death raises 
the possibility that this scene might be narrated retrospectively, by a consciousness 
looking back on this scene to recover the narrative memory of some final moments of 
dwelling before Rey’s death. As Peter Boxall comments of this chapter, it is ‘a scene 
which is, in some ways, already a memory of a scene, already laden with the weight 
of being the Last Day’.266 
Viewed this way, Lauren’s narration of the final morning with Rey works not 
only to make sense of events leading to Rey’s death, but to recover the texture and 
details of the ‘sedimented acts’ of daily life, of everyday habits and performances 
which weaved together to build their worldly belonging in this place. The memory of 
Rey’s identifying behaviours are as important for Lauren’s self-identity as her own, 
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particularly after his death, the meaningful sense of who ‘she’ was (or is) relying on 
the interplay of ‘his’ and ‘her’ particular way of being. Matthew Escobar rightly notes 
‘Lauren’s fixation on mentally identifying to whom each object in the kitchen belongs 
[...] distinctions that Lauren needs in order to feel that she exists as a separate 
consciousness’.267 In the aftermath of Rey’s death this economy of subjectivity, both 
relational and differential, is threatened with collapse. At the same time, as Lauren 
continues to live in the seaside home, her knowledge of Rey’s accumulated gestures, 
ritualised habits, and ways of interacting with objects tends towards sustaining Rey’s 
subjectivity, and her own, when she is alone in the household after his death. From 
this perspective, the narration of the final morning can be understood, primarily, as an 
act of narratively gathering details from Lauren’s and Rey’s past in the present 
moment after Rey’s death. I understand this as a process to fulfil Lauren’s need to 
distinguish between herself and Rey in order to establish a sense of autonomy after 
his death, whilst the narrative’s repeated distinctions between Lauren and Rey’s 
preferences also attest to the possibility that Lauren is shaping fragments from her 
past into a coherent narrative of selfhood in this scene. Taken collectively, these 
details make it is possible to read this narrative of the final morning as part of 
Lauren’s mourning and remembrance of Rey, a form of remembrance akin to a 
narrative memorialisation of their dwelling. 
Reading and gathering 
To back up the proposition that Lauren’s narration of the final morning might 
be a retrospective narrative gathering, a ‘reading’ of her own memories, it is 
necessary to consider the act of reading itself as it unfolds at the narrative level in this 
scene. As Lauren reads the newspaper she encounters living others there, navigating 
‘endless lines of identical print with people living somewhere in the words’ (p. 19). 
                                                 
267 Matthew Escobar, The Persistence of the Human: Consciousness, Meta-Body and Survival 
in Contemporary Film and Literature (Boston: Brill, 2016), p. 91. 
180 
 
Lauren finds herself transported, ‘halfway around the world’ (p. 19), as ‘she more or 
less saw herself talking to a doctor in the bush somewhere, with people hungry in the 
dust’ (pp. 23–24). Her sense of being located both in her kitchen and the place she is 
reading about, and of entry into the ‘the strange contained reality of paper and ink’ (p. 
19), also mirrors the reader’s own crossing of the threshold into the interior space of 
the text and house where they encounter Rey and Lauren, foregrounding the novel’s 
status as a world brought into existence in the event of reading. The narrative further 
evokes the experience of reading by creating a dialogue between Lauren’s narrating 
consciousness and the narrative she is reading in the paper, so that reading becomes 
the event of an encounter between Lauren and the others who are described in the 
newspaper. In this way that act of reading, and so the newspaper itself as a thing in 
the environment, shapes the narration of Lauren’s final morning with Rey. The 
displacement which occurs as Lauren reads, ‘[s]he read and drifted. She was here and 
there’ (p. 23), further suggests the displacement of individuality discussed above. As 
Kontoulis and Kitis note of this scene, ‘Lauren’s presumed subjectivity has already 
collapsed into the environment’.268 
It is equally possible to see this displacement of individual subjectivity as a 
move towards further entanglement with things in the lived environment. The process 
of reading discussed here draws Lauren outside of herself into a strangely bounded 
location: as Lauren reflects, ‘when you look at a page and distinguish one line from 
another it begins to gather you into it’ (p. 19). Yet Tyler Kessel’s suggestion that this 
scene narrates Lauren’s first experience of a Deleuzian Outside underestimates the 
extent to which being Outside yourself is inherent in human existence. Instead, I read 
this scene as a different, yet related instance of what I am calling ‘narrative gathering’ 
in this chapter: here, Lauren’s reading acts as an interpretative process of gathering 
that is mediated, in turn, by the thing in the environment (the newspaper) that shapes 
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her dwelling and identity. Rather than a departure into a non-space outside the lived 
environment, the gathering together of Lauren, Rey, the people in the newspaper, the 
newspaper itself, and all the other things in the environment is the event of dwelling 
itself, shaped in particular here by narrative media and the act of reading which 
constitute the mediating-interpreting texture of this unfolding moment of dwelling. 
The unexpected appearance of Rey’s obituary, which closes the opening 
chapter of the novel also evokes, for the reader, Lauren’s own shock at hearing the 
news of Rey’s sudden death, as well as the arrival of the newspaper version of Rey’s 
life in the outside world into the interior space of the home. I follow Rudiger Heinze’s 
descriptions of these shifts in form as ‘insertions’, as I find the term productively 
suggestive of Lauren’s own tendency ‘to place herself, to insert herself into certain 
stories in the newspaper’ (p. 14), which I have already discussed above.269 In this 
obituary, the reader likewise confronts, with Lauren, the problem of incorporating the 
version of Rey conveyed in the ‘strange contained reality’ (p. 19) of his obituary with 
her own knowledge of the man. Heinze persuasively argues, however, that the 
disruptive ‘insertion’ of different forms (the biographical obituary into the intimate 
narrative) holds an ethical function for the novel’s reader: 
The montage allows and even forces the readers to distance themselves, to 
reassess the impression about Rey attained in the first chapter, thus 
relativizing everything read so far […] In the end, the reader has to wager a 
guess which narrative to trust, and the result will most likely be a blend of the 
two narratives […] The posing of objectivity [in the obituary form] only 
reveals the impossibility of objectivity, and room is left for the reader to fill 
the gap of how Rey’s death affects Lauren […] the insertion creates the 
paradoxical effect of achieving intersubjective empathy through distancing.270 
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On one hand, the ‘insertion’ of this newspaper article into the narrative builds a sense 
of readerly immersion in the household environment, positioning DeLillo’s reader 
almost as if she were Lauren, reading the newspaper at the kitchen table in the seaside 
house. On the other, the potential for empathic contact that Heinze locates in the shift 
between forms perhaps downplays the force of rupture, and the disruption of a mode 
of belonging, enacted by the arrival of this news.271 
In this way DeLillo questions the narrative of dwelling that opened the novel, 
presenting the reader with two narrative representations of Rey’s existence, neither of 
which continue to offer the sense of worldly belonging that Lauren had experienced 
prior to Rey’s death. The implied arrival of the obituary on Lauren’s kitchen table 
likewise ruptures her connection to the narrative of dwelling which had disclosed that 
table as a meaningful thing in the environment, and so in turn threatens her 
connection to the table itself, and to the household environment as a world of 
belonging. The novel asks its reader to imagine that Lauren is encountering Rey 
through the process of reading, drifting and inserting herself into the life that the 
obituary accounts, allowing herself to be gathered into this reality and allowing it to 
come to presence in the context of the household space that harbours her memories of 
being with Rey. In the way the novel foregrounds the similarity, and the play 
between, Lauren’s narrative exploration of a lived environment (the seaside home 
before Rey’s death) and the phenomenological exploration of a narrative environment 
(his obituary). The arrival of the obituary in the household marks the end of Lauren’s 
harmonious belonging to this place, and the beginning of a new search for dwelling; a 
search which, paradoxically, is already underway in the narrative representation of 
life before Rey’s death. 
                                                 
271 This is particularly the case in Heinze’s reflection that the term ‘insertions’ ‘does not […] 
do justice to the montage of different kinds of texts, since it suggests a fissure, an alien-ness 
of texture, a “not belonging to,” an undue interruption’. Heinze, p. 68. 
183 
 
Drawing on this discussion, I would like to highlight further the importance 
accorded, in the opening chapter of The Body Artist, to reading as an activity that 
shapes human dwelling. The experience of reading is, as discussed above, one of 
movement into a ‘strange closed reality’ (p. 19), but a reality which converges with 
shapes, and is shaped by, Lauren’s experience of situatedness in the seaside home. 
Reading, here, is the event of being situated in an environment which is itself the 
open space of an encounter with alterity, the space of an event of crossing the spatial 
and temporal gap between the physical environment of the household in which 
Lauren is reading, and the textual environment where the other resides. This 
movement is conveyed through Lauren’s sense that ‘[s]he read and drifted. She was 
here and there’ (p. 23). In this experience of movement between the space occupied 
consciously by Lauren and that of the text, the reader allows the ‘reality’ of the 
newspaper story to enter, so that it ‘seeps through the house for a week’ (p. 19). This 
opening scene asks the reader to reflect on reading as an act of hospitality inseparable 
from dwelling, an event of gathering into a space and projection outside of the self, of 
reaching out to welcome otherness into the space of dwelling. 
The connection between reading and an entry into the lived environment here 
makes it possible to conceive of the text as a special thing that shapes dwelling by 
gathering together human and non-human entities in a world mediated by this thing. 
Lauren Hartke’s dwelling is shaped by reading, an experience which entailed 
hospitality, allowing otherness to enter the household and a gathering together of 
different people in their shared inhabitation of a worldly environment. Lauren’s 
dwelling is dependent on these others and the environing world of the text which 
shapes her own narrative interpretation of the world around her. I have taken some 
time over the novel’s presentation of the reading process, here, as these 
considerations are central to my interpretation of the way that Lauren’s remembrance 
of Rey unfolds through the narrative navigation of the lived space of the household 
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after his death. Likewise, the understanding of reading as a narrative process of 
encountering entities in an environment underpins my discussion, below, of the key 
event and philosophical issue of the novel: the appearance, presence and 
disappearance of Mr Tuttle. 
Mr Tuttle, alterity and things in the environment 
Choosing to remain alone at the seaside home after Rey’s death, Lauren’s 
inhabitation there unfolds in what Peter Boxall described as ‘the time of mourning, in 
a kind of evacuated time which has lost its narrative quality, which can neither inherit 
the legacy of the past, nor move towards the possibility of a new and undiscovered 
future’.272 The experience of grief and loss disrupts the interpretative process of 
narrative gathering and mediation which previously shaped Lauren’s sense of identity 
and worldly belonging. This disruption of narrative interpretation of worldly 
experience is both spatial — disrupting Lauren’s sense of the lived environment as 
meaningful — and temporal. Put differently, as the narrative entanglement of self, 
other and environment depicted in the opening chapter falters, so too does Lauren’s 
orientation in passing time. In Kontoulis’ and Kitis’ terms, ‘the breakdown of 
individuated subjectivity [in the novel] is commensurate with the dissolution of the 
concept of time as we know it’.273 At the same time the fundamentally narrative 
process of drawing meaningful connections between elements of the environment, 
and reflecting on meaningful relations between self and other in that environment, 
continues to underpin Lauren’s search for dwelling after Rey’s death; albeit in a form 
that has lost its narrative character. With these considerations in mind, I also read the 
scenes that follow Rey’s death as exploring the relationship between the ‘thin 
simultaneity’ of technological immediacy and the experience of temporal suspension 
discussed above.274 In doing so I foreground the creative possibilities of rupture for 
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reshaping worldly belonging, whilst proposing that worldly belonging itself is 
inextricably tied to narrative forms of knowledge in this novel. 
After Rey’s death, Lauren seeks to explore her memory of Rey and their 
dwelling together through the navigation of the household environment into which 
the memories of this past life are dispersed. In the face of this dispersion, Lauren 
continues to pursue the process of gathering which was fundamental to the form of 
worldly belonging figured in the novel’s opening chapter. Yet, in the wake of Rey’s 
death this process of gathering is no longer one comparable with the reading, 
narrating and meaningful inhabiting of the lived environment. The capacity for 
capturing a moment of dwelling through narrative memorialisation gives way to an 
interest in tape recordings and webcam footage, which present themselves to Lauren 
as media which respond to the stilled temporality of death and offer creative 
possibilities for shaping worldly inhabitation. The transition in interest towards non-
narrative, technological media here opens a play between narrative and non-narrative 
modes of disclosure, referentiality and worldly self-orientation central to the 
exploration of dwelling in the novel, in particular the interplay between written 
signification in the opening chapter and new media technologies in the middle section 
of the novel. As such, the possibility that Lauren sought to retrieve the memory of her 
past through retrospective narration of the morning scene is displaced here by a sense 
that narrative has lost its capacity to interpretatively gather and mediate relations 
between self, other and world. As I will discuss here, the stilled time of death and the 
modern technologies that preserve traces of life make possible a totalising gathering, 
one which eliminates temporal movement and distance and monumentalises this 
stilled temporality in the form of Mr Tuttle. 
Encountering life in technological media 
Lauren’s continued desire to inhabit the house with Rey after his death, what 
Peter Boxall has called her need to find him ‘alive in the stalled time of a refusal to 
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relinquish a loved one’, is evident in fleeting encounters with Rey shortly after his 
death.275 Lauren ‘felt him in the rooms on the second floor’ (p. 32), in a part of the 
house where he used to work on his scripts. Rey’s previous presence and activity here 
allows Lauren to locate him, not in the memory of the belonging that existed between 
Rey and Things in the environment, as before his death, but instead as a ‘thing’ 
himself, dispersed and unravelled into the environment: 
He used to prowl these rooms talking into a tiny tape recorder, smoke in his 
face, reciting ideas about some weary script to a writer somewhere whose 
name he could never recall […] Now he was the smoke, Rey was, the thing in 
the air, vaporous, drifting into every space sooner or later, unshaped, but with 
a face that was somehow part of the presence, specific to the prowling man. 
(p. 33) 
Here, Rey’s ghostly presence hangs in the air and is associated with the house itself, 
the ‘apparition’ which Lauren navigated in the opening chapter (p. 22). If Lauren and 
Rey had previously belonged with Things in the environment through their 
interaction and use of them, Rey’s presence now resides more than ever in these 
Things, the traces of his existence dispersed through the contents of the household. 
Whilst the sparse, modernist narrative style introduced in the opening chapter 
of the novel is sustained after Rey’s death, the lack of temporal progression that 
Lauren experiences, of ‘nothing going on’ (p. 38), drives a loss of interest in 
language-based, narrative forms. In this non-narrative time, Lauren shapes newfound 
attachments to non-narrative media technologies which correspond with her 
experience of this uneventful, atemporal and evacuated present. Her pursuit of a 
departure from narrative knowledge is fulfilled by these media technologies and their 
alternative modes of referentiality, which upset the sense of storytelling inherent in 
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the opening chapter of the novel through their resistance to event, progression and 
closure. 
By ‘reading’ the environment for traces of Rey’s presence – the smell of 
smoke, the memory of his dwelling in that room, how he prowled, smoked and spoke 
into a recording device – Lauren allows Rey’s otherness, like that of the figures in the 
newspaper, to emerge from a distant reality into the space she now occupies, to 
spread like smoke into the house and to fill every space there, suffusing it with his 
presence, ‘unshaped’ but discernible, ‘with a face’ (p. 33) that might even be visible 
to Lauren. This fleeting encounter with Rey is achieved through a moment of 
narrative interpretation reminiscent of the narrative dwelling that unfolded before 
Rey’s death, connecting the ‘apparition’ of the house and Rey’s spectral presence 
through their shared narrativity and suggesting the possibility of a meaningful form of 
narrative remembrance. 
After sensing Rey’s spectral presence in this part of the house, Lauren finds 
Mr Tuttle one floor higher, in a smaller bedroom connected to an empty room. When 
Lauren first speaks to Mr Tuttle, she recognises the speech he produces as coming 
from these specific recordings. At their second meeting the tape recorder, as yet 
unmentioned as an object in itself, ‘lay blinking in the middle of the table’ (p. 54).276 
All of this suggests that Mr Tuttle is a figure constituted through and in technological 
media, an expression of the capacity of this technological thing, formerly ‘his’, to 
create a bridge between Rey and Lauren: in David Cowart’s terms, Mr Tuttle ‘turns 
out to be a human tape recorder’.277 These recordings of Rey’s conversations with his 
scriptwriter allow Lauren a more direct encounter with Rey’s performed, professional 
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selfhood — a part of his life she had little access to. Most importantly, the recordings 
afford more immediacy of contact and sense of presence than Lauren’s memories of 
Rey. Lauren’s creative mourning of Rey explores the possibilities of overcoming the 
loss inherent in language, and indeed all communication, in order to return the lost 
other to living presence. This begins, as discussed above, with the newspaper and 
particularly with Rey’s obituary, which for Lauren allowed a ‘sending’ of otherness 
into the household space. Technological media such as the webcam of Kotka extend 
this interest for Lauren by eliminating, for her almost entirely, the dispersion and loss 
involved in ‘crossing’ or ‘sending’ information across space and time, from one 
reality to another. This sense of presence is strongest ‘in the dead times’ when the 
road is empty, when there are no cars entering or leaving Kotka but instead simply the 
road itself, a medium for both crossing, for arrival and departure, in ‘a place stripped 
of everything but a road that approaches and recedes, both realities occurring at once’ 
(p. 39). It is through a process of memorial gathering and recollection of the lost other 
that Lauren attempts to overcome death and bring the technical traces of Rey to life in 
their remote seaside home. 
In the non-narrative time of Lauren’s mourning these media traces do not 
weave, as Rey’s and Lauren’s conversations had done in the opening chapter, into 
narrative reflections which form a ‘dialogue or monologue’ between them (p. 16). 
Instead they take on substantial corporeal form in the arrival of Mr Tuttle, who 
emerges as an embodiment of the loss of narrative movement through time, of the 
desubjectified state of mourning and the simultaneity of technological immediacy. Mr 
Tuttle is the form of worldly existence that emerges in an ‘eternal, and hence 
atemporal, nowness’ that arises from the loss of narrative’s capacity for meaningful 
mediation in the novel.278 After his appearance, Mr Tuttle first reproduces for Lauren 
fragments of speech recorded by Rey in the weeks and months before his suicide, 
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messages that would be sent to a scriptwriter for one of his films. The first time Mr 
Tuttle produces Rey’s and Lauren’s voices, he reproduces a conversation between 
them captured on this recording device: 
He gestured as he spoke, moving his hand to the words, and she began to 
realize she’d said these things to Rey, here in the house, or things similar. 
They were routine remarks about a call she’d had from friends who wanted to 
visit. She remembered, she recalled dimly that she’d been standing at the foot 
of the stairs and that he’d been on the second floor, Rey had, walking up and 
down the hall, doing scriptwork. (p. 51) 
With time, Mr Tuttle produces vocalisations of other memories Lauren has of Rey 
that were not recorded on tape.279 Yet importantly, it is these technologically 
mediated traces of Rey (and Mr Tuttle’s ability to reproduce them) which provide a 
signature of Rey’s authentic existence in this man. 
As such, Mr Tuttle embodies the creative possibilities of immediacy and 
presence encapsulated in technological media, and in Lauren’s ‘refusal to relinquish a 
loved one’ into the realm of remembrance and spectrality.280 He is a figure, as 
discussed above in regard to Rachel Smith’s criticism, of a creative possibility shaped 
through grief and divorce from narrative time, which was unavailable to Lauren 
before the rupture of her narratively mediated dwelling. In Mr Tuttle’s existence, the 
worldly belonging that was shaped through Lauren and Rey’s inhabiting of and 
interaction with the environment gives way to another process of gathering, where 
Lauren gathers traces of Rey’s presence – in technological media, in the space of the 
house itself – and allows the radical alterity of death to take its place in the household 
space. Whilst Mr Tuttle exists, for Lauren, as a living being that she discovers in the 
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house, it is more accurate to locate his existence in the space of the gathering together 
of Lauren’s body, the media traces of Rey’s voice, and the household where her 
encounter with Mr Tuttle unfolds. Put differently, the rupture of narrative 
interpretation and mediation brings with it a collapse of the distance between Things, 
environment and body in the novel, and Mr Tuttle is a figure of this collapse. 
Following my discussion of Mr Tuttle’s appearance, it seems more apposite 
to locate Mr Tuttle existence not in a non-place outside of the lived environment, but 
in the household space itself, or more accurately in the gathering together of Lauren’s 
body, the media traces of Rey’s voice, and the household where her encounter with 
Mr Tuttle unfolds. Whilst Mr Tuttle exists for Lauren as a living being that she 
discovers in the house, it is more accurate to locate their encounter in the collapse of 
the distance between things, environment and body, a collapsing which occurs 
through the rupture of narrative interpretation and mediation. 
Mr Tuttle as a Thing: the substantiality of the event 
In order to understand the relationship between the issue of remembrance to 
the lived experience of dwelling, it is important to consider that the working of 
gathering in Dasein’s encounter with the world is evident, in Heidegger’s writings, 
not only in discourse, thought and memory, but also in the projects that shape and 
give meaning to the lived environment, creating relations between people and Things 
in those environments. Denken thought is already formulated by Heidegger in terms 
of gathering. In ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, building and dwelling are likewise 
conceived of in terms of gathering, enabling a clearer thinking of the relation between 
these practices. 
In what sense is Mr Tuttle a thing? In ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, the thing 
which gathers the fourfold into dwelling is nothing like a fixed point or object that 
secures a system of relations. Rather, its ‘thinging’ is temporary, constituted by its 
sustaining a relationship between the entities it gathers together. Heidegger argues, 
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for example, that a bridge makes possible relations between different elements of the 
environment and between the people who populate this environment precisely 
through this process of gathering: 
The bridge swings over the stream “with ease and power.” It does not just 
connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the 
bridge crosses the stream. The bridge expressly causes them to lie across from 
each other. […] With the banks, the bridge brings the stream to the one and 
the other expanse of the landscape lying behind them. It brings stream and 
bank and land into each other’s neighbourhood. The bridge gathers the earth 
as landscape around the stream. […] The bridge initiates the lingering and 
hastening ways of men to and fro, so that they may go to other banks and in 
the end, as mortals, to the other side. (BDT, p. 150, emphasis added) 
Whilst individuals might dwell on the bridge itself, tarrying, reflecting and interacting 
there, the bridge would not exist without the relations it creates between previously 
separate people and environments. The bridge does not exist independently of the 
event of drawing people and landscapes dwelling together into the same 
‘neighbourhood’ (BDT, p. 150). Also significant for my conception of Mr Tuttle as a 
Thing is the observation in ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ that dwelling unfolds 
through encounters with death and otherness: the bridge’s existence as an event of 
gathering, in that example, shapes an encounter with alterity and mortality central to 
dwelling. Via the bridge people ‘go to other banks’, encountering other locations and 
ways of life, and, ‘in the end, as mortals, to the other side’ (BDT, p. 150). In what 
sense is the bridge involved in encountering death, crossing over to ‘the other side’? 
In order to understand what Heidegger has in mind here, it is necessary first to attend 
to the distinction Heidegger draws between ‘men’ — who, ‘lingering and hastening’, 
make their way ‘to and fro’ — and ‘mortals’ in this passage. To become a mortal, for 
Heidegger, is to attend to death as the ultimate possibility of our lives. The encounter 
with alterity that the bridge initiates, the possibilities for crossing that it permits 
192 
 
enable reflection on the radical alterity of death, bringing this impossible possibility 
within the realm of human meaning and reflection. 
As R. L. Mølbak writes in relation to this passage, the bridge has ‘the 
substantiality of an event […] defined in and through the particular elements of a 
gathering’: 
[T]he bridge can only become the bridge that it is by constituting an event 
that draws the banks, the stream and the possibilities of a subject into it as 
part of its own gathering or world. It attains its individuality not from itself 
but from the locale which it draws together. Its thinghood resides in the 
distribution of the subjective and objective elements through which it shows 
itself and becomes this particular event of a bridge […] To say of the bridge 
that it has the substantiality of an event is thus to say that it has the nature of a 
specific belonging between subjects and objects that endures or stays for a 
while.281 
The involvement of the bridge in emergence of a locale, and the possibilities of 
subjects who are gathered there, makes the bridge itself an event of dwelling rather 
than an independent architectural structure or environment in itself. Mr Tuttle can be 
seen in just such terms: an entity whose substantiality depends upon the creation, and 
sustainment, of Lauren and Rey’s ‘lingering’ (BDT, p. 150) and ‘staying’ (BDT, p. 
145) with each other after Rey’s death. Mr Tuttle creates a belonging between Lauren 
and Rey in the latter’s absence, but is himself the thing in the environment which 
mediates this belonging between them. 
It is my view, then, that the problem of ‘living memory’ in The Body Artist 
revolves around a mode of gathering that unfolds, differentially, through narrative 
interpretation and through the immediacy of technological media. Mr Tuttle is 
likewise a technologically produced thing in the environment which gathers together 
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Lauren and Rey; by speaking the words that Rey spoke and recorded on his tape 
recorder, Mr Tuttle fills, and enables Lauren to cross, the metaphysical gap between 
her and Rey. To be more precise still, he is the happening of a space in which Lauren 
is able to encounter Rey. The end of this event is the end of a gathering that brought 
Lauren and Rey into proximity after Rey’s death, and so the end of the space that Mr 
Tuttle made possible, and the disappearance of Mr Tuttle himself. Like the bridge 
between two locales, Mr Tuttle exists only insofar as he is the happening of the space 
in which Lauren crosses the channel between her and Rey. The space that Mr Tuttle 
constitutes is the space of an event of relation between Lauren and Rey. Mr Tuttle 
suffuses the house with Rey’s presence, and attains substantiality in doing so. In other 
words, Mr Tuttle constitutes, and exists in the happening of, the space of Lauren’s 
creative remembrance and attempts to dwell. 
Remembrance and the problem of loss 
For Lauren, it is both important, and alarming that ‘this was not some 
communication with the dead. It was Rey alive in the course of a talk he’d had with 
her, in this room, not long after they’d come here’ (p. 61). The immediacy of 
Lauren’s encounter with Rey is, in this sense, not reducible to a notion of life beyond 
death: ‘[h]e was talking to her, not to a screenwriter in Rome or Los Angeles […] it 
did not seem like an act of memory. It was Rey’s voice all right, it was her husband’s 
tonal soul, but she didn’t think the man was remembering. It is happening now’ (p. 
61, p. 87). Memory here is paradoxically encountered as unfolding in the living 
present, as a form of contact with the living past which challenges understandings of 
memory and the retrieval of the past as a process of deferral, spectrality and loss 
associated with the technicity which made this living memory possible. The central 
difficulty in this encounter with Rey is that, in spite of the desire for Rey’s return, his 
presence is reducible to the performative gathering of technical traces and 
remembrance of their dwelling in the house together, which is itself challenging to the 
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notion of individuated subjectivity that Lauren is seeking to recover after the rupture 
of Rey’s death. When Mr Tuttle begins to give voice to other conversations between 
Rey and Lauren, Lauren (and DeLillo’s reader) is forced to grapple with the 
possibility that subjectivity can be boiled down to these performative reiterations, 
which initially only give rise to the diminished existence of Mr Tuttle but soon affect 
the resurrection of Rey himself. Whilst Mr Tuttle embodies the creative possibilities 
of grief and mourning, it is not yet clear how the creation and existence of this figure 
will shape Lauren’s recovery, or if it will do so at all. As long as Mr Tuttle exists, it 
seems that Lauren will not be able to recover from Rey’s death or find a way to 
incorporate Rey, to keep him close but to establish the necessary distance in order for 
her own life to continue. 
A tape recorder with physical reels of tape is a notably archaic technology in 
contemporary times and seems to demand reflection on the emergence as much as the 
experience of new media. The sense that Mr Tuttle’s mimicry of Rey’s tape 
recordings confirms, for Lauren, the authenticity of the interlocutor, is reminiscent of 
Friedrich Kittler’s discussion of the use of magnetic tapes to confirm the identity of 
telegram operators in WWII, in his seminal work from 1986, Gramophone, Film, 
Typewriter.282 As Kittler notes, the German Army High Command established the 
authenticity of messages received by checking the ‘signature’ of their messages 
against recordings left at home.283 To provide a record of this signature for comparing 
the messages, they ‘had the “handwriting” of every single agent recorded at the 
Wohldorf radio station close to Hamburg before they went abroad on their secret 
missions’.284 In this way, unique inflections in the messages confirmed the presence 
of the operator’s hand behind the incoming messages and allowed communication to 
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continue. Lauren is similarly willing to accept these technological confirmations of 
Rey’s unique technological ‘signature’ or ‘handwriting’. In spite of knowledge of 
Rey’s death, Lauren accepts that she is encountering him there, that he is 
paradoxically ‘alive’ in Mr Tuttle. In this way it is the immediacy of technological 
media and not Lauren’s memory that shapes Mr Tuttle and allows Lauren, in turn, to 
bring her memory of Rey into living presence. 
The ethical and philosophical stakes of this desire for ‘living memory’ can be 
explored further by turning to a text where Jacques Derrida discusses memory and 
remembrance in Heidegger. In Memories for Paul de Man, Derrida emphasises the 
dispersion and loss at the heart of all remembrance and questions an oppositional 
tendency in Heidegger towards an ‘all-gathering recollection’ that would obliterate 
loss.285 In The Body Artist Lauren’s creative mourning of Rey explores the 
possibilities of overcoming the loss inherent in language, and indeed all 
communication, in order to return the lost other to living presence. 
At issue here too, of course, is the character of Heidegger’s philosophical 
project which shapes my interpretation of the novel. Beginning with Being and Time, 
Heidegger sought to address our forgetfulness of being and inaugurated a 
philosophical project which Nicholas de Warren describes, fittingly, as a ‘singular 
struggle against forgetting’.286 Heidegger’s thinking of Being rests, in this sense, on 
the possibility of an ‘all-gathering recollection’ of Being through the history of 
language, of Being’s sending through the historical traditions of philosophy.287 
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Heidegger argues in What is Called Thinking that the German term for thought, 
Gedanc: 
[D]oes not mean the current meaning still left over in our present usage of the 
word “thought.” A thought usually means an idea, a view or opinion, a notion. 
The root or originary word says: the gathered, all-gathering recollection. 
(WCT, p. 92) 
Unsettling the opposition between thought and memory, Heidegger’s argument 
performs, for Derrida, a problematic movement towards unity, gathering and 
originarity, reducing the ‘difference’ and ‘disjunction’ at the heart of all 
communication.288 
In Chapter 1 I suggested that reading, when considered or practised in the 
vein and spirit of Heidegger’s thought, could be understood as a process of 
interpretative gathering. In addressing this point I turned to Heidegger’s discussion of 
the early Greek experience of language. For Heidegger, as discussed there, the early 
Greeks inhabited language not as rational animals in possession of the ability to order 
reality through speech, but as a manifestation of a human capacity for discourse, 
which itself responds to emergence the emergence of entities in the world into 
presence, and their gathering together into meaningful relations and contexts of 
experience. I cited there Heidegger’s point that: 
The word logos names that which gathers all present beings into presencing 
and lets them lie before us in it […] The laying that gathers assembles in itself 
all destiny by bringing things and letting them lie before us, keeping each 
absent and present being in its place and on its way; and by its assembling it 
secures everything in the totality. Thus each being can be secured and sent 
into its own. (EGT, p. 68). 
                                                 




Particularly important in the context of this discussion is Heidegger’s intimation that 
each being comes to presence not through human volition but instead is ‘sent into its 
own’, coming into being according its ‘destiny’. Being itself is never revealed as a 
being, of course, but instead is thought, as this passage suggests, as occurring 
progressively, through time, in a simultaneous process of revealing and concealing 
which constitutes the there of lived experience. For Heidegger, the particular stage of 
the ‘destiny’ of being, in the time of the Greeks, finds expression in the fragment 
from Heraclitus around which his discussion revolves. 
Heidegger’s reading of the fragment from Heraclitus is one instance of the 
expression of being as it unfolds historically in different epochs. In Contributions to 
Philosophy (of the Event) Heidegger further explicated these considerations, as well 
as detailing how, in his view, this unfolding of being often remains unthought, only 
coming to expression in the works of certain writers at certain historical junctures (of 
which Heraclitus is an important example). This time, discussing the unfolding of 
being not in terms of language explicitly, but, as in the Heraclitus fragment, in terms 
of progressive historical conceptions of truth, Heidegger writes of ‘the essence of 
truth’: 
Most intrinsically proper to this essence is the fact that it is historical. The 
history of truth, the history of the shining forth, transforming, and grounding 
of its essence, contains only rare and widespread moments. For long periods 
of time, this essence seems congealed (cf. the lengthy history of truth as 
correctness: adaequatio), because what is sought and pursued is only the true 
that is determined by this essence. Truth never “is”; instead, it essentially 
occurs. For truth is the truth of beyng, and beyng “only” essentially occurs. 
Thus what essentially occurs is everything that belongs to truth, including 
time-space and consequently “time” and “space”. (CPE, pp. 270–271) 
In this passage Heidegger argues that the essence of truth is historical, is the truth of 
being itself as it unfolds progressively through different epochs. This argument is 
consistent in many ways with the discussion of logos as quoted above, in particular 
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the idea that ‘truth’, like the discoursing-gathering which underpins human language, 
is ‘primarily clearing-concealment’ tied to the progressive ‘destiny’ of being in 
different epochs and so to what Heidegger calls ‘the self-concealing of beyng in the 
clearing of the “there”’ (CPE, p. 271). 
To demonstrate the importance of this discussion to The Body Artist it is 
necessary to recall that the Heraclitus fragments offer, for Heidegger, evidence of the 
early Greek understanding of truth in its essence, in terms similar both to the 
‘clearing-unconcealment’ which Heidegger discusses in Contributions and ‘truth in 
the sense of discoveredness (unconcealment)’ in Being and Time (BT, p. 210). As 
Heidegger writes, ‘in one of the fragments of Heraclitus – the oldest fragments of 
philosophical doctrine in which the λόγος [logos] is explicitly handled – the 
phenomenon of truth in the sense of discoveredness (unconcealment), as we have set 
it forth, shows through’ (BT, p. 210). Heraclitus’ fragments retain the trace of the pre-
philosophical, pre-metaphysical era which they unknowingly inaugurate, evident in 
the way that Heidegger can speak of the continuity in the Greek’s ‘pre-philosophical 
and their philosophical ways of interpreting […] the essence of man’ (BT, p. 157). 
That the pre-philosophical ‘essence’ of truth (or indeed language) remains 
intact through all the distortions of the metaphysical tradition, that it has a ‘history’, if 
only one of ‘rare and widespread moments’, is a central issue in working with an 
understanding of human discoursing-gathering —including language, reading and 
phenomenal interpretation. Derrida in particular, as Jussi Backman notes, ‘becomes 
increasingly sensitive to certain traditional commitments of the Heideggerian notion 
of the epochal history of metaphysics […] suspicious of the very notion of “history” 
as such, insofar as it implies, in the literal sense of the Greek ἱστορία, a teleologically 
structured narrative in which all elements ultimately come together’.289 
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To relate this discussion to The Body Artist, I turn to a story, perhaps a joke, 
Derrida offers about his relationship with Heidegger in The Post Card. There, Derrida 
relates receiving a call from ‘Heidegger’ in 1979, three years after the thinker’s death: 
The American operator asks me if I accept a “collect call” from Martin (she 
says Martine or Martini) Heidegger. I heard, as one often does in these 
situations […] voices that I thought I recognized on the other end of the 
intercontinental line, listening to me and watching my reaction. What will he 
do with the ghost or Geist of Martin? I cannot summarize here all the 
chemistry of the calculation that very quickly made me refuse (“It’s a joke, I 
do not accept”) after having had the name of Martini Heidegger repeated 
several times, hoping that the author of the farce would finally name himself. 
[…] All of this must not lead you to believe that no telephonic 
communication links me to Heidegger’s ghost, as to more than one other. 
Quite the contrary, the network of my hookups, you have the proof of it here, 
is on the burdensome side, and more than one switchboard is necessary in 
order to digest the overload. It is simply […] that my private relation with 
Martin does not go through the same exchange.290 
Derrida does not miss the opportunity to raise the distinction between the ‘network’ 
of connections between his work and Heidegger’s and the kind of immediate, 
unmediated encounter suggested by the telephone exchange. Instead, after attesting to 
the veracity of the tale (‘I know that I will be suspected of making it all up, since it is 
too good to be true. But what can I do? It is true, rigorously, from start to finish’) 
Derrida returns the question of the correspondence between him and Heidegger to the 
letters which make up The Post Card itself: ‘It is true, and moreover demonstrable, if 
one wishes to take the trouble of inquiring: there are witnesses and a postal archive of 
the thing. I call upon these witnesses (these waystations between Heidegger and 
myself) to make themselves known’.291 In this way, and not least through the slippage 
from Martin to Martine or Martini in his story, Derrida returns his reader to the 
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‘postal principle’, and so to Heidegger’s thought itself. As Derrida writes later in this 
work, describing the originary contamination of all ‘essence’ through the very event 
of sending itself, ‘the postal principle does not happen to differance, and even less to 
“Being,” it destines them to itself from the very “first” envoi [dispatch]’.292 
In Heidegger’s Ear: Philopolemology, Derrida considers revising his account 
of logocentrism to accommodate Heidegger’s practice of interpreting logos in terms 
of gathering, writing that, ‘at bottom logocentrism is perhaps not so much the gesture 
that consists in placing the logos at the centre as the interpretation of logos as 
Versammlung, that is, as the gathering that precisely concenters what it configures’.293 
At the same time, Derrida also acknowledged the importance of this act of gathering 
for meaningful understanding and thought, commenting elsewhere of Heidegger’s 
tendency to gathering that ‘I will not turn my uneasiness into a critique, because I do 
not believe that this gesture of gathering is avoidable. It is always productive, and 
philosophically necessary’.294 
Art and dwelling 
So far I have pointed towards the creative possibilities emerging from the 
rupture of Rey’s death only in terms of the emergence of Mr Tuttle. Considering 
Lauren’s remembrance and the emergence of Mr Tuttle as an artistic process means 
adopting a broad view of artistry and questioning the position of the ‘artwork’ as the 
privileged element in the relationship between art and Lauren’s recovery, considered 
here in terms of her pursuit of worldly dwelling or belonging. This section considers 
more closely the question of artistry and dwelling as represented in DeLillo’s novel, 
looking at how Heidegger’s thought makes it possible to retain the sense of Mr Tuttle 
                                                 
292 Derrida, The Post Card, p. 191. 
293 Jacques Derrida, ‘Heidegger’s Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV)’, ed. by John Sallis, 
trans. by John P. Leavey Jr (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 187. 
294 Jacques Derrida, “Désistance”, p. 212, qtd. in Sean Gaston, Derrida, Literature and War: 
Absence and the Chance of Meeting (London: Continuum, 2009), p. 75. 
201 
 
as a creative process of mourning without conceiving of artistry as something that 
only occurs in the teleological process of translating mourning into an artwork which, 
as I will demonstrate, does not really lead to Lauren’s recovery. Instead, I turn to a 
thinking of remembrance as a creative process in itself, outside of the economy of 
professional artistry. 
Body Time 
Through her interactions with Mr Tuttle, with the technologies and lived 
environment, Lauren gradually returns to her body artistry and produces her 
performance work, Body Time, which she performs publicly and that is relayed to the 
reader through a newspaper article written by Lauren’s friend and writer Mariella 
Chapman. This piece, as Peter Boxall notes, ‘is littered with reshaped elements drawn 
not only from The Body Artist, but from the range of DeLillo’s oeuvre’.295 This piece 
is the culmination of the process of artistry Lauren has undergone in the novel and is 
the culmination of Lauren’s capacity for self-transformation. Yet this performance 
does not satisfy Lauren’s search for a new mode of worldly belonging, and does not 
mark the completion or culmination of Lauren’s recovery, or the shaping of her 
worldly dwelling that I am interested in here. It is necessary to consider not only the 
artistry that unfolds in this preparative process but in fact to consider elements of this 
artistry as entirely related to mourning, and as existing apart from the teleological 
creation of the public artwork. This discussion underpins and prepares for my 
analysis of Lauren’s recovery of a narrative mode of dwelling in the final section of 
this chapter. 
The performance of Body Time marks Lauren’s return to the realm of work 
and the social, staging an encounter between the non-time of grief and the narrative 
conventions of both theatre and everyday experience. Lauren wants her audience, 
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Body Time’s reviewer writes, ‘to feel time go by, viscerally, even painfully’ (p. 104), 
but this desire for a visceral experience of passing time is equally applicable to 
Hartke herself. Although, on Body Time, as Mark Osteen puts it, ‘husband and wife 
come together behind the veil of art, merging in the figure of a naked man lip-
synching to a tape recorder’,296 the performance does not afford Lauren any 
satisfactory release from grief through this encounter with Rey, nor does it provide 
the mark a reinvention or re-emergence of her individuated subjectivity. 
Penelope Ingram has rightly argued, drawing on Heidegger’s work, that 
Lauren’s resistance of a return to conventional subjectivity or narrative theatrical 
performance in Body Time opens important ethical possibilities for being. Ingram 
argues that Lauren’s body work retrieves the capacity of morphological being that she 
locates in Heidegger’s Dasein. By powerfully revealing to her audience that ‘alterior 
bodily meanings exist here and now’, Body Time helps the reader realise the full scale 
of difference inherent in Dasein’s being.297 This retrieval of Being is made possible, 
in Ingram’s argument, when the body signifies outside of language and so outside of 
the metaphysical tradition. In Ingram’s terms, ‘[t]he body that expresses itself through 
changing sexual and racial significations can be seen to realize its full ontological 
potential’; ‘by imagining matter not tied to representation […] we can foresee an 
ontology without ground, from which multiple expressions of difference in Being can 
arise’.298 The key passage in The Body Artist that opens onto this reading comes from 
Mariella Chapman’s review of Body Time, where the critic comments that Hartke 
‘makes femaleness so mysterious and strong that it encompasses both sexes and a 
number of nameless states’ (p. 109). Through a recovery of Dasein’s morphological 
sexuality, she argues, the metaphysical understanding of the ground of being can be 
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broken. Dasein’s transcendence of race, class, sex, etc., its being-without-ground, 
opens future possibilities for being that exceed existing cultural representations. For 
Ingram, Lauren Hartke is unable to be ‘read’, resisting being subsumed into a 
patriarchal representational economy. Instead, argues Ingram, in The Body Artist ‘the 
narrative’s disruption of representative categories reveals to the reader her own 
foreclosed material possibilities and can release her to an ontological becoming 
through an ethics of reading’.299 
It is unsurprising that this performance in itself does not complete Lauren’s 
recovery, however. Pavlina Radia’s analysis demonstrates, conversely, how the body 
always comes to presence in a lived context which can compromise its search for 
dwelling. Radia focuses on the compromised nature of performance artwork as a 
means for resistance; of particular interest is ‘the artist’s own complicity in 
monumentalizing suffering into an act of public consumption’.300 In Radia’s view, the 
novel interrogates the performance artwork and demonstrates that it is compromised 
as a form of resistance; performance artistry makes possible the reclamation of 
subjectivity, in this view, only through resort to a commodifying spectacle which robs 
the body of its materiality as it becomes a site for the aestheticisation of traumatic 
suffering. As such, Lauren’s body becomes the site for ‘enflesh[ing] the reality of her 
loss’ whilst, in Body Time, her ‘corporeal suffering is staged and thus inevitably 
reduced to a plethora of aestheticized, albeit ecstatic crossings’.301 Important for my 
argument, here, is Radia’ body is always viewed in relation to the lived environment 
in which it takes its place, something that has been overlooked by criticism focusing 
on the ‘outside’ in this novel thus far. 
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Notwithstanding Radia’s successful critique of critical investments in the 
materiality of the body as a site for cultural resistance, her argument — as with other 
criticism before it — does not look beyond the public performance of Body Time to 
find a place for Lauren’s redemption or recovery. For Radia, the body retrieves itself 
through this commodifying process ‘as an art object that immolates itself […] the 
singed body […] experiences its own glorious flaying, and in this dédoublement, 
realizes its materiality’.302 This reading remains fixated on the artwork-cum-revivalist 
spectacle, the moment when Lauren extinguishes her selfhood ‘just to remain 
present’.303 As such the argument remains trapped in a quasi-functionalist perspective 
in which a compromised ritual, the public performance artwork, retains value for its 
capacity to renew the body and retrieve its materiality in spite of its being 
compromised.304 
Festivity and unproductive artistry 
Discussion of these works suggests the difficulty of thinking the radical 
possibilities of Lauren’s creative process of mourning apart from the artwork they 
produce, which itself, as Joseph Dewey notes, is ‘a narrow sort of reclamation that is 
for public consumption […] more for Lauren’s audience than for Lauren’.305 The 
creative process of self-transformation Lauren undergoes in the house manifests in 
ways which exceed the translation of mourning into art, and indeed fall outside the 
economy of both mourning and public consumption. After Body Time, for instance, 
Mr Tuttle becomes a form for resisting reintegration into everyday time, in particular 
for resisting the narrative incorporation of her loss of Rey into a journalistic tale of 
                                                 
302 Radia, p. 210. 
303 Radia, p. 210. 
304 This argument reflects a development of ideas present in Mark Osteen’s landmark 
monograph on DeLillo, which read DeLillo’s novels (prior to The Body Artist) as explorations 
of ritual purgation and renewal through forms that are complicit in the very structures they 
seek to transcend. American Magic and Dread: Don DeLillo’s Dialogue with Culture, Penn 
Studies in Contemporary American Fiction (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2000). 
305 Joseph Dewey, Beyond Grief and Nothing: A Reading of Don DeLillo (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2006), p. 133. 
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love, tragedy and redemption through art. This is made clear in Lauren’s retreat from 
her public identity when she meets for an interview with art critic and friend Mariella 
Chapman; during the interview, Chapman attempts to draw information about her life 
with Rey, ‘reminding her of the one time we spent together, the three of us, in Rome, 
when Rey showed up for dinner with a stray cat on his shoulder. The memory enters 
her eyes and she sags a bit. I want to blame the recording device sitting on the table. 
It’s an ergonomically smart four-inch-long, one-and-a-half-ounce, message-storing 
digital voice recorder, and this is the devil that makes me do it.’ (p. 108). 
Confronting the threat Lauren perceives in Chapman’s use of the same media 
technology, the tape recorder, which shaped her own self-transformation into Mr 
Tuttle and her encounter with Rey in Body Time, Lauren rejects this possibility of a 
story of redemption narrated by a sympathetic friend and instead adopts Mr Tuttle’s 
voice, frightening Chapman before abandoning the interview and disappearing. In this 
way Lauren confronts the loss of narrative agency that she has not yet recovered, 
resisting the appropriation of her experience of grief To bring these aspects of 
Lauren’s artistic production to light I appeal to Heidegger’s notion of ‘the festive’, a 
period of ‘commemorative thinking’, ‘remembrance’, ‘holiday’ or ‘holy mourning’ 
that stands outside a relationship to ‘work’ or ‘the habitual’, as discussed primarily in 
his writing on Hölderlin’s poetry. This makes it possible to think about the production 
of an artwork without interpreting the process of mourning as a teleological return to 
work itself, since the festival, as figured by Heidegger, is not solely a break from 
work, an arbeitpause (EHP, p. 102), but also the space where a different kind of work 
can happen. In this way it is possible to understand how Lauren’s artistry at the house 
shapes her recovery apart from the teleology of a return to public and profession life 
and performance. 
Heidegger describes the withdrawal from the routine of work and the 
everyday into another creative state as the ‘festive’. This does not necessarily signal 
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festivity in terms of celebration — in fact almost the opposite. The holiday that 
Heidegger describes stands outside this relationship to work, defined as ‘setting 
oneself outside everyday activity, the cessation of work’ (EHP, p. 97). The ‘cessation 
of work’ (‘das Ruhenlassen der Arbeit’) here is specifically the work of labour, 
arbeit. As Julian Young notes, for Heidegger the modern holiday, by contrast, is 
‘defined in relation to work’ and as such is limited to ‘rest and recreation’.306 
Conversely, Heidegger’s authentic, Greek holiday makes space for, and does not 
mean the end of, producing or creating. The opposition of this ‘festive’ state to the 
‘rest and recreation’ of the modern holiday creates the opportunity for the ‘inhabitual’ 
artistry that takes place during Lauren’s time at the seaside house.307 
Festive attunement through the ‘holy’ is, in this view, what makes Lauren 
able to attune to and contact Rey. As in Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin’s poetry, 
the capacity for artistry to think into the impossible by mourning the ‘holy’ is not 
wasted. In mourning the holy and seeking to gather what is sacred from her past into 
the present, Lauren achieves the festive state that enables her body artistry, 
culminating in the final scene of the novel that negotiates the prospect of a reunion 
with Rey. Lauren returns to the seaside house after her performance of Body Time, 
foregrounding the importance of this particular space to her recovery, when she 
reflects that she returned ‘because he’d said what he’d said, that she would be here in 
the end’ (p. 111). The seaside house is associated, in this way, with the possibility of 
release from the non-time of bereavement and recovery of a linear narrative 
temporality of meaningful beginnings and ends. At the same time, Lauren’s artistic 
transformation of time and body prepares for and makes possible a different ‘end’: a 
physical reunion with Rey in the bedroom where they had slept together and where 
                                                 
306 Young, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, p. 58. 
307 Heidegger does not view the artwork as a breakdown, but there is a significant parallel 
between breakdown as ethical moment and festive creation which emerges in this breaking-
out-of the everyday. 
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Lauren first found Mr Tuttle. Whilst Rey’s ‘living memory’ had resided, previously, 
in Lauren’s own body and in the corporeal figure of Mr Tuttle, at the close of the 
novel Lauren now senses Rey’s presence in the household space itself. Lauren ‘knew 
how it would happen’; ‘she’d return to the house and mount the stairs, past U-HAUL 
and AUTO PARTS, and walk along the hall on the second floor, in chanted motion, 
fitting herself to a body in the process of becoming hers’ (p. 121). Lauren feels ‘she 
was a fool, in this way and that’ (p. 121), for believing that Mr Tuttle was a figure of 
loss and of Rey, and not simply a vulnerable and aphasic man, but does not doubt 
Rey’s presence ‘in her room […] because that’s where Rey was intact, in his real 
body, smoke in his hair and clothes’ (p. 121). 
This encounter with Rey at the close of the novel is the culmination of a 
movement towards living memory pursued throughout the novel’s gathering of 
temporal elements, in Mr Tuttle and in Body Time, and the reunion takes place at the 
heart of a temporal ‘moment’ of dwelling where narrative and place coincide. Entry 
into the liminal reality of Lauren’s meeting with Rey repeats the logic of the artist 
overcoming time that we witnessed in Body Time where, as Lauren explains to 
Mariella Chapman, her intention was to ‘stop time, or stretch it out, or open it up’ 
completely (p. 107). Lauren sees the possibility of bringing this world into existence, 
allowing the ‘two real bodies in a room’ to materialise a new reality in which Rey did 
not die on that final morning. It is Lauren’s failure to recover the holy and gather the 
scared aspect of her past into unity with her present, that gives a glimpse of that unity 
as a narrative fiction, and that provides Lauren with a conception of artistic 
transcendence that resides precisely in the capacity to let things show up, in and 
through their unrecoverability, a mode of disclosure which typifies this festive 
attunement. 
Yet Lauren allows this narrative reunion to slip away in favour of a return to 
narrative time. She stops before entering the room, ‘at room’s edge, facing back into 
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the hall, and felt the emptiness around her’. What she now feels is not ‘them’, the two 
bodies in the room, but instead ‘she could feel the look on her face […] a frieze of 
false anticipation’. Lauren’s refusal of this fictional reunion with Rey is central to the 
novel’s position on the ethics of artwork and fiction, as this refusal to monumentalise 
Lauren’s suffering, to bring to reality Lauren’s imagined meeting through their use of 
Mr Tuttle, the Other that makes their physical communion possible, signals a refusal 
of the materialisation of aesthetics that Radia and Ingram – albeit quite differently – 
propose in their readings. 
It is my view that the performance of Body Time does not in itself prepare 
Lauren to relinquish the desire to find Rey ‘alive’ in their bedroom. As I will discuss 
below, this recovery depends on the return to a capacity for narration or storytelling 
so important in shaping the moment of dwelling narrated by Lauren’s consciousness 
in the novel’s opening chapter. Paradoxically Lauren’s autonomy depends both on the 
capacity to narrate, and to relate to this narrative as a fiction. The weaving of this 
fiction through the narrative interpretation of a lived environment and the possibilities 
for being that exist for the embodied dweller there is the shaping of dwelling itself. 
‘Being here’ and narrative recovery 
The final moments of Lauren’s recovery involve, without being reducible to, 
a recovery of the capacity for narrative interpretation and mediation. The 
disappearance of Mr Tuttle, a figure of mourning and the failure of narrative 
orientation in space and time, is central to this recovery. Indeed, whilst the criticism I 
have discussed centres around the corporeal gathering of temporal traces that Lauren 
achieves in Body Time, details from this period of isolation in the remote household 
suggest that transformations in Lauren’s embodied navigation of the environing world 
first constituted the existence of Mr Tuttle and now underpin Lauren’s recovery. 
Examining Lauren’s navigation of the physical environment, here, allows me to speak 
on the encounter with Mr Tuttle, and look forward to how Lauren relinquishes the 
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encounter she has with Rey at the close of the novel. Lauren’s recovery concurrently 
occurs through the establishment of a new relationship between narrative and the 
physical environment, and through the opening of a space for remembrance of Rey 
and Mr Tuttle such that their incorporeal presence persists in the lived environment to 
which Lauren opens her body in the closing moments of the novel. Conceiving 
Lauren’s movement from the ‘time of grief’ to a new, living time in this way 
proceeds by attending to the importance of the lived environment in shaping Lauren’s 
(narrative) recovery. 
Perception of the environment and narrative time 
In the non-place and non-time of mourning after Rey’s death, Lauren’s pays 
even closer attention to passing narrative time as it emerges in the relationship 
between her body and the surrounding space. When Lauren drops a paperclip, she 
narrates the experience as one of emerging into consciousness of what has happened. 
Lauren realises, ‘you’ve dropped something, you hear it hit the floor, belatedly’; ‘it 
takes a second or two before you know it and even then you know it only as a 
formless distortion in the teeming space around your body’ (p. 89). The formless 
disruption takes on the shape of a paperclip when it makes a sound, landing against 
the floor: ‘You hear the thing fall and know what it is at the same time, more or less, 
and it’s a paperclip’ (p. 89).With the arrival of this knowledge comes the belated 
realisation of having known all along: 
[y]ou know this from the sound it makes when it hits the floor and from the 
retrieved memory of the drop itself, the thing falling from your hand or 
slipping off the edge of the page to which it was clipped. It slipped off the 
edge of the page. Now that you know you dropped it, you remember how it 
happened, or half remember, or sort of see it maybe, or something else. The 
paperclip hits the floor with an end-to-end bounce, faint and weightless, a 
sound for which there is no imitative word, the sound of a paperclip falling, 
but when you bend to pick it up, it isn’t there. (pp. 89–90) 
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This scene, as di Prete rightly suggests, is one example of a moment when narrative 
contemplation enables Lauren to follow ‘the complicated journey to knowledge’ of 
Rey’s absence.308 From the perspective of trauma theory, as di Prete notes, ‘DeLillo’s 
word [“belatedly”] is crucial here’, inviting the reading of this scene as a navigation 
of ‘the distorted temporality that, in trauma, manifests itself as perceptual 
belatedness’.309 As di Prete rightly argues, the experience of belatedness shapes 
Lauren’s knowledge of Rey’s absence: 
DeLillo deliberately points to the distinctive way in which language can teach 
about the meaning of loss by carrying the subject to the place of such 
realization. The subject learns not that the paper clip is falling, or that it has 
just fallen, but rather that it had fallen in the past, and only its loss, its actual 
absence, belongs to the present. As a discovery, the fictitiousness of the 
second sound mirrors the image of Rey’s body in Lauren’s reverie. As the 
paper clip is not on the floor, Lauren becomes aware of the absence of Rey’s 
body in her traumatic re-enactment as well as in her life.310 
This reading explains the scene, as di Prete notes, as an ‘analogy’ for the recovery 
from traumatic repetition. An unresolved question remains, however: did the 
paperclip exist, or was it imagined, a projection of Lauren’s ‘hyper-aware’ 
consciousness (p. 16)? This issue cannot be resolved, clearly, as both the belated 
perception of the object and the realisation of its absence depend on Lauren’s 
embodied perception. In order to account for Lauren’s embodied navigation of the 
environment, it is equally important not to privilege the visual perception ‘it isn’t 
there’ (p. 89) over the bodily knowledge of the object’s presence, its ‘distortion of the 
teeming space around your body’ (p. 89). Ultimately, the sound Lauren perceives is 
inseparable from her projection that it must belong to a paperclip (‘you hear the thing 
                                                 
308 Laura Di Prete, ‘Don DeLillo’s The Body Artist : Performing the Body, Narrating 
Trauma’, Contemporary Literature, 46.3 (2005), 483–510 (p. 499) 
<https://doi.org/10.1353/cli.2005.0033>. 
309 Di Prete, pp. 499, 493. 
310 Di Prete, p. 499. 
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fall and you know what it is at the same time, more or less, and it’s a paperclip’ [p. 
89]), which in turn gives rise to the memory of the object, in the past, as what will 
have fallen from the table (‘Now that you know you dropped it, you remember how it 
happened, or half remember, or sort of see it maybe, or something else’ [p. 89]). As 
Sylvia Mieszkowski writes of this scene, ‘memory and perception collapse into each 
other, while they are both equally unreliable’.311 Put differently, despite the 
realisation that the paperclip ‘isn’t there’ (p. 89), Lauren’s bodily knowledge of its 
presence as a distortion of the space around her, remains. The unresolved location of 
the paperclip leaves open the possibility of coming to terms with the presence of an 
absent object, achieved through the creation of a new relationship between the body 
and its surrounding space. In this way, Lauren learns to negotiate the difference 
between memory and perception through bodily encounter with things in the house. 
There are other notable instances after Rey’s death when Lauren reflects on 
the way that phenomenological perception of the environment can give presence to 
fictional living entities, both of which can inform understanding of Lauren’s 
recovery, and of Mr Tuttle’s existence which informs this reading. In one, Lauren 
sees a man on a paint pot. In the other, she sees an animal in a burlap sack and in yet 
another, a bird at the window. In each example, Lauren’s reflections on the way that 
phenomenological perception of the environment can give presence to fictional living 
entities prepares for her encounter with, and relinquishing of, Rey (and Mr Tuttle) in 
the final pages of the novel. 
These examples demonstrate that Lauren and Mr Tuttle achieve their 
substantiality only in and as part of the secluded environment they navigate, and that 
                                                 
311 Sylvia Mieszkowski, Resonant Alterities: Sound, Desire and Anxiety in Non-Realist 
Fiction (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2014), p. 341. This critic offers a detailed and productive 
analysis of ‘the sound of (rather than in) the text’, and, more broadly an exploration of aural 
perception in The Body Artist, ‘what impact the production and perception of sound has on the 
(re)constitution of the protagonist’s gendered identity, desire, and subject status’. 
Miezskowski, pp. 301–364 (p. 301). 
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Mr Tuttle is like these fictional entities in that he exists only in Lauren’s projection 
and interpretation of the environment. The question of Mr Tuttle’s fictionality was an 
issue for Lauren as she was not able to navigate the environment narratively and was 
not able to reflect on her projections and the things and people, which instead 
remained held in the temporally stilled moment of their perceptual appearance and 
apprehension. Now, with the return of passing time, she realises that things are not 
what they ‘seem’: 
She looked and it was a bird, its flight line perfectly vertical, its streaked 
brown body horizontal, wings calmly stroking, a sparrow, not wind-hovering 
but generating lift and then instantly gone. 
She saw it mostly in retrospect because she didn’t know what she was seeing 
at first and had to re-create the ghostly moment, write it like a line in a piece 
of fiction, and maybe it wasn’t a sparrow at all but a smaller bird, gray and 
not brown and not spotted and not streaked but not as small as a 
hummingbird, and how would she ever know for sure unless it happened 
again, and even then, she thought, and even then again. 
It isn’t true because it can’t be true. Rey is not alive in this man’s 
consciousness or in his palpable verb tense, his walking talking continuum. 
(p. 91) 
Here Lauren’s realisation of the fiction of her perceptions depends on her retrieval of 
human narrative processes, both of recreating the moment (‘writing it like a line of 
fiction’), and more importantly, perhaps, of recognising its fictionality and the 
fleeting moment of an encounter that unfolded but cannot be recalled, restored or 
preserved. This process of navigating and renewing her own capacities for projection 
and interpretation in both narrative and non-narrative terms underpin both Lauren’s 
transformation into Mr Tuttle and her eventual recovery, shaping her final 
relinquishing of Rey’s ‘real’ existence in Mr Tuttle in favour of the lingering 
presence of his dwelling, the narrative of which she can only weave ‘like a line in a 
piece of fiction’ (p. 91). 
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(Narrative) recovery at the seaside home 
In the final scene of the novel, Lauren relinquishes the possibility of this 
physical encounter, acknowledging that the ‘room was empty all along’ before 
throwing open the window ‘to feel the flow of time in her body, to tell her who she 
was’. Stepping into that past reality — ‘she will already have been there’ — is now a 
temporal issue, one of positioning her body in that time by closing any gap between 
this reality and that, ‘a question of fitting herself into the moment’ (p. 122). On the 
margins of reality, a figure is there, ‘the pulse of every secret intimation you’ve ever 
felt around the edges of your life’ (p. 122), and Lauren and Rey ‘are two real bodies 
in a room’ (p. 122). Lauren ‘feels them’, and in this reality they have just had their 
breakfast on the final morning, only Rey did not leave afterwards, Lauren destroyed 
his keys and it was ‘the simplest thing in the world’ (p. 123). This scene of 
communion, ‘with hands that touch and rub and mouths that open slowly’ is 
negotiated temporally: ‘it is a question of fitting herself to the moment’, of straddling 
the temporal gap between the day of Rey’s death and the time of this scene. Months 
after Rey’s death, this gap has been reduced, through this gathering of memories, 
brought to life in Mr Tuttle and Lauren’s body, to smallest of temporal spaces, the 
‘slivered heart of the half second’ that opens the physical meeting between Lauren 
and Rey. As in the opening of the novel, the narration of the ‘final morning’, Lauren 
is gathered into a temporal moment, ‘slid[ing] into another reality’ (p. 114) 
constituted through Lauren allowing an imagined, ideal past into presence. 
No longer able to hold Mr Tuttle and Rey with her, Lauren ‘rocked down to 
the floor, backed against the doorpost. She went twistingly down, slowly, almost 
thoughtfully, and opened her mouth, oh, in a moan that remained unsounded’. This 
moan carries with it both the agony of mourning and a silently voiced realisation 
which marks Lauren’s belated understanding that ‘she’d known it was empty all 
along but was only catching up’ (p. 124). As in earlier scenes when Lauren is reading 
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the newspaper, observing birds through the window, or watching water run from a 
tap, the fleeting experience of presence, of ‘seeing as is for the first time’ is primarily 
captured retrospectively, glancingly, through Lauren’s narration that captures the 
fiction of unity and transcendence to ‘re-create the ghostly moment, write it like a line 
in a piece of fiction’ (p. 91). By creating and sustaining an open space for Rey’s 
return and allowing her irretrievable past into the house, Lauren produces a narrative 
of their encounter that preserves Rey in the world around her. Yet, as with Lauren’s 
communication with people she encounters in the newspaper before Rey’s death, this 
moment of transcendence and communion with Rey that Lauren edges into is also a 
displacement from the present. This moment of ‘wonder’, gives way to shame as 
Lauren realises, retrospectively, that the room is empty: ‘it was pathetic to look’ in 
the room, where ‘the bed was empty. She’d known it was empty all along but was 
only catching up’ (p. 124). Lauren’s exposure arrived finally through an admission of 
the impossibility of bringing memories of the dead to life, even as those dead 
memories are becoming living memories in the event of Lauren’s imagined encounter 
with Rey. Lauren is then exposed to ‘the flow of time in her body, to tell her who she 
was’. The other reality that is carried in the temporal opening constituted by Lauren’s 
artistry, the ‘slivered heart of the half second’ where the body caresses and opens 
space, allows an opening to otherness that resides in the internal divisions of the self. 
Lauren’s realisation of her ongoing relationship with the Other provides the security 
for the release from grief that she experiences in this scene, for instance when she 
reflects that ‘her mother died when she was nine. It wasn’t her fault. It had nothing to 
do with her’. Even as Lauren relinquishes the possibility of a physical communion 
with Rey, the experience of transcendence persists, bringing with it the knowledge of 
Lauren’s intersubjectivity, held open in Lauren’s retrieval of a world where the 




In DeLillo’s 9/11 novel, Falling Man (2003), as both Richard Gray and Pieter 
Vermeulen have argued, the domestic stands as a container for the trauma of the 9/11 
attacks, driving their psychological effects into confinement and so precluding 
reflection on their transformational impact. In Vermeulen’s terms, the ‘ashes [of 9/11] 
are gathered into the domestic domain […] domestic trauma is a foreclosure of the 
global dimensions of the affective and political changes that the events of 9/11 have 
unleashed’.312 I have sought to demonstrate in this chapter that this movement of 
gathering, the return ‘home’ and to the domestic, does not have the same effect of 
foreclosing the ruptures incurred by traumatic loss.313 It is clear that The Body Artist 
resists characterisation as a domestic trauma narrative primarily due to the radical 
disruption of domesticity in the novel. Yet, this radicalisation does not render the 
‘homely’ environment dispensable. Instead, home, the remembrance of and dwelling 
in that place, shapes a radical and intimate exploration, and transformation of, 
subjectivity in the secluded encounter between Lauren and the mysterious Mr Tuttle. 
The dynamics of Lauren’s recovery in The Body Artist involve the emergence 
of an awareness that the return to dwelling unfolds not simply through capturing and 
distilling moments in the unfolding of being, but through taking over the possibilities 
that these moments open for the self and incorporating them into an orientation 
towards the future. The opening scene depicting the ‘final morning’ represents, as 
Peter Boxall points out, a series of ‘moments of being’, and distils these above all as 
markers of subjective individuation; Body Time, for its part, is the culmination of 
Lauren’s ability to incorporate and perform such moments of (subjective) being — 
first expressed in Mr Tuttle — and so, as Ingram has observed, to give expression to 
                                                 
312 Pieter Vermeulen, ‘Don DeLillo’s Point Omega, the Anthropocene, and the Scales of 
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different possibilities for existence.314 However, as I have argued, it is only through 
incorporating these moments into narrative that Lauren is able recover her orientation 
in passing time. Peter Boxall’s observation that, for Lauren Hartke, ‘[d]welling in the 
moment involves, always, an estrangement from the moment’ (Boxall, p. 218) 
captures this movement most usefully, in particular for the way it suggests that 
capturing the moment itself precludes the unfolding of dwelling. Ultimately, it is 
through recapturing the power of narration, figured here as the ability to allow these 
moments to pass into narrative, ‘like a line of fiction’ (p. 91), that Lauren achieves 
autonomy over her being at the close of the novel. Paradoxically, through recovering 
this capacity for narration, Lauren is able to relinquish the ‘fiction’ of Rey’s living 
presence. As I have shown, it is remembrance, of and in place, and a return home in 
this novel that primarily makes possible this recuperation of narrative interpretation: 
through a process of interpretative gathering that unfolds in this place, Lauren is able 
to relinquish the atemporal moment of Mr Tuttle’s thinging and allow his presence, 
and Rey’s, to be gathered into the environment and into a movement of dwelling 
amongst things. 
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Any reader turning from Being and Time’s fundamental anthropology of 
Dasein to Heidegger’s late work ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ will be struck by the 
transformation in the form of life they encounter there. In Being and Time, the 
‘authentic’ self is, above all, ‘resolute’ — a figure which takes on its socially 
embedded possibilities for being with ownership and resolve. For instance, in that text 
Heidegger writes that: ‘It is from the authentic being a self of resoluteness that 
authentic being-with-one-another first arises, not from ambiguous and jealous 
stipulations and talkative fraternizing in the they and in what one wants to undertake’ 
(BT, p. 285). In this work awareness of ‘not-being-at-home’, as the authentic 
condition of Dasein, and the fundamental attunement of anxiety that precedes it, is 
infinitely preferable to the ‘tranquilized self-assurance’ of ‘everyday publicness’ (BT, 
p. 182). Dasein, here, is a figure which above all attains to its essential nature when it 
gathers itself together, confronting its fundamental mortality and protecting against 
the ever-present threat of dispersion into everyday, inauthentic concerns. 
In the essays on dwelling in the collection Poetry, Language, Thought, 
Heidegger imagines a human figure, by contrast, that attains to its mortality not 
through a resolute confrontation with the abyssal ground of its being, but through its 
binding into the simple oneness of the fourfold. In this ‘mirror-play’ of earth, sky, 
divinities and mortals, each element attains to its essential nature. Rather than 
gathering itself, the human figure is gathered together by its relation to the ‘locations’ 
and ‘things’ through which this gathering unfolds (BDT, p. 155). In dwelling, their 
place in the fourfold reflects an essential openness and entanglement into the 
environing world. For Heidegger, this signals a proximity to Being, ‘in keeping with 
which mortals exist’ (BDT, p. 158), but in more everyday terms, it is possible to 
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understand this ‘round dance’ (BDT, p. 180) of dwelling as the movement between 
these elements that unfolds both in life and in death.  
As such, the movement towards a conception of human being as dwelling in 
Heidegger’s thought centres, as Julian Young notes, around a radical change: 
‘ontological insecurity, understood as the heart of human being, has been transformed 
into ontological security’.315 And, in this way, what Young has called Heidegger’s 
‘gradual, but radical, reappraisal of the character of “the nothing”’ in his later 
writings gives shape to a radical change in the character of the human figure.316  
Importantly, it is artworks like Van Gogh’s painting of shoes, and Friedrich 
Hölderlin’s and Rainer Maria Rilke’s poetry, that enabled Heidegger to articulate this 
conception of ontological security through their aesthetic revealing of dwelling as a 
mode of being. As with Heidegger’s discussion of the peasant shoes in ‘The Origin of 
the Work of Art’, the abyssal ‘nothing’ that forms the background of everyday 
existence comes to take on a positive quality in these artworks that enables Heidegger 
to rethink our relationship to death. In ‘What Are Poets For?’, for instance, Heidegger 
turns to Rilke’s poetic description of the dark and lighted sides of moon as an 
aesthetic expression of the ‘globe of being’ (WPF, p. 121). Through this aesthetic 
formulation, Heidegger is able to express his conception of death not as an abyssal 
nothing but as an unthought dimension of our being: ‘[d]eath and the realm of the 
dead belong to the whole of beings as its other side’ (WPF, p. 122).  
In sum, in these writings Heidegger demonstrates how artworks attend to, and 
reveal for contemplation, dimensions of our existence that we tend to turn away from 
both in everyday life and in our everyday experience of artworks. Put simply, 
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Heidegger’s later works on art and poetry also facilitate his reinterpretation of the 
fundamental anthropology of Being and Time. In a certain, although not too literal 
sense, a similar movement through aesthetic exploration of anthropological premises 
can be seen to organise my interpretation of the novels discussed in this thesis. In 
other words, each chapter has taken as it starting point an aspect of human 
worldliness that emerges in Heidegger’s thought — our attunements or relation to 
technology, and our fundamental entanglement with narrative — and addressed its 
exploration in the aesthetic and formal experimentation of contemporary fiction 
writers. Whilst these dimensions of worldliness are central to Heidegger’s writings on 
the search, and possibility, of dwelling, I have argued that in each case these concerns 
are mobilised in the novels themselves. 
As indivisibly anthropological and aesthetic concerns, human attunements, 
entanglements with technologies and with narratives offer a starting point for each 
writer to reflexively explore the relation between the human life they seek to narrate 
and the novel form. As such whilst my readings were inspired, in part, by this turn to 
poetry and artworks in Heidegger’s thought, I have argued that the aesthetic and 
formal assessments of anthropological premises discussed in this thesis are internal to 
each of the writers’ works addressed here. Where Heidegger saw in art, technology 
and poetic attunement a ‘saving power [that] lets man see and enter into the highest 
dignity of his essence’ (QCT, p. 32), the novels that I have discussed here offer a 
condensed negotiation between anthropological interpolations of the human that open 
their narratives and the capacities of their form to respond and accommodate the life 
that inhabits it. Dwelling offered something of a conceptual nexus for addressing 
these novelistic explorations in the thesis, but also gives name to the possibilities for 
inhabiting the novel form explored in each novel. 
Significantly, as discussed in each chapter and above, each novel (or pair of 
novels, as in the case of Chapter 2) discussed in the thesis introduces its particular 
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aesthetic concerns through the instantiation of new or altered modes of human life at 
the beginnings of their novels. White Teeth, for instance, opens with a suicide crisis 
announcing not only the emergence of a new mode of life that will inhabit the novel 
form, but also the characterisation of this mode of life in terms of attunement and its 
ecstatic temporality. In Remainder, a mode of Being more fundamental than the 
feeling of detachment the narrator suffers after his accident is held up as an elusive 
goal. In The Body Artist, the narratively mediated form of worldly belonging that 
opens the novel is irrevocably ruptured to create a new search for dwelling that tests 
the limits of our attachment to narrative forms. In each novel, these traumatic 
beginnings open possibilities for new modes of existence by rupturing both 
psychological interiority, as in White Teeth and Remainder, or creating subjects with 
a new relationship to language, most explicit in The Body Artist but also at work in 
the Smith’s and McCarthy’s novels discussed here.  
In the technological modernity that Heidegger was concerned with, in 
particular, the disruptive threat of trauma presents itself, as John Roberts notes, ‘an 
epistemological limit that threatens to reveal the partiality of its ontological mode of 
disclosure, that of Gestell, or enframing […] ‘trauma potentially liberates the subject 
from the restraints of representational thought’.317 As such it is quite possible to 
suggest that the premise of the search for dwelling in each novel is not an interest in 
novel form and the dwelling of human life in the novel, but what Roberts calls the 
‘traumatic ontology of the modern subject’, something that is certainly implicit in 
each of the novels discussed here. 
Whilst this view supports my reading of Remainder in particular, I have 
resisted reading any of these beginnings through the lens of trauma theory; in part 
because, as Zadie Smith’s White Teeth suggests, all subjects in modernity begin their 
                                                 
317  Roberts, p. 300. 
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search for dwelling on the ground of the traumatic legacies of the twentieth century. 
Furthermore, whilst trauma makes possible the break out of familiar representational 
modes, in each novel, it remains, necessarily only a starting point: by definition, 
trauma is unintelligible, or is intelligible only in its explanation as trauma. Rather, the 
threat that trauma poses to psychological interiority, our relationship to language and 
to technologies of writing we are indivisibly attached to, provides a background 
which ‘supports the revealing or unconcealment of modern reflexivity, agency and 
biographical selfhood’ in each writer addressed here.318 In this sense, trauma 
supports, but is secondary to, the search for dwelling in these novels. Reading each of 
the novels addressed here in relation to the question of dwelling, furthermore, allowed 
me to attend to the specific dimensions of reflexivity, agency and selfhood as they 
present in each writers’ works.  
As such, in each chapter, the ‘search for dwelling’ served not to reveal the 
traumatic underpinnings of the modern subject, but instead to reveal certain aesthetic 
dimensions that underpin the existence of human life in the novel form. In this sense, 
it is the aesthetic and formal background to ‘life’ in the novel that I have sought to 
attend to, and argued that these contemporary writers are likewise concerned with 
bringing into view. 
It is also perhaps possible to assess the relative achievements of the thesis as a 
whole. Firstly, I hope to have demonstrated that approaching fiction with a ‘dwelling 
perspective’ can not only lead to original readings of works by significant 
contemporary authors, but can expand critical viewpoints on contemporary writing in 
which attachments to particular locations, architectures, things, houses, towns, 
neighbourhoods or postcodes are in productive tension with the experience of ‘not 
being at home in the world, including the world of language’.319 In this particular 
                                                 
318 Roberts, p. 315. 
319 Spurr, p. x.  
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moment in contemporary fiction which I have been concerned with elucidating here, 
the characters’ attachments to lived environments and architectures is allowed to 
speak for their attachment to the novel form – its moods, its narrative 
spatiotemporality, and its existence as a technology of writing. To be more precise 
still, the act of dwelling in these environments achieves what Timothy Bewes argues 
is distinctively contemporary about contemporary fiction: ‘it is primarily ontological; 
it defines the very world that opens itself up for presentation and can no longer be 
reduced to a mere consequence of the act of representation’.320 
I conclude by noting that the thesis makes a modest, but potentially 
significant, contribution to the developing interest in Heidegger’s writings on 
dwelling in the fields on novel criticism and theory. Heidegger’s privileging of 
ontology over ethics perhaps explains his absence from the list of influences that 
Dorothy Hale cites in her discussion of new ethical theory of the novel: Emmanuel 
Levinas, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, and Alain Badiou. 
Yet, Heidegger’s presence in the background of these philosophers’ work has never 
been in doubt, and his work has in turn influenced the work of ‘new ethicists’ like 
Judith Butler in diffuse and diverse ways. That critical approaches like this thesis, 
which address Heidegger and the novel, and dwelling and the novel in particular, are 
only now beginning to emerge, is perhaps to be expected: the rich and highly original 
interpretations of the aesthetic dimensions of the poetry and artworks in Heidegger’s 
writings will be increasingly productive for novel theory and criticism as it relocates 
the ethical in texts’ diverse ontological dimensions.  
Each chapter of the thesis also sought to make Heidegger’s writings on 
dwelling ‘speak’ to the field of contemporary literary criticism. In Chapter 1, I 
suggested that Heidegger’s writings on Stimmung serve to reveal the ethical 
                                                 
320 Timothy Bewes, ‘Introduction: Temporalizing the Present’, NOVEL A Forum on Fiction, 
45.2 (2012), 159–64 (p. 160) <https://doi.org/10.1215/00295132-1573913>. 
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dimensions of attunement in Zadie Smith’s White Teeth, a novel that might be 
overlooked by more traditional ethical criticism. As I have suggested, attunements 
dispose characters towards the world in ways that serve to reveal that world for 
readers. For some ethically-minded critics, the value of attention to characterological 
attunement might lie in a more nuanced understanding of the encounter with alterity 
that unfolds in the process of reading.  
As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, a growing body of criticism 
now seeks to approach the question of ethics and politics in the novel through the 
affective, aesthetic and formal dimensions of texts, in a turn away from the traditional 
ethical focus on the encounter with a social other in the novel. In Chapter 3, I sought 
to position my work on dwelling in relation to this criticism, and so to demonstrate 
how Heidegger’s thought can contribute to theoretically-oriented discussions of the 
contemporary novel. In that chapter, again, I suggested that novelists are rethinking 
the function of their characters as figures who, in their search for dwelling, reveal the 
ontological dimensions of their worlds. Dwelling in turn offers a thematic for 
thinking through the complex ontological binds that these formal and aesthetic 
dimensions place characters in. 
Ben Masters, one of the neo-formalist proponents of this new critical 
generation (a side of which was represented in particular in this thesis by Namwali 
Serpell’s work on narrative ‘modes’) describes his approach as attending to ‘how 
ethics is felt and realized through a text’s stylistic performativity’. As critics 
increasingly turn to the ethics of style and form, they may benefit from the attempt, in 
this thesis, to think in more depth about the way in which character is itself generative 
of the novel’s aesthetic and stylistic dimensions.  
The final chapter of this thesis, on The Body Artist, demonstrated the 
strongest example of an instance of dwelling in the novel and brought together key 
theoretical strands of the thesis – attunement, technology and narrative. In particular 
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this chapter sought to theorise and foreground the spatial qualities of narrative 
dwelling. By demonstrating that the central encounter with alterity in the novel 
unfolds in and through dwelling in a particular place, this chapter gestured, albeit 
indirectly, to the potential for developing an ontologically sensitive ethics of dwelling 
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